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The U.S. Government's Global Hunger & Food Security Initiative

CONFLICT AND CLIMATE ANALYSIS REPORT

MANDERA CLUSTER

Cross border peace meeting between the Malkamari of Kenya and Somalia for strengthening peace and security.

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FOREWORD

The Mandera cluster, consisting of the borderlands of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, is susceptible to conflict and climate risks that undermine the capacities of the populations therein to lead fruitful lives. This conflict and climate assessment has been produced within the context of the Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity in order to provide the technical evidence base for the Activity's conflict sensitivity programming.

As such, the assessment identifies the main conflict and climate trends in the Mandera cluster, together with the drivers and dynamics of the conflicts and climate risks, and opportunities for promoting social cohesion and climate risk adaptation. The aim is to obtain evidence for coming up with social cohesion projects in this conflict prone zone, while adhering to conflict sensitivity when designing interventions across the cross-border area. At the same time, the climate assessment explores the common and differentiated climate risks across the cluster, the impacts of climate change on different groups, formal and informal mechanisms for addressing such impacts, the barriers as well as opportunities for climate risks mitigation.

The CBCR Activity's overall ambitions of enhancing resilience among the Mandera cross-border communities, and thus reducing the need for humanitarian assistance cannot be achieved without the critical input of conflict and climate sensitive programming. It is therefore important that the CBCR implementing partners and other like-minded organizations, take into account the evidence laid out in this assessment in their programming.

Jebiwot Sumbeiywo, Chief of Party (CoP),

Cross Border Community Resilience Activity (CBCR).

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ACRONYMS

ASAL	Arid and Semi-Arid Land
AS	Al-Shabaab
ATMIS	African Transition Mission in Somalia
CREW	Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiative
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CBCR	Cross-Border Conflict and Climate Analysis
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EWS	Early Warning Systems
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FGD	Focused Group Discussion
FMS	Federal Member States
GHACOF	Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ICPAC	IGAD'S Climate Prediction and Applications Centre
ICBT	Informal Cross-Border Trade
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KII	Key Informant Interview
NCCRS	National Climate Change Response Strategy
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
RACIDA	Rural Agency for Community Development and Assistance
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
KMD	Kenya Meteorological Department
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NEMA	National Environmental Management Authority
RRC	Risk Reduction Committee
WARMA	Water Resource Management Authority
NCCAP	National Climate Change Action Plan
NDC	National Determined Coordination

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides the conflict and climate assessment for the Mandera cluster to establish the technical evidence base for identifying the significant trends, dynamics, and drivers of the two related phenomena. It also notes the opportunities for advancing social cohesion and climate risk adaptation initiatives. Hence, the assessment will inform gender-responsive climate adaptation and resilience interventions to be implemented by the Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity.

The study applied qualitative methodology comprising desk literature review, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and field observations. The data from all these sources were triangulated to achieve the study objectives and adequately address the study questions. The study was conducted in pre-selected locations, including Rhamu, Banisa, Lafey, and Mandera towns in Kenya; Dolo Ado in Ethiopia; and Belethawa and Dolow districts in Gedo, Somalia. The locations were selected in consultation with the CBCR Activity due to their accessibility, security situation, and influence on the triangle. Two hundred twenty-two respondents, 144 (65%) male and 78 (35%) female, were involved in this study.

In the Mandera triangle, informal cross-border trade, pastoralism, and agro-pastoralism are the communities' primary sources of economic and livelihood opportunities. While the livestock sector plays a critical economic and socio-cultural role, its production system is vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and women are at the periphery of the value chain. The limited livelihood opportunities are compounded by increased land degradation, inadequate community participation in decision-making, lack of appropriate frameworks for local-level resource management, and capacity gaps among the key stakeholders at both community and government levels.

There has been active conflict in the Mandera triangle. The main cross-border conflict incidents are clan tensions and fights, terrorism, random attacks and killings resulting from inadequate resources (grazing land and water points for livestock and domestic use), and political rivalry. Overall, the cluster experiences intersections of conflict along social (clan and sub-clans) and political fault lines (contests for power and territory).

Conflicts in the cluster involve multiple interconnected parties, who may form alliances or influence each other during the conflicts. While it is clear that the various types of conflict in the cluster are caused, in part, by the same drivers, the interconnectedness among them (drivers), together with their influence on each other, make a clear thematic separation difficult. Yet still, it is clear that some of the major conflict trends include clan rivalries and violent extremism, both of which assume regional dimensions. Clan elders, civil society organizations (CSOs), women, youth, and religious leaders are some of the enablers of peace in the Mandera triangle's conflicts.

The main conflict fault lines in Somalia's Gedo region are the weak central government and political tensions. Political tensions have become a center for political conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the Jubaland administration, and power struggles within the more prominent Marehan clan. Moreover, intra/inter-clan conflicts are rampant, primarily because of political and economic influence, limited natural resources, and business opportunities. Political supremacy between the different levels of governance in Somalia has challenged the possibilities of effective resource allocation to the people, with implications of fueling inter-communal conflicts.

The Al-Shabaab infiltration poses significant threats in Kenya's Mandera County, which has a long porous and ungoverned space shared with the Gedo region of Somalia. Moreover, the conflicts in Gedo occasionally spill into the Kenyan side of the cluster, causing tensions among communities, the influx of refugees, and the destruction of properties within Mandera County. In addition, inter-clan conflicts

between the Gedo and the Degodia, political competition and quests for territorial control, and competition for scarce pasture and water resources are primary causes of conflict and tensions in the county. While the practice of negotiated democracy and the recently devolved system of governance have made things better over the years, some minority clans have been excluded from these political settlements, hence the persistence of group conflicts.

The conflict between the FGS and the Jubaland administration also affects the Ethiopian side of the cross-border cluster. Ethiopian forces are stationed along the border between Gedo and the Liben region to aid the Somalian forces against the Jubaland forces. The Ethiopian side of the cluster has also experienced the presence of Al-Shabaab, whose influence in parts of the region breeds tension and insecurity, revealing the region's peace and stability fragility.

Ethiopia's Dolo Ado is home to a large number of Somali refugees, the majority of whom have fled the South West State (SWS), the traditional homeland of the Digil and Mirifle clans. Refugees and their hosts share a cultural and racial identity, and facilities such as slaughterhouses and water points. Most host communities believe that the refugee camps' socioeconomic benefits outweigh their adverse effects, such as deforestation.

In addition to conflict, the Mandera triangle is prone to climate risks, including prolonged droughts. The area has hot temperatures and low average rainfall. Evapotranspiration often doubles annual rainfall and can exceed ten times in some regions. The environment is particularly vulnerable since it is subject to a wide variety of outside and inside factors, such as competition over land and watering points, unplanned settlements, and deforestation, which have already caused significant degradation and depletion of the cluster's natural resource base. In addition, the cluster has recently experienced floods and locust invasions that have exacerbated its vulnerabilities. Herders have, therefore, formed complex social alliances to survive droughts, floods, and other climate-induced vulnerabilities.

Climate change amplifies economic, social, and political risks driving the violence. Climate change may also amplify conflict risks, threatening peace and stability, by causing pastoralist migration in search of scarce water and pasture resources.

The study also identified resources for peace and climate change adaptation in the Mandera cluster. These include clan elders who are often seen as connectors and indispensable actors to any peace and climate change adaptation processes in the region, and CSOs, including youth and women's groups (such as Mandera Women for Peace and Balad Xaawo Women for Peace), and the Interfaith Dialogue in Mandera. Women were specifically described as "the glue" that binds and grips clans, including those in conflict. In addition, religious leaders, government agencies, the business community, community-based organizations (CBOs), local peace committees, and local leadership were not left out as key influencers of peace and climate change adaptation in the cluster.

The following recommendations are proposed based on the outcome of this conflict and climate assessment.

Conflict

- **Establish regular coordination mechanisms**: The CBCR Activity should help create a linkage between formal and informal justice systems to ensure information sharing among legal authorities, community structures, community organizations, and support service providers to foster coordination for referrals, understand gaps and barriers, and facilitate cooperative solutions to unmet justice needs in the triangle.

- Leverage support for **gender-responsive advocacy and initiatives** for peace in the Mandera cluster.
- **Design context specific capacity-building training** for local CSOs, local leaders, media, business leaders, and government officials.
- **Strengthen local governance capacities**: The interplay of risk and resilience factors in driving clan conflict and violent extremism occurs at the local level. For this reason, building the capacities of local governance structures in addressing these factors is critical.
- **Incorporate gender perspectives and involve women as agents of change in peace building initiatives**: The consultation and participation of women in conflict resolution mechanisms must be ensured, and the role of women's groups and networks strengthened at all levels (community, sub-county/district, county/district, national, regional).
- **Strengthen interlinkages** among the county/national/state governments, non-state actors, and community structures such as conflict committees, elders, and religious leaders to respond to tensions and emerging threats to community cohesion.
- Strengthen the capacity of the local administrations, county/district peace committees and council of elders in mediation, conflict transformation and early warning and response mechanisms.
- **Learn from, and improve existing traditional dispute settlement mechanisms**, such as the council of elders from the Garre community, the Wabar (traditional king) from the Degodia, and other elders from the different communities in the cluster. The CBCR Activity should learn from where such informal mechanisms are functioning well. They may help prevent and mitigate conflicts by offering peaceful dispute resolution, and reducing opportunities for armed opposition groups such as Al-Shabaab to exploit local disputes or grievances against the government or communities.
- Support and **strengthen cross-border community awareness and knowledge** on effects of conflicts and climate change.

Climate Change

- **Develop awareness raising, education, and training on climate change and environment**: Sharing knowledge and raising awareness of climate adaptation technologies is one of the significant drivers of transferring climate technologies.
- **Support the diversification of resilient livelihood strategies**: The CBCR Activity should promote gender-responsive and sustainable land and natural resource management to help build resilience among vulnerable populations, particularly those impacted by climate change and variability.
- Build a **harmonized data analysis and information dissemination platform** to help enhance knowledge and information sharing on cross-border disasters.
- **Promote and develop climate change adaptation strategies** that consider important household characteristics and extension service provisions as they affect the adoption of the strategies significantly.
- **Set up information channels and databases** that enable the analyses of climate change and adaptation and mitigation strategies at local levels.
- Governmental and non-governmental organizations should work closely to enhance the adaptive capacity of the local communities to climate variability and adaptation.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Mandera cluster, a region in East Africa, is roughly a triangle territory that comprises the Gedo region of Somalia, the Mandera County of Kenya, and the Dolo Ado region of Ethiopia. Agro-pastoral livelihoods and ways of life predominate the area[1]. Cross-border trade, particularly in livestock, grains, electronics, clothing, and consumer products, is also a significant economic activity within the cluster. Through the Somalia ports, the market chain extends to Kenya, Somalia, and the Gulf countries[2].

While the livestock sector plays a critical economic and socio-cultural role in the cluster, the livestock production system is vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Unpredictable weather variations and prolonged droughts have led to a scarcity of water and pasture. These challenges often result in inter-ethnic clashes and conflicts as communities jostle for these scarce yet critical resources. At the same time, armed conflict and violent events aggravate climate risks, as growing climate risks endanger lives and exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities and inequities, societal fragility, and environmental degradation.

In recent years, there has been a growing concern about climate change as a security issue, with fears that climate change could spark a slew of conflicts[3]. Scientists generally agree that climate change does not directly cause armed conflict, but it might indirectly increase the likelihood of conflict by aggravating factors that can ultimately lead to conflict. These include disputes over resources, social marginalization, degradation, and economic and environmental risks[4]. In other words, climate change is a vulnerability multiplier. People, communities, and states affected by armed conflict are vulnerable to climate disruptions. This is because conflicts damage assets needed to manage shocks and adapt to climate change, such as infrastructure, markets, institutions, social capital, and livelihoods. In some cases, it impairs collective action, which is key to adaptation (for example, managing resources in agreed ways).

As a result of adaptation to climate change and informal cross-border trade, small towns and communities have sprouted across the borderlands, particularly along the Kenya-Somalia border. The majority of these towns and localities are close to one another, making it difficult to monitor cross-border migration, such as in Beledhawa and Mandera. However, residents on each side of the border are connected and benefit from each other's government and social services, including livestock marketplaces, slaughterhouses, schools, hospitals, and airstrips[5].

Due to the fact that the Kenya–Ethiopia–Somalia border has long been vulnerable to recurrent external stresses, human catastrophes, droughts, hunger, and unemployment, cross-border interactions are crucial to the population's survival abilities. As such, the Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity, a five-year project financed by USAID and implemented by Chemonics International, is designed to enhance resilience, and thus reduce the need for humanitarian assistance among

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[1] Danish Refugee Council, 'Building opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia, DRC: Baseline survey report,' July 2018, https://boreshahoa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/baseline-survey-final-report.pdf (Accessed 10 January 2023).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Selby, J. Omar S. Dashi, Christiane Fröhlich and Mike Hulme. 'Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited. *Political Geography*, 60 (2017): 232-244.

[4] Katie Peters and Leigh Mayhew, 'Double vulnerability: The humanitarian implications of intersecting climate and conflict risk,' March 2019, https://odi.org/en/publications/double-vulnerability-the-humanitarian-implications-of-intersecting-climate-and-conflict-risk/ (accessed 10 January 2023)

[5] European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, '2021 Annual Report,' 2022, https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/2021/05/20/borderlands-mandera/ (accessed 2 January 2023).

communities in cross-border clusters such as Mandera. In addition, the activity aims to empower local entities, including communities, civil society, the private sector, and governments, to chart their pathways for addressing conflict, improving livelihoods and/or reducing the risks of shocks and stresses. Towards these ends, the CBCR Activity commissioned this conflict and climate assessment to establish the technical evidence base for identifying the central conflict and climate trends, dynamics, drivers, and opportunities for advancing social cohesion and climate risk adaptation initiatives in the Mandera cluster.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

This conflict and climate analysis report is organized into five sections. After this introduction, the second section describes the methodology applied in undertaking this assessment, and the challenges faced during the data collection processes.

The key findings of the Mandera conflict and climate assessment are presented in the following section. It first sets the scene by offering a snapshot of the triangle's conflict context. This is followed by discussions of the causes of conflicts, conflict actors, conflict trends, conflict spoilers, and capacities for peace in the cluster. It also describes the differential impacts of cluster conflicts on gender, including the related hazards, gender and social dimensions of climate vulnerabilities, management of climate risks in traditional and non-traditional initiatives, and challenges the triangle faces in addressing these hazards.

The fourth section concludes the report and gives recommendations. Finally, questionnaires and a map of the study locations are annexed to this report.

2. METHODOLOGY

To undertake the assessment, the research team adopted a qualitative and participatory approach that comprised desk literature review, key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and field observations. The study was conducted in pre-selected study sites, including Rhamu, Banisa, Lafey, and Mandera town in Kenya; Dolo Ado in Ethiopia; and Belethawa and Dolow districts in Somalia. The sites were selected due to their accessibility and security situation, balance of different clan habitations, and severity of drought.

2.1 USAID CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

To better understand conflict and climate risk in the Mandera cluster, the conflict assessment utilized the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework. This is an analytical tool that is meant to assist teams to assess conflict situations, and prepare systematically and collaboratively for interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization[6].

In accordance with USAID's conflict assessment guide, the research team conducted the conflict assessment in two phases:

1. **Diagnosis** – This entailed examining the political, economic, social, and security factors at play in the Mandera cluster context, with a focus on core grievances and resilience; analysis of how key actors mobilize grievance and resilience to drive or mitigate conflict; forecasting how these dynamics and related trends may evolve in the future; and anticipating potential triggers and turning points.
2. **Formulation of response recommendations** – This entailed an analysis of anticipated programming to determine programming gaps and options in relation to conflict dynamics.

For the climate assessment, the focus was on the fundamental climate risks to identify the sudden and slow onset of hazards, socio-economic causes and effects, and gendered dimensions of climate risks in the cluster. These informed recommendations on anticipated programming to mitigate climate risks.

2.2 GENDER ANALYSIS

For gender related conflict and climate analysis, the following domains were applied for analysis:

a) Access to resources (who has what? who can use what?): The capacity to use the resources necessary to be a fully active and productive participant (socially, economically, and politically) in society, or within the project activities. Resources may include income, credit services, employment, property, assets, land, natural resources, agricultural inputs, education, knowledge, skills and information, as well as social support networks.

b) Norms (socio-cultural), values, beliefs, and perceptions: who knows what? Which beliefs shape gender identities and behavior? (Often due to their gender-based roles and responsibilities); How are values defined within the project target group?

c) Legal and policy context (laws, legal rights, policies, and institutions): how gender roles affect the way people are regarded and treated by both customary law and the formal legal code and judicial system.

d) Power and patterns of decision making: who decides? why? (within each of the above domains); how is power negotiated and changed?

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[6] United States Agency for International Development, 'Conflict Assessment Framework: Application Guide,' June 2012, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADY740.pdf (accessed 10 January 2023).

2.3 DATA COLLECTION

The scope of the primary data collection was to gather insights from key stakeholders on the context of conflicts in the Mandera triangle and how climate change may impact them. The composition of the research assistants was gender balanced, in order to ensure that both women and men felt comfortable in participating and sharing their views.

Drafts of the KII and FGD discussion guides were developed in English, translated into Somali, and pre-tested in the field sites. The guides were administered to the respondents in Borana and Somali languages in some of the locations, especially in Belethawa, Somalia and Dolow, Ethiopia. At Dolo Ado and Moyale, the assessment was guided by two sets of interrelated interview guides which are annexed to this report.

The research team conducted face-to-face KIIs with local authorities and administration, local NGO staff, officials from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), traditional leaders/clan elders, and key community sector group leaders, such as women and religious leaders. The data collection process was participatory and included marginalized groups like women, youth, and persons living with disabilities.

Throughout the study period, the research team conducted a desk-review of literature, including reports from governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic articles, and online sources.

The study adopted purposive sampling techniques due to clan dynamics of the social groups, location variations, and a need for categorization of the study respondents across gender, age, and occupation. The data collection took place from August 26 – September 12, 2022.

A total of 222 respondents (144 (65%) male and 78 (35%) female) participated in the study through 54 KIIs and 24 FGDs in each of the study locations.

Government officials, representatives from local development organizations and drought management authorities, community leaders, peace committees, women, youth, religious/faith leaders, local politicians, farmers, pastoralists, and representatives of water user organizations participated in each location's three FGDs. In order to achieve gender equity, inclusion, and diversity, FGDs were performed separately for women and men at each site.

A total of 14 research assistants, comprising of 11 males and 3 females, were selected and trained to ensure that both men and women were at ease during the discussions and were comfortably able to share their views.

Table 1: Number of KIIs and FGDs per study location

#	Community	Location*	Country	No of FGDs	No of KIIs
1	Banisa	Banisa	Kenya	1 Women only, 1 Men only and 1 mixed youth	7
2	Mandera North Sub County	Rhamu	Kenya	1 Women only, 1 Men only and 1 mixed youth	7
3	Lafey Sub County	Lafey / Libehia	Kenya	1 Women only, 1 Men only and 1 mixed youth.	7

4	Mandera	Mandera Town	Kenya	1 Women only, 1 Men only and 1 mixed youth	7
5	Dolo Ado	Dolo Ado	Ethiopia	1 Women only, 1 Men only and 1 mixed youth	7
6	Beledhawa	Beledhawa	Somalia	1 Women only, 1 Men only and 1 mixed youth	7
7	Dolow	Dolow Somalia	Somalia	1 Women only, 1 Men only and 1 mixed youth	7
Total				21	49
Total number of respondents				173	49
Grand total number respondents (FGD+KII)				222	

2.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Given the limited access to the target rural regions of the Mandera cluster because of security concerns, data was collected from respondents in only seven areas that were safe, while ensuring representation of the various social categories, including women and youth.

Respondents, mainly from Somalia, complained of research fatigue due to the fact that numerous people and organizations collect data that is of little use to the locals. This poised a challenge when attempting to engage them for interviews. The research assistants were able to explain the objective of this particular study and assured the respondents that they would be targeted in the subsequent phase of the assessment such as validation meetings, which was done.

Also, due to the sensitive nature of some questions, such as 'who are the main spoilers of peace?', and follow up questions, some respondents were reluctant to openly express their views. This was despite being assured of confidentiality. In order to make them more comfortable and ensure our discussions were as open as possible, no photographs were taken, and no recordings were made without the consent of all participants.

3. FINDINGS

3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE MANDERA CLUSTER CONTEXT

The Kenyan side of the cluster (Mandera County) is inhabited by mainly ethnic Somalis categorized into four clan groupings: the Garre, Murulle, Degodia, and the "corner tribes," a grouping of the smaller clans. After Somalia's collapse in 1991, a sizable population of the Marehan clan from Somalia also arrived in Mandera, and has been seeking recognition as the county's fifth clan[7].

Somalia's Gedo region lies to the west, with Mandera on the Kenyan side and south with the Liben region of Ethiopia. The specific districts that touch the cluster are Belet Hawa, Dolo, and El-Wak. It is dominated mainly by the Marehan clan but also includes the Rahanweyn, Garre, Garremare, and other smaller clans such as the Harti clans and some Somali Bantu.

On the Ethiopian side of the border, the Dolo Ado region is home to the Degodia, Garre, Marehan, Rahwein, and Gabaweyn. Other smaller clans from other parts of Ethiopia, such as the Waleyta and the Oromo, also inhabit the region.

The cross-border cluster shows remarkable similarities with respect to clan composition, distribution, and concomitant conflict dynamics. Specifically, the Mandera cluster and the pastoralist/agro-pastoral way of life are frequently associated with violent conflict. For example, disputes between pastoralists and farmers over access to pasture and water have escalated into more violent clashes, especially along the riverine areas. In contrast, livestock raiding between pastoralist groups has destroyed villages stuck in cycles of violence and counter-violence.

Chronic insecurity and endemic violence in pastoralist areas have been more devastating and have taken more lives over time than election-related violence outbreaks in other parts of the country. Pastoralists' concerns are not as intertwined with national ethno-political rivalry as they have in other parts of the country. However, this does not mean that disputes in northern Kenya are not politicized. Politicians seeking votes frequently include opposing pastoralist groups in local political rivalries, which can aggravate the violence.

Accessibility to grasslands usually causes tensions between pastoralists and sedentary farmers. Disputes escalate when pastoralists move cattle into areas deemed private land, such as cattle ranches. Similar tensions arise when many pastoralist communities gather to graze their cattle on the same pasture. Different ideas of property rights, which pastoralists view as fluid and negotiable rather than set and exclusive, add to the complexity[8]. When access to water is restricted through fencing, crops are destroyed by livestock, or water resources are reduced as a result of excessive utilization, tensions

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[7] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 'Somalia: The Marehan in the Gedo region and whether there are other regions with large concentrations of Marehan and whether it is safe for Marehan in those regions or areas; the likelihood of self-exiled Marehan returning to those areas including Gedo,' 1 March 1999, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac0e37.html (accessed 10 January 2023)

[8] Gianluca Rampolla, 'Transforming Risks into Cooperation: Introducing the Environment and Security Initiative,' in *Understanding Environment, Conflict and Co-operation* ed. UNEP (Nairobi: UNEP, 2004). https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8684/-Understanding%20Environment%2C%20Conflict%20and%20Cooperation-2004424.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y), 10 January 2023

between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers may also arise. Conflicts between pastoralist communities also occur over water availability or ownership of water sites[9].

Scarcity of natural resources results in these kinds of conflicts. Scarcity happens when the available supply cannot meet increased demand, such as from an increase in the number of cattle, or from a drop in supply. Decreased supply may be caused by a lack of resource management plans/decisions, an increase in privately owned land, ecological degradation, or in this case, climate change.

The relationship between natural resource shortage and conflict, however, is indirect. As this study will demonstrate, managing natural resources and conflicts over their scarcity is a crucial determinant. Access to pasture and water may typically be handled peacefully between communities through traditional institutions and processes that have historically provided this function, such as reciprocal grazing rights.

Despite their considerable importance, competition for and scarcity of natural resources are not the sole causes of conflict in the cluster. Most parts of the region are marginalized in several ways. The region is geographically isolated, and marginalized in terms of infrastructure, especially road networks. Ungoverned porous borders coupled with weak governance structures and inadequate security measures render many roads unsuitable for travel due to the risk of terrorist assaults[10].

Ethnic identities and divisions shape and usually exacerbate conflict. There is substantial interaction between group identities and historical feuds among pastoralist communities. These cause cycles of retaliatory attacks, which can result in the inculcation of ethnic hatred and fear amongst clans[11].

Since the Somali community makes up the overwhelming majority of the population in the tri-border region, conflicts between the various Somali clans have often led to internecine violence. For example, it is known that the Garre (sub-clan of the Somali) and the Degodia coexist in Suftu, Ethiopia and Rhamu, Kenya. Both communities also co-exist in Wajir County in Kenya, even though the Degodia are considered the majority there. Moreover, the Marehan, Murule, Garre and minority clans coexist in Somalia and Mandera County in Kenya. The 2016 conflict between the Garre and Degodia which began in Ethiopia and extended to Mandera and subsequently to Wajir County, is only one example of how conflicts can spread[12].

Notwithstanding the commonalities in the overall conflict context in the region, a more case-specific analysis of the cluster reveals a number of particularities. Accordingly, the assessment now examines the conflict contexts in Somalia's Gedo region, Kenya's Mandera County, and the Dolo Ado region of Ethiopia.

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[9] Interview with woman, Banisa Mandera County-Kenya, 3, August, 2022

[10] Interview with NGO worker, Mandera, Kenya, 7, Septmber, 2022.

[11] Interview with woman, Rhamu, Jubaland country, 7 September 2022; Interview with key informant, Rhamu, Jubaland, 7 September 2022.

[12] National Cohesion and Integration Commission and Interpeace, 'Voices of the People: Challenges to Peace in Mandera County,' January 2017 https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-ECA-Kenia-Mandera-County-Note.pdf (accessed 10 January 2023).

3.1.1 THE GEDO REGION OF SOMALIA: MANDERA CLUSTER'S FLASHPOINT FOR CONFLICT

The main conflict among the various sub-clans in Somalia's Gedo region is over political supremacy and rivalry on who controls the administration of the key districts in the region. There is also conflict between the pastoralist Marehan and the Garremare farmers, which is caused by the invasion of the former's livestock into the farming areas of the riverine clans, as well as their desire to maintain control over the others.

Gedo conflicts are more challenging to define due to their ambiguity and complexity, and because the current hostilities extend back to 1991. The most active parties are the Al Shabaab, the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), the Jubaland administration, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), clan militias, the Ethiopian forces, and the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF). Some conflicts take place between state and non-state actors, but others are between non-state actors such as warlords, extremist groups or factional leaders, and sectarian groups, while others are unilateral. The dynamics of various forms of conflicts vary, and sometimes there are conflicts within conflicts. Moreover, the nature and intentions of the actors, as well as their targets, means of assault, and their political agendas vary. Some disputes are brief or intermittent, while others are prolonged.

Political conflict is defined as the competition between individuals and organizations to control formal political structures and access to resources. For example, study participants revealed three instances of significant armed clashes between the FGS-aligned Somali forces and Jubaland state forces. First, on February 8, 2021, there was a fierce fight between clan militias with support from Ethiopian troops to expel Al-Shabaab groups from the district. Second, on the same day, clan militias loyal to the Jubaland administration attacked clans in the district on suspicion that they were not loyal to the administration. Third, on March 2, 2022, troops loyal to Jubaland, with support from the local administration in Mandera, Kenya, confronted Special Forces troops deployed in Belethawa by the Federal Government of Somalia. The three incidents forced thousands of people from Belethawa and its surroundings, and some in Mandera town to abandon their homes. Since the parliamentary and presidential elections in Jubaland in August 2019, the region has been rife with warfare.

3.1.2. THE RECENT GEDO CONFLICT AND ITS INTRICACY

In 2018, the relations between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Jubaland administration were becoming increasingly sour in the months leading to the Jubaland state assembly and the presidential election. The Jubaland state accused the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) of undermining and inappropriately interfering in its electoral processes, making legal arguments based on Article 120 of Somalia's Provisional Constitution 2012, which specifically mentions the establishment of legislative and executive bodies of Federal Member States (FMS).

Fighting in Gedo reflects political fault lines ranging from national politics to local clan rivalries, all contributing to Somalia's instability. As a result, there is a schism between the Jubaland state's leadership and the FGS. They disagree over how power should be distributed in Somalia's government. In addition, clan and sub-clan connections and rivalries that have arisen due to their differences have inflamed local tensions[13]. They both represent rival clans of the Ogaden and Marehan, who have struggled to control the port city of Kismet, a vital resource, for decades.

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[13]Focus group discussion with Elders, Beledhawa Somalia, 8 September 2022.

For its part, the Al-Shabaab has lost control of Kismet, now controlled by the Jubaland state. The former FGS president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, and the Jubaland president, Ahmed Madobe, have starkly opposing views on the correct division of authority between the center and member states. After the election of the new president of the federal government, there is normalcy of relations between the Jubaland administration and the federal government. Due to this cordial relationship, the president of Jubaland extended his term for one more year. There is also evidence of collaboration between Kismet and Mogadishu on liberating the remaining districts under the administration of the Al-Shabaab.

As a local elder in Dolow stated,

> *"Gedo's conflicts reflect national and local political fault lines, adding to Somalia's insecurity. As a result, the states of Jubaland and Somalia's central authority are at odds. In Somalia, power is divided, particularly between Jubaland and FGS. This is exacerbated further by the past war between the clans of the present FGS president and Jubaland, which fought for the possession of Kismet, a wealthy and strategically important city. Due to their differences, local conflicts and alliances have erupted between the two clans and sub-clans. Moreover, there are significant differences in resource allocation between the two levels of government."* [14]

The FMS' constitutions are responsible for establishing their legislative and executive bodies, according to Article 120 of the provisional Somali constitution. While the FMS have the authority to organize their elections, as stated in the interim constitution's mandate, the FGS's function in state-level elections is not mentioned. However, the link between the FGS and the FMS is asymmetric and different in practice when elections are concerned.

For example, there has never been a role for the FGS in Puntland's local elections because this state existed long before the FGS was formally established in 2012. However, for the South West, Galmudug, and HirShabelle states that the FGS created in 2014, the latter has had a significant impact on their local politics.

Although the FGS was either in its transitional period (before September 2012) or underperforming, Jubaland was forming throughout that time. Therefore, the FGS had very little influence on the first Jubaland state elections. However, as accusations and counter accusations between the two continued, the Jubaland state assembly elected Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) president for a second term in August 2019. Meanwhile, the FGS leadership continued planning to take political, security, and administrative control over the Gedo region. The dispute was triggered by the FGS leadership's refusal to recognize the re-election of Madobe, arguing that the election was flawed. As a result, with border security and national defense justification, the FGS leadership began deploying federal forces to the Gedo region.

Along with federal-state armed clashes that resulted in numerous deaths and displacement of over 56,000 people, the Gedo region has seen increased security incidents, battles, and attacks between state and non-state conflict actors. These include the Somali National Army (SNA), the KDF, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF), and the Al-Shabaab. The result was 151 security incidents and 146 fatalities between January 2020 and the end of June 2021. Gedo's Beled Hawo, Luuq, Garbaharey, and El-Wak districts received the highest fatalities (53, 32, 25, and 21, respectively) [15].

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[14] Interview with key informant, Dolow -Ethiopia, 2 September 2022.

[15] European Asylum Support Office's,,'Report on the Somalia Security Situation,' September 2021, https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Somalia_Security_situation_new_AC.pdf (accessed 10 January 2023)

Moreover, when President Farmajo was unsuccessful in his attempt for a second term, the Gedo region, one of his greatest bases, splintered into two factions. The supporters of Farmajo's *'Nabab iyo Nolol'* regime chose to form 'Gedoland' by declaring independence from Madobe's Jubaland state and severing connections with the new government in Mogadishu[16]. The second faction mainly consisted of members of the 'rer Ahmed clan who supported Madobe's government in Jubaland. According to reports, the former has ties to Ethiopian forces[17].

3.1.3. DOLO ADO, ETHIOPIA: HOST OF REFUGEES AND SOMALI KING WITH INFLUENCE IN THE MANDERA TRIANGLE AND BEYOND

The Ethiopian side of the cluster, Dolo Ado, is traversed by perennial rivers, whose banks form an agricultural belt surrounded by a pastoralist economy. These agricultural corridors are settled by primarily cultivating groups of heterogeneous origin living in permanent agricultural villages. Outside these agricultural corridors are the grazing regions frequented by Somali clans practicing traditional livestock husbandry.

Competition for access to prime agricultural land between the large Degodia clan and the riverine Garremare clan, as well as the desire of the Degodia to maintain control over the others, explains their often-strained relations. Similarly, competition for access to pasture and water, between the Garre and Degodia, the two largest nomadic clans in the zone, is chiefly responsible for the strained relations and hostility between them. This is aggravated by competition for access to government resources and external interference from Mandera County on the Kenyan side. Despite such inter-clan rivalry, security on the Ethiopian side of the cluster has remarkably improved over the last years.

Although relations between the Degodia and Garremare are strained mainly because of competition for access to prime agricultural land, grazing lands, and watering points, relations between the Garre and other minority groups in the zone are harmonious. The Garre and the Garremare appear to be united in opposition to the Degodia.

The Dolo Ado region is also home to a large number of displaced people, the vast majority of whom fled Somalia due to drought and conflict. More specifically, the Somali refugees in Dolo Ado hail from the South West State, which is the traditional homeland of the Digil and the Mirifle clans, two of the five major Somali clans.

Somali refugees and their hosts have a cordial relationship based on Somali ties, which are far more significant than differences in nationality. The two groups also share cultural and ethnic identity and speak the same language. However, the majority of Somali refugees speak May. Relationships between refugees and host populations are broad, though primarily commercial and, to a lesser extent, social[18].

The refugee camps and the surrounding local communities share facilities such as slaughterhouses and sometimes water points if one has a water shortage, for instance[19]. In addition, they use the same marketplaces, and refugees are given farmland to cultivate by locals with full support of inputs,

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[17] FGD participants, Beledhawa, Jubaland, 31 August 2022.

[18] Interview with key informant, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 23 August 2022.

[19] Key Informant Interview, Dolo Ado, 23 August 2022.

pesticides, and other farming necessities, after which they share the harvests equally[20]. This is a result of an initiative by the IKEA Foundation, through which refugees and hosts worked together on farmlands[21]. In some instances, refugees are employed as farm laborers.

Refugees and hosts also engage in economic activities beyond the scope of cooperation in farmlands. In the Bokolmayo refugee camp, for example, where farming is particularly difficult due to poor soil quality and a lack of water, refugees with agricultural experience frequently find employment with neighboring farmers[22].

King Abdille, leader of the dominant Degodia clan in Dolo Ado, lives in Bokolmayo. However, his jurisdiction and influence encompass not only the Degodia clan's traditional territory around Dolo Ado, but also extends further in the Mandera triangle and beyond[23]. Although the king is not a member of the Somali regional administration or *woreda,* he has always been a revered clan and ethnic leader who also represents this region's elders[24]. He is recognized by Ethiopia and many Somali clans across the greater Horn and East Africa. The Garre clan also has a regionally influential Sultan named Mohamed Haji Hasan Gababa based in Moyale, Ethiopia.

While some members of the local host communities raised concerns about the negative effects of the refugee influxes, such as deforestation, the vast majority of the host communities acknowledge that the socioeconomic benefits of the camps vastly outweigh the negative effects. Even though the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGOs came to support the refugee communities in the area, they also brought opportunities for the host communities. These include schools, health facilities, and support for local farmers. However, employment opportunities have been the most significant benefit for majority of the Degodia sub-clans. Locals are of the opinion that if it were not for the refugees, the area would have remained poorer with limited economic opportunities and means of livelihood.

According to some focus group discussants (women) from Dolo, conflict between refugees and hosts occasionally erupts, usually when the youth fight while playing soccer or when refugees or women from host communities are assaulted[25]. To address this, clan elders from refugees and the host communities collaborate with formal authorities such as the police who maintain law and order in the area[26]. Sometimes, representatives of refugees and hosts convene to discuss sensitive issues between the two groups[27]. In certain instances, sub-clans or clans meet to discuss matters of mutual interest.

3.1.4. CONFLICT CONTEXT OF MANDERA COUNTY

Although the Somali clan system has existed for centuries, rivalries between clans intensified during British and Italian colonial rule due to the balkanization of the clans into grazing enclaves. To date, the clan-defined, colonial-era grazing areas remain a reference point for the local population in Mandera County. Combined with the instability on the Somalia side and localization of clan systems on the Ethiopian side, these constitute major issues of contestation and conflicts in the cluster.

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[20] Key Informant Interview, Dolo Ado, 23 September 2022.

[21] Key Informant Interview, Dolo Ado, 23 September 2022.

[22] Key informant interviews and focus group discussion data

[23] Interview with elder, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 19, September 2022.

[24] Interview with elder, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 19, September 2022.

[25] Focus group discussions, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 19, September 2022.

[26] Interview with elder, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 19, September 2022.

[27] Interview with elder, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 19, September 2022.

Times have since changed and Mandera County has gained infamy for conflict. Places like Rhamu, the hometown of Sayid Abaas, the revered religious leader, elder, and peacemaker who wielded influence across local communities in North Eastern Kenya, have since turned into some of the worst epicenters of violent conflict.

Since 1963, Mandera has experienced cyclical violent conflicts between various clans. Although most of these conflicts have been ended through negotiated ceasefires, the process of reconciling the communities has typically been forgotten once the guns are silenced. The result is that any subsequent conflict escalates with greater momentum due to the pile up of unresolved grievances and disagreements from previous conflicts.

The *xeer* tradition, an age-old social contract through which Somali clans mobilize resources to assist their kin in times of difficulty, has often been negatively invoked to mobilize clan militias and resources for violent conflict. The most fundamental cause of these conflicts has long been the scarcity of water and pasture for Mandera's largely pastoralist communities.

New conflict triggers have, however, emerged over the decades. For example, the devolved governance structure introduced under the 2010 Constitution has intensified competition over political positions. These positions are perceived by the clans as both a guarantee of access to resources and as a vanguard against exclusion and domination by other clans. The situation in the county is further complicated by the porosity of the Kenya-Somalia border, which facilitates the easy entry of Al-Shabab to launch attacks both within Mandera and in other parts of Kenya.

The most recent group conflict in the county has been between the Garre and Degodia clans. The two clans have engaged in on and off conflicts since independence, peaking from 2011 to 2015. As of November 2015, the Garre-Degodia conflict had led to the loss of at least 77 lives, the displacement of over 18,000 households, and massive destruction of property[28].

3.2. TYPES OF CONFLICT IN THE CLUSTER

Three overlapping lines of conflict are visible in the cluster. These are political conflicts, socio-economic conflicts, and the Al-Shabaab insurgency. The first line refers to conflicts over political power and territory, while the second refers to conflicts that occur within and between clans and sub-clans at a more local level, whether over access to resources and land. This section will provide a brief overview of these conflicts before going into more depth about the respective conflict trends that they manifest.

3.2.1 POLITICALLY MOTIVATED CONFLICTS

The Mandera triangle has suffered the brunt of political conflicts over the years. This is in regards to conflict related to politics within Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. They also include cross-border conflicts that can be linked with policies and political stances taken by one country that affect the communities of the neighboring countries. The closure of the Kenya-Somalia border and the ban on cross-border trade, the conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Jubaland state, and internal political wrangles within Ethiopia are examples of the political conflict in the region.

Both the Gedo region of Somalia and the Mandera County of Kenya are of strategic importance to various political candidates, as they have top-down incitement among the different clans competing over political power. In the Gedo region, political power is frequently and violently contested at various levels. The most recent and significant political conflicts have been waged between the FGS and the

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[28] International Crisis Group, 'Kenya's Somali North East: Devolution and Security,' Briefing N°114 made on 17 November 2015, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-s-somali-north-east-devolution-and-security (accessed 10 January 2023)

Jubaland administration, each with its own external and clan support. In an effort to destroy the Al-Shabaab, a coalition of national and regional actors, including the Kenyan and Ethiopian military, and clan militias are waging concurrent battles. Several of these conflict parties are allies in one conflict but foes in another, and the two conflicts are tightly connected.

The frictions in Gedo reflect political fault lines that cut from regional and national politics to local clan tensions, and constitute a significant source of instability for the Mandera cluster. The principal conflict was the standoff between the Jubaland state, notably its leader, Madobe, and the former Somalia president, Farmajo. The conflict reflected a more profound disagreement over how Somalia's political system should allocate power. The political differences have fuelled local tensions via clan and sub-clan alliances and rivalries that characterize the country's often fractious politics[29].

The situation was worsened by tensions between external actors serving as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is mandated to support efforts by federal and state governments to combat the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Ethiopia, which has a contingent of troops in the contested region of Gedo in the north of Jubaland, backed Mogadishu. In contrast, Kenya, whose troops are based farther south in Lower Juba, supported Jubaland's incumbent president. Kenya still sees him as critical to a buffer zone in that region, protecting Kenya from militant incursions. Neither of the two regional heavyweights seeks a confrontation, but absent a resolution, their rivalry could feed a violent conflict in Somalia that would have repercussions for regional stability.

On the Kenyan side of the cluster, the Degodia and Garre clans are reported to have had a feud over the Mandera North parliamentary seat. Each of the two clans claimed dominion by organizing followers during the 2013 and 2017 Kenyan general elections, turning Rhamu into a battle zone[30]. The two clans have a long history of conflict that can be traced back to the colonial era both in Kenya and Ethiopia. In the last decade, however, political supremacy took the center stage.

The current conflict began in 2008 following the election of Abdikadir Mohamed from the Degodia clan as the Member of Parliament for Mandera Central Constituency. Mr. Mohamed unseated Billow Kerow from the Garre clan, the majority clan in Mandera and previous occupants of the Mandera Central seat. This election result had wider ramifications on the politics of Mandera as the alleged political domination of the Garre clan was broken, and the political presence of the Degodia clan was felt.

After the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution and the realization of devolution, the political stakes in Mandera reached a new height. With the underlying causes of the 2008 conflict unaddressed, and with higher political stakes in the 2013 elections, it was only a matter of time before a new cycle of violence erupted. The central point of unity for the Garre in the 2013 election was to reassert their dominance in Mandera County. Subsequently, they not only regained the Mandera Central parliamentary seat, but also won an overwhelming majority of political seats in Mandera, including the key posts of Governor and Senator. They also surprisingly won - and this was the main trigger for the inter-clan conflict - the new Mandera North constituency in the largely Degodia-dominated areas.

In the 2017 and 2022 general elections, the concept of negotiated democracy has taken root amongst the Somali clans in northern Kenya. This, in combination with internal wrangles within the Garre clan leadership, saw the sitting Mandera Governor, Captain Ali Roba, enter an informal agreement with the

[29] International Crisis Group, 'Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia,' 14 July 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b158-ending-dangerous-standoff-southern-somalia, (accessed 10 January 2023).

[30] FGD with elders, Beledhawa-Somalia, 19 September 2022.

Degodia clan in 2017 to back his candidature and, in return, support the Degodia pursuit to win the Mandera North constituency. The Degodia also supported a faction of the Garre clan in the 2022 general election. While this may have deescalated open hostilities, the political competition between the Garre and Degodia is still very much alive, and it may take only a minor trigger for a full blown inter-clan conflict.

FGD discussants also reported the involvement of the provincial administration in land demarcations and administrative boundaries as another cause of conflict. For instance, the Kenya government gazettes locations and sub-locations without making thorough consultations with the local clans within Mandera County. This has always resulted in skirmishes between the Garre and Murule in Yedo location, among the corner tribes and Mandera County Government at Koromey in Mandera East, and between the Garre and Degodia in Banisa sub-county. As a result, these contested locations are not inhabited due to fear of conflict with other clans, yet the government has not provided clear demarcations.

The major market in Rhamu town in Mandera County, for instance, has been divided into sections for the Degodia and the Garre. Violent conflicts in Rhamu are exacerbated by the ongoing political contestation between the Garre and the Degodia. Some respondents, however, believe that the Garre's numerical superiority in Mandera County offers them an edge over the county's other towns in regard to governance, resource distribution, and economic prosperity.

3.2.1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONFLICTS

Social-economic conflicts in the Mandera triangle are multi-faceted, come in many forms, and are caused by diverse factors. The communities in the Mandera triangle are mostly pastoralist, and they rely on livestock and livestock products as a means of livelihood. Agro-pastoralism on subsistence level is also practiced to a smaller, yet significant, extent along the border. In addition to this, cross-border trade is also considered a significant economical undertaking in the Mandera triangle, where goods and services are traded across communities and across countries. Therefore, competition over the scarce resources such as water, pasture, and land, coupled with the effects of climate change and poor government service delivery make the Mandera triangle susceptible to conflict.

The inadequate provision of basic services, such as food, education, and health care, in the cluster heightens the population's vulnerability and creates space for alternative actors to supplant governmental duties. For instance, education levels in the Mandera triangle are significantly lower than in the rest of the respective countries. Some members of Somali families on the Ethiopian and Somali side of the border travel to Mandera on the Kenyan side to attend school and are housed by family while they study, while others who live in Beledhawa commute daily to Mandera to attend school[31].

The region is also seen to be highly underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure. Gedo, for example, has no single tarmac road in the whole region. This discrepancy can be explained in the late liberation of some of the districts in the region from Al-Shabaab control, as well as the difficulty in access for aid organizations to support schooling and other key activities[32]. Prior to 2013, there were no tarmac roads in the entirety of Mandera County. Dolow Ado of Ethiopia and Dolo Somalia, on the other hand, are on the periphery and lack asphalt roads.

In sum, the conflict fault lines in the cluster could be attributed to the limited provision of services and access to resources such as land, water, and pasture. In turn, the clan becomes an organizing actor in the contest for these limited resources.

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[31] Focus group discussion participant, Mandera, Kenya, 12 September 2022.
[32] Interview with CSO, Mandera, Kenya, 12 September 2022.

In the Gedo region, for example, where the Marehan are the majority clan, intra/inter-clan conflict consists primarily of disputes between different sub-clans and, occasionally, with other clans, such as the Rahanween-Marehan and the Garre-Marehan conflicts. While the intra/inter-clan conflict is primarily about political and economic influence, access to resources pervades every sector of society, and is the root cause of almost every escalation.

Also, Yedo, a small village in Mandera East constituency bordering Somalia, is a crucial point of contention between the Murule and Garre clans. Intense fighting wreaked havoc on these communities in 2020/21, claiming lives and destroying homes[33]. The town is rendered uninhabitable due to the rival clans' claims of ownership. The problem has not been resolved despite extensive efforts, and it could escalate at any time if not addressed.

There were recent cases of land conflicts in Dolow and Luuq districts and along the Juba valley between the Gasaraguda and the Gabaweyn (both sub-clans of the Rahanweyn/Digil-Mirifle).The local administrations of Luuq and Dolow intervened through the support of the FGS, but tension still exists[34].

Several factors have led to an intensification of these conflicts, key of which is climate change. When resources such as pasture, land, and water become increasingly scarce, conflicts arise between pastoralists and peasant farmers over their use. While this issue is predominant in rural areas, related clan affiliations cause spill-over effects in urban areas. Furthermore, the expansion of urban centers and individuals seizing pastoralist land that had traditionally been communally-owned has caused disputes over land ownership[35].

Additionally, putting up of small locations/settlements as centers of NGO support or relief food distribution causes friction between clans that live in them and the incoming settlers. This practice has increased intra-clan tensions within Mandera County and the Gedo region in Somalia. Without a legitimate national register of land ownership and functioning land management system, these disputes cannot be solved through formal procedures.

Besides the inter-clan conflicts over access to resources, there are intra-clan conflicts over positions of authority. Since Somalia's social system is largely clan-based, traditional clans and sub-clans have maintained considerable cultural and social authority, whereby traditional leaders represent their respective constituencies and have influence within their communities. For example, in the Marehan clan structure, the grand Marehan *Ugaas* was the highest traditional unit that held all other sub-units together. The grand *Ugaas* came from one sub-clan, the Reer Ugaas, which held this position through many generations, and the position is traditionally earmarked for them[36].

Additionally, each sub-clan of the Marehan has a traditional leader, and a council of elders, the *Guurti*. The *Guurti* work with the grand *Ugaas.* They are appointed or nominated by the elders to represent their sub-clans, and mostly arbitrate in disputes among warring clans and parties in the region. However, conflicts over these positions of authority have harmed the Marehan. Political conflicts among the Marehan and moves by politicians and state authorities over the years to create their own 'fake' elders who duplicate and contest the authority of traditional elders have weakened the legitimacy and the role of the Marehan grand *Ugaas* and other clan leadership.

[33] Interview with FGD in Libihiya/Lafey, 31 August 2022.

[34] Interview with elder, Dolow, Somalia, 11 September 2022.

[35] Interview with Government KII, Mandera and Dolow, Somalia, 14 September 2022.

[36] Interview with Elders Mandera, Kenya, 31 August 2022.

The inter- and intra-clan conflicts resulting from socio-economic dynamics are exacerbated by the presence and easy access of small arms and light weapons in the Mandera cluster. A weak and sometimes corrupt security architecture, characterized by inadequate border control mechanisms and minimal police presence in vast parts of the triangle, creates a favorable environment for illicit small arms trafficking, possession, and use. Moreover, the triangle communities' marginal existence in underdeveloped parts of the region creates a demand for small arms, as groups compete for scarce resources and to protect their livelihoods. This, coupled with inter-ethnic rivalries that turn violent, for instance, through cattle-rustling raids, pushes communities to self-arm for security. Worse still, the government's failure to impose its presence through service provision and by enhancing law and order has cumulatively fed communities' essential need for firearms. As a religious scholar in Lafey, Kenya, stated, *"The communities are armed, and it will be difficult to manage conflicts if we do not control access to small arms within the three countries."*[37]

Another cause of this conflict is mistrust between communities and clans residing in the Mandera cluster. The assessment found evidence of simmering tensions, unresolved hostilities, and outstanding disputes that sometimes lead to clashes among sub-clans in all the three countries.

Conflicts are mainly over farmlands, political power, resource sharing, and growing grievances by some of the dominant sub-clans against the local and respective government administrations. Some of the outstanding disputes are largely centered on farm and land grabbing/encroachment, and unfair distribution of agricultural inputs and equipment by NGOs. Although armed confrontation between communities is limited due to the presence of security forces, these conflicts could undermine stabilization efforts in the area if left unaddressed.

For example in Jubaland, the assessment found that most of the communities feel they are under-represented - at least on the surface - in the village administration. Moreover, the state governance and administrative structures are dominated by the Kumade/Ogaden communities, undermining the legitimacy of the administrative structures in the area. Grievances are largely geared towards the political settlement in Kismayo district, which is seen as less inclusive. There is thus a need to develop bottom-up reconciliation processes to bring communities together to foster cohesion through settlement of historical grievances.

3.2.2. THE AL-SHABAAB INSURGENCY

Since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in the 1990s, Somalia has been a hotspot for terrorism, conflict, and instability. In recent years, the predominant perpetrator of violence in Somalia has been the Al-Shabaab. The emergence of Al-Shabaab is as a result of the inability of the FGS and Somali Armed Forces to provide security, which gave the militia groups a chance to re-establish themselves. While the group's initial focus was primarily domestic, in the past few years it has expanded its presence into neighboring countries.

Despite the Jubaland administration and the presence of FGS security personnel and Ethiopian and Kenyan troops, Al-Shabaab controls much of Gedo's rural districts, particularly in the southeast. In 2014, the group was expelled from Garbaharey and Luuq districts in Gedo. The Beledhawa-Dolow route was secured by Ethiopian ATMIS forces and Somali militias[38]. Al-Shabaab now maintains its

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[37] FGD participant,, Lafey Kenya, 31August, 2022.

[38] European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing The Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa (EUTF) 'Cross-border analysis and mapping: Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia', August 2016, https://blogs.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/files/2020/02/Cross-border-cluster-1.pdf (accessed 10 January 2023).

influence in Gedo and the wider Jubaland by exploiting divisions among communities, which allows the group to enter Kenya's porous border.

The decision by the Kenyan government to deploy troops in Somalia to wage war against Al-Shabaab resulted in the group and their sympathizers launching a retaliatory terror campaign in Kenya, especially in north-eastern Kenya, where Mandera County falls. For example, the Garissa University massacre and Mandera quarry worker attack of 2015 were perpetrated by the Al-Shabaab since the Kenyan troops entered Somalia[39]. Kenya's worst military setback occurred when they attacked the KDF military base at Ceel-Ade in January 2016. While Al-Shabaab has released a propaganda video about the attack, many elements are yet unknown. The tragedy gives psychological support and propaganda for Al-Shabaab.

The group has had no success in launching similar attacks in Ethiopia. Kenya is, by far, the worst affected by the expansion of Al-Shabaab, while Ethiopia is arguably the least affected. Considering the fact that Al-Shabaab enjoys an equally antagonistic relationship with both states, this situation is surprising. The difference in Al-Shabaab's presence and influence between Kenya and Ethiopia is distinct, and is a result of marginalization, selective state repression, ethnic and clan dynamics, and the competency of the security sector.

The porous and ungoverned borderland areas within the Mandera cluster also provide an enabling environment for the Al-Shabaab groups to infiltrate and carry out terror attacks within Kenya. The study participants opined that, because of the ungoverned porous border, it is easier for Al-Shabaab militia to move across the border and carry out acts of terrorism as frequently observed in the border towns of Mandera, such as El-Wak and Lafey, and in Mandera North and Mandera South sub-counties.

Kenya is trying to slow down and ultimately reverse the negative trend. Alongside harsh counterterrorism methods, the state has taken a few, albeit small, steps to develop a softer repertoire of countering violent extremism. This includes (reportedly unsuccessful) amnesties for the Al-Shabaab fighters, and a range of local initiatives[40]. According to the majority of the study respondents, the youth are particularly vulnerable to recruitment into the Al-Shabaab due to their marginalization. The marginalization of the youth stems, in part, from the rigidities of the clan system, which entrusts most decision-making power and influence in the hands of clan elders. The youth marginalization and frustration are also found in complex historical, cultural, political, economic and environmental factors.

Moreover, they have limited economic opportunities, making them susceptible and easy targets for violent extremism organizations. Many youths are recruited by violent extremism organizations who promise them better livelihoods. The youth are also easily manipulated by politicians and clan militias during conflicts. There is also a trend by the Al-Shabaab to recruit camel herders who crossed over to Somalia due to drought on the Kenyan and Ethiopian side in search of pasture and water. Afterwards, they are transferred to the Al-Shabaab administered areas within the Gedo region of Somalia. For clans and sub-clans such as the Guri and Galti Marehan, tactical affiliation with Al-Shabaab has been a useful means of countering a dominant rival. The Al-Shabaab has successfully exploited local clan and other grievances to this end[41.]

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid

[41] Ken Menkhaus, 'Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland,' Danish Demining Group, March 2015 https://land.igad.int/index.php/documents-1/countries/somalia/conflict-4/874-conflict-assessment-2014-northern-kenya-and-somaliland-1/file (accessed 10 January 2023)

The Somali diaspora across the Mandera triangle is inextricably linked to Somali political and economic life in their area. In Somalia, for example, it is estimated that they contribute about $1 billion to the Somali economy each year through remittances and business activities, and that remittances support approximately 40 percent of the Somali population[42]. While diaspora remittances and businesses create job opportunities in Somalia, it is also known that in some cases, these businesses and remittances end up supporting armed non-state actors such as clan militias, particularly during times of tension and conflict, and Al-Shabaab[43].

According to a key informant from Dolow, Somalia, Al-Shabaab is still believed to be offering services that the Kenyan, Somalia, and Ethiopian governments do not, particularly to populations distrustful or excluded from the still-fragile political process. The informant believes that Al-Shabaab offers a modicum of security in areas under its influence. It operates courts, including mobile courts, to punish crime and resolve disputes[44]. This is important in an area rife with local conflicts, especially land disputes, and few practical ways to settle them except with violence. This has increased local levels of violence and has been the main cause of instability in the cluster in recent years, causing displacement of people within and beyond the cluster.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) play an important role in the prevention and countering of violence extremism (P/CVE). Both international and local CSOs partner with important community and government stakeholders to convene interventions geared towards P/CVE such as counter-narrative measures, sensitization forums, training workshops on P/CVE, as well as forums for strengthening the relationships between communities and security. Religious leaders also play an important role in disseminating counter-narrative messages on P/CVE.

CONFLICT TRENDS

As has been discussed, multiple actors are involved in the various conflict types in the Mandera cluster. These actors are interconnected and may form alliances or exert influence over one another during the conflict period. This section goes into detail about the conflict trends that emerge from these actors, namely inter-clan conflicts, intra-clan conflicts, and violent extremism.

3.2.3.   INTER-CLAN CONFLICTS

The population in the cluster is organized in a clan system that dominates both the informal and formal spheres of life. The clan to which a Somali belongs determines their identity rather than their national identity or the ethnic group to which the vast majority of the population belongs. The role of clans is to control resources and secure access to political and economic power at both the national and sub-national levels. This societal organization legacy has an impact on all conflicts and tensions emerging in the Mandera cluster.

For example, the Somali government reflects the clan system in the political sphere. Both parliament and the government are formed on the basis of a power-sharing formula known as the 4.5 system[45]. It

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[42] Rift Valley Institute, 'Remittance transfers to Somalia,' 11 September 2013, https://riftvalley.net/sites/default/files/publication-documents/RVI%20-%20Nairobi%20Forum%20-%20Remittance%20Transfers%20to%20Somalia%20-%201%20October%202013.pdf (accessed 9 October 2020).

[43] Mitchell Sipus, 'Support for Al-Shabaab through the diaspora,' 2013 https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/non-state/29.pdf (accessed 14 October 2020)

[44] Interview with local authority official, Dolow, Somalia, 21 September 2022.

[45] Ibid.

states that the four major clans receive an equal share of seats in parliament, while minority clans, including ethnic minorities, share the remaining 0.5[46].

The same can be said for the private sector. Companies and organizations are mostly organized along clan lines, and recruitment is done within the same clans because the general level of mistrust between clans is high. These practices exacerbate inequality between clans, further marginalize minority clans, and can lead to increased frustration and aversion, not only between clans, but also among marginalized clans, towards the state, which benefits some while disadvantages others[47].

Clan families are responsible, in some instances, for providing financial support to less well-off members of communities and dealing with disputes. Without the protection of clan families, even young men noted that smaller clans might become susceptible to bullying and lack the capacity to seek justice for their members in instances of violence. Despite the perceived clan protection, traditional methods of dealing with violence against women (VAW) and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) facilitated by the clan can also lead to a lack of justice. If a young woman is raped, for example, in some instances, clan families become involved, and the offender is usually issued with nothing more than a fine. This type of behavior was noted in all FGDs as contributing to a prevailing culture of impunity.

Women mentioned that larger clans normally influence both the formal and informal justice systems, such that smaller clans have to appease the larger and stronger clans. People that get caught with explosions and grenades are not brought to justice. People in authority commit rape, and those from larger clans with financial means can easily get away with it. Compensation also plays a role in this system where sometimes a girl or woman who has been raped/defiled may be forced to get married to the perpetrator who hails from the larger clan for peace to prevail. If the perpetrator can afford to give the survivor's family a certain amount of money, they are mostly acquitted of the crime.

The cluster experiences inter-clan conflict between neighboring communities in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The Garre clan, who are the majority clan in Mandera County, Kenya, have been in recurring conflict with the Marehan clan both within Mandera and across the border in Belledhawa, Somalia. The Garre and Degodia conflict is another recurring inter-clan conflict in the cluster. These conflicts spill over from one country to another and sometimes one county to another. For example, in 2016 inter-clan conflict between Garre and Degodia communities that originated in Ethiopia, then spread to Mandera County, and onwards into Wajir County.

The Garre/Murule conflict is also another inter-clan conflict within Mandera County. This conflict is political in nature but the trigger encompasses resources, land disputes, and sometimes violent extremism, as clans recuse themselves of allegedly perpetrating incidents and sympathizing with VEOs. The primary actors in these conflicts are political actors and community leaders who are the decision-making organs within the community, and both enablers and spoilers of peace. Other actors include religious leaders, CSOs, youth, and women, who over the years played critical roles in intervening and de-escalating conflicts in the region.

While inter-clan conflicts are amplified in the cluster as it has bigger impact across countries and counties and occurs in a much bigger scope, there are also intra-clan conflicts affecting members of the same clan. In the Mandera cluster, the assessment established that there have been a number of intra-

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[46] Afyare Elmi, 'The Politics of the Electoral System in Somalia: An Assessment,' 2021, https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=bildhaan,

[47] Erik Bryld, 'Evaluation of SIDA's Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts: Somalia Country Report,' 2019, https://cdn.sida.se/publications/files/sida62214en-evaluation-of-sidas-support-to-peacebuilding-in-conflict-and-post-conflict-contexts-somalia-country-report.pdf (accessed 14 September 2022).

clan conflicts observed over the years. For example, intra-clan conflicts between different Marehan sub-clans are visible in the Gedo region, primarily in the north. The Marehan sub-clans that exist in the Gedo region are Rer Ahmed and Rer Dini on one side, and Rer Hassan, Hawarsame, Ali Dhere, and Fiqi Yaqub on the other. The latter group was supported by the Ethiopian government, particularly during the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) reign. According to the study respondents, the Reer Dini sub-clan are the Marehan elites, as well as the region's most socio-economically and politically influential[48].

Intra-clan conflict is mainly a result of political differences and allegiance between the sub-branches of the same clan, as observed in the example above. In Mandera County, the Garre community experienced an intra-clan political disagreement in 2017, when a faction of the clan elders endorsed a different candidate for the gubernatorial position in opposition to the sitting governor. This has divided the community, leading to polarization within the clan structure.

3.2.4. REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN THE GEDO REGION

Since 1991, successive Somali administrations have supported local allies or proxies against their opponents, notably the Al-Shabaab, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and, most recently, the Jubaland administration, to weaken them.

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has tried to control Jubaland, which borders Kenya and Ethiopia, and controls trade routes to Kismayo Port in South East Somalia[49]. After former President Farmajo, a Marehan clan member, was elected, the FGS took a more aggressive approach to reining in the Jubaland administration, supporting opposition candidates in 2019, and sending federal security forces to Gedo to overthrow the Madobe-aligned local administrations. By mid-2020, the FGS had removed district commissioners in Luuq, Dolow, and Beled Hawa, and strengthened its grip over Garbaharey and Bardhere. The FGS refused to recognize Madobe as Jubaland's president, escalating tensions[50].

In response, the FGS deployed more soldiers to the region, a move which has escalated conflict and tensions in the triangle. The escalation of tensions between former President Farmajo and current Jubaland President Madobe drew in Kenya, which backed and continues to back the Kismayo-based regional government, and Ethiopia, which is said to back Farmajo. Furthermore, diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia deteriorated, and at some point culminated in physical confrontation.

According to KII and FGD participants, hundreds of Somali troops who completed training in Eritrea were deployed to Gedo during President Abdullahi's regime as tensions continued to simmer over who should control the region as the FGS elections were looming on the horizon. According to one study participant, *"Gedo is pregnant with troops, Kenya has beefed up its military along the border, Ethiopia is heavily present, we sleep and wake up with constant fear that more violence could escalate."*[51]

The deployment came at a time when the relations between Somalia and Kenya were at their lowest point. The government of former Somali President Farmajo accused the Kenyan military of arming rebel militias to seize its military bases in cross-border attacks and, consequently, ordered the deployment of fresh troops along the border between the two countries. The Jubaland state, whose

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[48] Interview with elders, Dolow, Somalia, 07 September 2022.
[49] FGD participant, Beledhawa, Somalia, 29 August 2022.
[50] Interview with key informant, Dolow, Somalia, 02 September 2022.
[51] Ibid.

administration in Gedo had been removed through military force by the government, accused the Somali federal authorities of establishing guerrillas in Gedo, and escalated regional tensions.

Amidst these simmering tensions along the porous borders, Ethiopia and Kenya found themselves on opposing sides. Given the implications of cross-border security, Kenya and Ethiopia have had a more profound history of cooperation in Jubaland. They both bought into the 2013 Addis Ababa agreement that installed Madobe as the head of the emergent Jubaland state. However, any sense of shared vision for the region appears to have evaporated, with Ethiopia backing Farmajo in Mogadishu and Kenya deepening its relationship with Madobe.

The rivalry, at some point, seemed to be breaking down ATMIS's cohesion, opening space for Al-Shabaab in the Mandera cluster. The level of discord almost led to blows on August 22, 2019, the day of the Jubaland election, when a plane carrying Ethiopian forces attempted to land at Kismayo airport but was prevented from doing so by Jubaland and Kenyan troops[52].

Ethiopia, which shares a large border with the Gedo region, has maintained a keen interest in Gedo affairs. Ethiopia has stationed troops in Gedo at various points over the last two decades, and used the border to conduct military operations in Somalia. Despite being a part of Jubaland, Gedo is home to Ethiopian ATMIS forces as part of 'Sector 3' alongside the Bay and Bakool regions, as opposed to the rest of Jubaland, which is home to the Kenyan contingent.

Ethiopia, along with Kenya, initially supported a federal Somalia and the establishment of Jubaland. However, since Abiy Ahmed's appointment as Prime Minister in 2018, Ethiopia's policy of strengthening Somalia's FMSs has begun to shift, because of Aby's strong alliance with former President Farmajo[53].

As a result, Ethiopian troops are increasingly involved in Gedo's conflicts in support of the FGS. The presence of troops has essentially allowed Gedo to operate independently of the Jubaland administration, undermining Madobe's claims to represent the entire region.

With tensions between the FGS and the Jubaland administration running high in early 2020, Ethiopia sent hundreds of heavily armed troops to Dolow[54]. At times, the presence of Ethiopian troops has also led to dangerous confrontations, including once incident where Ethiopian troops attempting to land in Kismet were refused to do so by Kenyan troops.

At the same time, Ethiopia's support for the FGS may benefit some of its domestic interests. Madobe has close ties with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), a former Ethiopian rebel group that has become Abiy's main pillar in Ethiopia's Somali region, removing ONLF from the terrorist list. A Dolow-based government KII reported that the FGS knew about the arrival of Ethiopia's new non-African Transition mission (ATMIS) troops in the region, saying that the government knew the troops were coming to fight the militant group.

For its part, Kenya's primary goal in Somalia is to secure its border from Al-Shabaab, which has launched several deadly attacks on Kenyan soil while maintaining an influence in the country's north-eastern regions. Ethiopia's shift to supporting the FGS in disputes with the Jubaland administration has presented Kenya with an awkward dilemma.

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[52] International Crisis Group, 'Ending Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia,' 14 July 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b158-ending-dangerous-standoff-southern-somalia

[53] Ibid.

[54] Interview with key informant, Dolow, Somalia, 22 September 2022.

Kenya is closely tied to the Jubaland administration, which it supports as an integral security partner. At the same time, Ethiopia's alliance with the FGS has overshadowed Kenya, which has instead been engaged in several diplomatic disputes with Somalia, including over their shared maritime boundary[55], imports of *miraa* (khat) into Somalia, and frequent exchanges of diplomatic sanctions[56]. In response to Kenyan citizens' growing uneasiness with regard to the cross-border violence from Somalia-based terrorists, the government of Kenya has begun to erect a barrier along its shared border with Somalia.

3.2.5. VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Violent extremism is a serious challenge in the Mandera triangle, and more so on the Kenyan and Somalia sides. In the past three years, there have been many terrorist attacks in Mandera, El-Wak, Banisa, Lafey, Arabiya, and several other sub-locations in Mandera County. On the Somalia side, attacks have happened in Dolow, Belet Hawa and El-Wak Somalia. These attacks have resulted in deaths, maiming of people, and destruction of property.

According to the majority of study respondents, the key drivers of violent extremism in the triangle are poor access to education, employment, and other opportunities to earn an income, social exclusion of certain groups, as well as mistrust between communities and security forces.

The incentive of monetary rewards is believed to have attracted many youths to extremist causes. As such, perceptions of long-standing regional/communal grievances over land and other resources have been used to lure the youth into violent extremism. Most parents, teachers, and other care-givers are generally unaware about how to identify and deal with youth who may be getting involved in extremist movements.

Although Kenya has an Act on Prevention of Terrorism that was endorsed in 2012[57], the country has long lacked a comprehensive and official counter-violent extremism (CVE) policy. Consequently, there is no anchor and framework for the diverse efforts of various actors, including security agencies, civil society groups, and others who are rolling out CVE-related initiatives.

Violent extremism (VE) affects communities living in the Mandera cluster, albeit differently amongst the different categories within the community. Young males are susceptible to recruitment and radicalization because of the prevailing social and structural issues predisposing them to associate themselves with violent extremism organizations (VEOs). These issues include lack of critical government services such as identity cards, unemployment, limited education, and unfriendly government responses to VE issues such as collective punishment and extra-judicial killings, among others.

VEOs also target especially impressionable young women in their radicalization and recruitment strategies. Whereas young men are mostly recruited as soldiers fighting on the frontline, young women are recruited as sleeper cells who facilitate the movement of Al-Shabaab members from one location to another while also playing the role of host. The literature on the role of women in violent extremism also establishes women as victims of human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and slavery[43].

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[55]Julian Hattem, 'Kenya and Somalia's Long-Simmering Territorial Dispute Threatens to Boil Over,' World Politics Review, April 6 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/the-long-simmering-kenya-somalia-maritime-dispute-threatens-to-boil-over/ (accessed 10 January 22)

[56] Selam Demissie, 'Kenya-Somalia dispute threatens an embattled Horn of Africa,' Institute for Security Studies, 16 March 2021, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/kenya-somalia-dispute-threatens-an-embattled-horn-of-africa

[57] Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012.

CSOs in this cluster use strategies such as peace dialogues, forums for religious leaders, radio talks, and youth engagement to address the violent extremism problem[58]. These strategies raise awareness and preach peace and tolerance, and keep the youths occupied with constructive activities. Although constructive, these strategies have their limitations, and appropriate conflict management and resolution and CVE strategies should be implemented.

3.3. LINKAGES BETWEEN INFORMAL AND FORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS

The communities living in the triangle maintain a pluralistic justice system. This system is a legacy of three legal traditions – *Xeer* customary law, religious sharia law, and formal justice (Somalia transitional constitution (2012), Kenya constitution (2010), and the Ethiopian constitution (1994)). The formal justice systems from all three governments of the cluster recognize the informal dispute resolution mechanisms within the cluster's communities as eligible for governing certain disputes. For instance, in Ethiopia, the FDRE constitution recognizes the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family matters under religious and customary laws[59]. The formal justice system, however, does not allow customary dispute resolution adjudication in criminal cases.

In the case of the Mandera triangle, with the context of protracted political fragility and weak governance, the *Xeer* normative code and collective assumption of responsibility have functioned as "an effective tool for promoting social cohesion and the regulation of inter [and intra]-clan affairs". As a result, *Xeer* is widely recognized as "an integral component of the communities living in the Mandera triangle, and it continues to be the preferred and most used legal system on all sides of the triangle[60].

Informal conflict management and resolution mechanisms in the Mandera triangle use local actors and traditional community-based judicial and legal decision-making mechanisms to manage and resolve conflicts within or between communities. These local mechanisms aim to resolve disputes without resorting to state-run judicial systems, police, or other external structures. Local negotiations, therefore, continue to impact conflicts in the triangle significantly. According to participants, they lead to ad-hoc applicable agreements which keep broader inter-communal relations positive, creating environments where the triangle's nomadic communities graze together, and those living in towns live together. Merchants trade together even if there is clan animosity or even if tensions remain un-reconciled[61].

Though the formal and customary dispute resolution systems live apart in the three sides of the triangle, the traditional (informal) system is sometimes assisted by the government in implementing its decisions[62]. While the informal dispute resolution systems have absolute and final authority over their verdicts, they lack the actual implementation, which is where they usually seek support from the legal systems.

There is growing recognition of the importance of "complementarity" between formal and traditional/informal justice systems in the Mandera triangle. All study participants unanimously agreed that each system needs to be flexible to strengthen the links between the two systems for a more

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[58] KII interviews in Mandera, Somalia and Ethiopia, 23 August 2022

[59] Interviews with the Mandera, Dolow and Dolo Ado Commissioners and other government KIIs.

[60] KII Interview in Dolow, Dolo Ado and Mandera, 18 September 2022

[61] Interview with the KIIs in Dolow, Rhamu and Banisa September 2022

[62] Interviews with the Mandera & Dolow Commissioners and other government KIIs.

supportive relationship with each other. In addition, these changes could also improve each system as each would be learning from and adapting positive aspects of the other system.

3.4. DIFFERENTIATED IMPACTS OF CONFLICT ON GENDER

Conflict affects men and women differently and exacerbates gender inequalities[63]. Men and boys make up the vast majority of direct victims of armed conflict. While they face forced recruitment and arbitrary detention, women and girls become more vulnerable to the indirect impacts of war, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and limited access to health, food, and education[64].

The ripple effects of protracted conflicts within the Mandera triangle include significant gender-specific barriers to accessing essential services such as health, education, water, and sanitation. The broader macroeconomic challenges include increased poverty rates, higher debt burdens, and deteriorating employment prospects. Armed conflicts also have indirect negative consequences that affect agriculture, livelihoods, infrastructure, public health, and welfare provision, gravely disrupting the social order.

Business opportunities: The impact of cross-border conflict on economic security through trade and other related economic activities among the Mandera triangle's communities cannot be underestimated. The communities in the region are some of the most isolated ethnic groups, and engage in informal cross-border trade by mainly selling livestock to buy grains and other household goods.

Most study participants could not over emphasize the impact of conflict on trade. Conflicts affect the incomes of the business community through changes in the market price of goods sold and purchased by households. Costs of transacting business have risen as a result of insecurity. Several KIIs highlighted the fact that during armed conflict or tensions, markets and businesses fail to operate, resulting in significant household utility and welfare reductions. In addition, the security apparatus from all three countries tighten their presence along the borders, reducing the movement of goods and people.

Some key informants reported that women's participation in the informal sector increases significantly in conflict and post-conflict settings. Changes in gender roles during conflict contribute to expansion of economic opportunities for women. Women adapt new roles as heads of households in the absence of their spouses, thus pushing them to adapt new roles as bread winners. The study participants added that continued conflict and tensions present challenges to women as they are forced to spend more time outside their homes in productive activities and spend minimal time with their children, further ailing the social fabric in the absence of their spouses. This absence has contributed to the male youth being enrolled in violent extremist groups, while girls get lured into early marriages or experience gender-based violence in form of rape and defilement.

Conflict, tensions, and disasters also create opportunities for women's increased control over their earned income. This is because they are able to make decisions on the utilization of their incomes without fear of intimidation from male members of the family, including their spouses.

Climate change, conflict, and other environmental crises are creating contexts that are putting many children in the Mandera cluster at greater risk of child marriage. Due to the lack of economic opportunities, crises are pushing families to marry off their daughters in exchange for dowry. Moreover, school enrolment rates are very low for girls, implying that they will not be able to support their families

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[63] Alsaba Khuloud, Kapilashrami Anju, 'Understanding women's experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria,' *Reprudcitve Health Matters*, 24(47) (2016):5–17.

[64] Oluwakemi Amodu, Bukola Salami, Solina Richter, and Philomena Okeke-Ihejirika, 'Reproductive healthcare for women in IDP camps in Nigeria: An analysis of structural gaps,' *Glob Public Health* 16(4) (2021):563–77.

economically by being part of the employment market. The study participants mentioned that the practice of marrying girls off often happens as part of economic recovery for most families affected by conflict and other forms of distress.

Due to the volatile and insecure situation in parts of the cluster, especially in rural areas, there has been limited access for international humanitarian and development organizations that could conduct specific gender advocacy and awareness raising towards departing from these traditional norms[65].

Access to health services: The detrimental impact of armed conflict on health is not limited to deaths, injuries, and disability. Conflict also bears indirect health effects through a variety of risk factors. Attacks and other disruptions to health systems reduce access to curative and preventive services.

Health care infrastructure within the triangle varies across the countries. In common with all IGAD countries, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya lag in most health indicators[66]. The multiple types of conflicts reported in the earlier part of this report are all reported to have disrupted the provision of health services to the public in the region.

Population displacements have negative effects on the public health system in settings not directly affected by armed conflicts. For instance, the Al-Shabaab insurgency has reduced the availability and accessibility of health services in affected areas. According to key informants from Mandera County, many of the health districts along the borders of Somalia have been severely affected. Many health facilities have closed as health workers and communities have fled for safety. The disruption of normal life and health services due to the insurgency has created an environment conducive to the spread of communicable diseases.

Access to education: The majority of the participants, irrespective of gender differences, reiterated the huge impact of conflicts on access to education for all. Clashes result in the closure of learning institutions, including primary and secondary schools. For example, the continued inter-clan conflict between the Degodia and Garre in Mandera County has continued to impact access to education in the conflict hotspots of Rhamu and Banisa sub-counties. The closure of schools has caused a major impact on school attendance, further resulting in a drop in performance over the years. The effects of displacement on children have been particularly pronounced.

The insurgency and counterinsurgency of Al-Shabaab in the Mandera triangle have resulted in the departure of many skilled professionals from the area. The triangle's education system heavily depends on teachers from Kenya. Most of these teachers have left the area for fear of their lives, deepening the woes of an already impoverished region. Women in FGDs also highlighted the detrimental psychological impact of violence, particularly attacks on teachers and schools, on children who also suffer from school closures.

3.5. WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CHALLENGES THEY EXPERIENCE

Violent conflict disproportionately affects women and girls, and intensifies pre-existing gender inequalities and discrimination. Nonetheless, women are active agents of peace in armed conflict.

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[65] Female FGD participant, Dolow-Ado, Ethiopia, 30 August,2022.

[66] Interpeace, 'A Comprehensive Study of Health Gaps and Needs in the Mandera Triangle: The Cross-Border Health for Peace Programme,' 2021, https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2021-Cross-Border-Health-Policy-and-Practice-Report-Mandera_PRINT.pdf (accessed 10 January 2023)

However, their roles as key players and change agents of peace have been largely unrecognized. Acknowledging and integrating women's different understanding, experiences, and capabilities into all aspects of UN peace operations is essential for the success of UN peacekeeping efforts and sustaining peace[67].

Efforts to foreground women's perspectives in peace processes and prevent gender-based violence have met with limited success in the Mandera triangle and the whole region. According to study respondents, women's participation in conflict resolution and peace-building in the Mandera triangle has been very limited by several factors, including the prevalence of rape and sexual assault, which generates fear and helps silence campaigns for women's social, economic, and political rights.

Women mostly take on responsibilities such as primary care-givers and providers for dependents, which makes participation in peace-building more complex. The cultural pressures against women also cause them to refrain from travel and engagements in important public arenas. Other challenges faced by women in the cluster include limited access to employment opportunities and productive assets such as land, capital, health services, training, and education. According to a study participant from Ethiopia, *"The women's agenda has been driven by NGOs for so long, and there has never been any willingness from our local and national governments to support any women initiatives."*[68]

The lack of willingness and support from government agencies and traditional systems hinders women's motivation to be at the forefront of peace initiatives. According to several respondents, deep structural inequalities between men and women in the triangle limit women's presence in the public arena. At the same time, women lag significantly in literacy compared to men. Discussions among the respondents revealed certain norms and practices linked to tradition/culture and religion that constitute potential challenges to the effective participation of women in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts at the local level. For example, some traditional and religious authorities are reluctant to involve women. This reluctance is not openly expressed but manifested by the fact that these authorities do not explicitly encourage women's involvement and show little enthusiasm for supporting their participation.

Women participants in the focus groups across the triangle identified several formal and informal mechanisms when referring to their role in preventing or resolving conflicts in their communities. These mechanisms include negotiation and mediation, dialogue, sensitization, inter- and intra-community mediation, and raising awareness of the destructive consequences of disputes. While it was clear from the discussions that women's potential for conflict resolution and management is usually not emphasized, it was found that women play essential roles in conflict resolution in their communities. A few women study participants narrated that while the nature of local conflict resolution mechanisms often inhibits women's participation, they can occasionally make interventions due to the flexibility of such local systems and mechanisms.

Study participants indicated that support for and consolidation of women's networks are opportunities to promote their meaningful participation in peace and reconciliation processes. Strengthening and consolidating women's associations and networks would enable them, in collaboration with men, to

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[67] United Nations Peace Keeping, 'Promoting Women, Peace and Security,' 2022, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/promoting-women-peace-and-security (accessed 10 January 2023)
[68] Ibid.

forge effective conflict resolution strategies and an inclusive and participatory climate for peace and reconciliation processes.

In recent years, several women's organizations have emerged in in the Mandera triangle, specifically to promote peace in the region. According to several high profile key informants from across the borders, women's organizations have frequently promoted awareness of human rights and addressed issues of justice by assisting victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). With many women susceptible to such experiences, organizations and individual women often provide psychosocial counselling to victims in the aftermath. By listening to testimonies, women help relieve victims of emotional burdens that could lead to sustained animosity.

Across the triangle, women who marry outside of their clans provide inter-clan networks that can provide crucial communication channels between warring parties, as echoed by several study respondents.

Several participants in all three locations raised the issue of training and workshops to promote women's participation in peace processes. They noted that empowering women and revitalizing their roles and contributions to conflict resolution would positively influence ongoing peace negotiations and conflict resolution. They also observed that training and workshops would help improve the general knowledge about women's rights and how they could be peace agents.

However, several participants also complained that existing training frameworks are not adequately adapted to the local realities in their communities, and do not allow participants sufficient time to internalize the content of the training. A few study participants noted that several women have been assisting survivors of SGBV and advocating for rights within the justice system. However, there is need for consistent capacity building and systems support to enable survivor-centered approaches in prevention, response, and mitigation of SGBV.

3.6. CAPACITIES FOR PEACE IN THE MANDERA TRIANGLE
This section explores probable linkages and mitigating factors along the existing conflict lines in the Mandera triangle. These aspects, actors, or institutions contribute to peace and could be utilized to bolster a shift toward a more peaceful future.

3.6.1. CLAN ELDERS
Traditional clan elders are often seen as connectors and indispensable actors to any peace process in the region, especially the kings of the Degodia and Garre clans that are both based in Ethiopia. As community leaders among Somalis, they derive their authority from inheritance, by community selection, or by government appointment. However, government-appointed elders, in some cases, do not enjoy legitimacy from the community, as they are seen as primarily serving the interests of the government[69]. To a large extent, elders represent their clans in disputes with others, and provide justice based on the *Xeer*. In this role, they are trusted by the population and are perceived as legitimate, neutral, and objective[70].

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[69] Male KII 3 September, 2022.

[70] Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy, 'Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking,' Accord Issue 21, Conciliation Resources,' 2010,, https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-

In the Gedo region of Somalia, for example, despite contestation over leadership, the Marehan are said to have a council of elders. The council consists of 33 representatives of all the Marehan sub-clans inhabiting the region, and is expected to intervene in inter-clan conflicts occurring within the region and the Jubaland state[71]. The Garre, Degodia, Murule, and other clans in the region have their own councils of elders. However, the Garre elders are known for introducing negotiated democracy in the region for the first time[72].

While the elders' customary justice system prevents inter-clan conflicts from escalating into violence given their legitimate rule, it should be noted that this does not always imply that they can contribute to "positive peace". In fact, while the customary justice system is widely accepted and perceived as legitimate by many, it has flaws and does not always provide equal justice to all, but may disadvantage marginalized groups.

These flaws include denying women and girls their rights when they face SGBV within their communities. It is often the male (elders) from the victim's family that agree with the perpetrator's family without the input of the victim. Likewise, elders focus on ceasefire and not long-term reconciliation between the conflicted parties, which sometimes result in revenge and repeated failures of elders' brokered ceasefire.

3.6.2. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Civil society organizations (CSOs) engage in research, training, conflict management, alternative dispute resolution, human rights activism, and legal assistance programs to ensure peace, security, and stability in the cluster. International organizations and institutions such as the Islamic Relief, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Fin Church Aid and many others provide training in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, among other things.

In a participatory conflict analysis conducted with local peace-building organizations[73], the crucial role of CSOs, including women's and youth groups, as supporters of peace was highlighted. It was mentioned that when local communities are unable to settle their disputes autonomously, they rely heavily on these organizations to prevent escalation through forums of dialogue or mediation. If these organizations are not successful, clan elders and security forces are involved, the latter as a last resort.

A system of mutual respect and communication between grassroots, elders, and local governments ensures effective conflict resolution at the local level[74]. In the Mandera triangle, such CSOs do exist as well. However, their set-up and resources are limited[75]. Nevertheless, the case of Kismet shows that strengthening a system of grassroots-based conflict resolution could be an opportunity to ensure conflicts are solved before they escalate.

On the Kenyan side of the border are local organizations that are locally-owned and have the legitimacy within local communities to conduct peace processes within the county. These include the women-led Mandera Women for Peace (MWFP), which has peace groups across the three border towns. These

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public/Whose_peace_is_it_anyway_connecting_Somali_and_international_peacemaking_Accord_Issue_21.pdf, (accessed 13 September 2022), 50-51.

[71] FGD participant, Beledhawa, 12 September, 2022.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Peace Direct, 'Opportunities for peace in Kismayu, Somalia: Insights from local peacebuilders on the causes of violent conflict and the prospects for peace,' April 2019, https://www.peacedirect.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/P861-PD-Somalia-LVP-Report_WEB-1-1.pdf.

[75] Interview with Member peace committee, Mandera, Kenya, 26 August 2022.

groups were established to carry out rapid responses whenever there are issues that arise in the cluster. They have a coordination office in Mandera and influence on the local authorities in the cluster. Thee Mandera Peace Committee and Mandera Mediation Council work closely with the County Commissioner and security providers, following their mandates as front liners in dialogue and community cohesion processes in the county. The Rural Agency for Community Development and Assistance (RACIDA) is an NGO that supports community resilience-building processes.

On the Belethawa side of the border, the Belethawa Women for Peace closely collaborates with Mandera Women for Peace on cross-border peace processes. They receive funding from the Global Engagement to conduct peace processes on the Belethawa side of the border[76]. There are other local organizations such as the Gedo Peace Organization and Development Concern Initiatives that support youth engagement and peace-building, with the collaboration of the local authorities.

3.6.3. WOMEN

Women were described as the "glue" that binds and grips clans, including those in conflict. Participants also mentioned that in Somali culture, women, children, and the elderly are referred to as *birmageydo* or 'those who are spared from the sword, or those who require full protection during conflicts', or simply vulnerable groups that must not be slaughtered.

Because of their weaker ties to the clans, which are based on male ancestry, women in the cluster are in a better position to build cross-clan alliances and exchanges with women from other clans. Furthermore, mothers of families have a certain position of respect and influence in their households.

However, by engaging in peace-building and resolution of conflicts, women are putting themselves at high risk of becoming collateral damage. Contrary to men, the killing of a woman does not trigger the same revenge attacks by the woman's clan. Such an act is less punishable, and easily resolved in some cases. Nonetheless if there was already an existing tension between her clan and that of the perpetrator, it may flare up conflict[77].

3.6.4. YOUTH

It is important to remember that while the youth are often viewed as key players in conflicts, they also play an important role in maintaining peace. If youths are given the proper training and opportunities to actively participate in peace-building, they will do so. They could serve as mediators, community mobilizers, humanitarian workers, and peace brokers thanks to their youthful vigor and ability to adapt to new technological trends. Mobilizing the capacities of young people, like any other conflict-affected population group, requires a focused and long-term approach.

Peace and security interventions in the Mandera cluster never considered the youth in the past. While the youth are facing unemployment and never get an opportunity to showcase their talents, they are increasingly becoming vulnerable to extremist groups.

Several respondents emphasized that the only way to end frequent attacks in the border areas is by involving youths from both sides in peace-building initiatives such as sports. For example, in August 2021, the Mandera cluster business community engaged youths from Somalia and Kenya in a peace-building initiative in the region through a football league in Mandera County[78].

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[76] Interview with CSO activist, Belet Xaawo, Somalia, 19 September 2022.
[77] Female FGD participant, Dolow, Kenya, 1 September 2022.
[78] Interview with business women, Mandera, Kenya, 22 September 2022.

3.6.5.   RELIGIOUS LEADERS

Religious leaders command respect from the communities they serve. They spread messages of peace and hold community awareness sessions through sermons delivered in mosques and other public gatherings. Religious leaders have the ability to preach peaceful coexistence and facilitate dialogue.

Local religious leaders have been able to successfully mediate cross-border conflicts, which has resulted in the establishment of peaceful and stable dialogue processes[79]. They know the best fora to use and their appeals are typically less confrontational. They have unique access in conflict stabilization through their significant local authority and trust from communities[80].

The credibility of these religious leaders is closely connected to their unique position of authority, and they are often the most respected figures in their communities. Imams and sheikhs, therefore, play a decisive role in shaping their members' attitudes, opinions, and behaviors. Religious leaders should leverage this attribute to positively promote spiritual values and virtues like peaceful coexistence, and dispel extremist propaganda.

In Kenya, imams and sheikhs should courageously and consistently speak up against Al-Shabaab propaganda and narratives that use Islam as justifications for violent extremism. The expected backlash from extremist groups can be dulled by a cohesive and well-coordinated campaign that includes every religious leader. Religious leaders can also utilize institutional resources at their disposal to contribute towards grander efforts of preventing terrorism and violent extremism, at least from within their spaces.

3.6.6.   STATE SECURITY AGENCIES

The provision of peace, security, and justice has always been perceived as the mandate of state security forces. Consequently, most of the cluster's population looks to their respective state agencies to ensure social justice and peace through their formal institutions, such as the police, military, judiciary, paramilitary organizations, and other law enforcement agencies. However, growing concerns about the state's ability to adequately provide for the security of its citizens and the constant accusations against state agencies for neglecting their roles have been repeated across the borders. Investing in institutional and security infrastructure, and closer cooperation with national and local authorities and community actors can prevent gaps exploited by armed groups.

The underlying tensions between state and community actors continue to hinder their effective collaboration towards security and justice provision in the triangle. The growing feeling among the public that the state security forces and the judiciary are corrupt and unresponsive to citizens is a probable factor accounting for the strain in the relationship. Police personnel are especially perceived as troublemakers instead of peacemakers, and are often accused of engaging in bribery and corrupt activities. The state institutions, in turn, accuse community members of lacking honesty and not sharing information.

These differences have limited collaboration between the two groups. Nevertheless, there are some collaborative initiatives between the police, the judiciary, and some community members such as chiefs and religious leaders, which is worth noting. Communities in the cluster could potentially enjoy lasting peace and stability through responsible and accountable institutions, better/improved security frontline behaviors, inclusive political processes, equal access to justice, and upholding of the rule of law.

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[79] Interveiw with leader, Mandera, Kenya, 22 September 2022.

[80] Ibid.

3.6.7.   THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

The private sector exists in all conflict situations and has the potential to both exacerbate and ameliorate conflict, the outcome of which can be greatly affected by appropriate support from external partners. They can play roles such as sponsorship of candidates, media sensitization, public communications, and preventing incitements.

In addition, the private sector has the power of networks and convening. Encouraging the private sector to stimulate local development, job creation, and basic social infrastructure can contribute to long-term social stability and improved local livelihoods. The private sector can have a particularly positive role in providing jobs during and after the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process.

A few of the respondents believe that some local businesses benefit from conflicts in the triangle. For most respondents, however, conflict is bad for majority of business owners. This can be the fundamental motivation for the business community's involvement in peace-building initiatives. Moreover, their lack of a uniform agenda and varied interests provide opportunities and challenges in identifying their potential to help build peace.

3.6.8.   THE MEDIA

From the research participants' perspectives and the literature, the media can potentially build bridges between people and groups, improving governance mechanisms, increasing knowledge of complex issues, and providing early warning of potential conflicts. The development of social media can offer new perspectives in understanding conflict contexts and inform the design of interventions. This includes mapping people and their profiles, their conversations, gathering information about conflict dynamics, and overcoming traditional program design challenges.

Social media can amplify peaceful voices and shape the public and political narrative across the three countries. This can be done by countering fake news and threat narratives, and addressing potential trigger points through rumor management. It can also have a bridging function between local, national, and international spheres to mobilize action. In addition, it can create new spaces for people to connect, coordinate, and mobilize around peace. It can act as a vehicle for collective coping, augment traditional dialogue activities, engage in dialogue people who may not ordinarily participate in offline activities, and strengthen peace processes.

3.7. CLIMATE ASSESSMENT

This section of the report presents findings on the climate assessment for the Mandera cluster, including the related hazards, gender and social dimensions of climate vulnerabilities, management of climate risks in traditional and non-traditional initiatives, and challenges the triangle faces in addressing these hazards.

The Mandera triangle is among the most vulnerable regions to climate change. This vulnerability is complex, differentiated, multi-dimensional, and a function of several factors, including high exposure to climate risks, continued instability, weak governance, gender inequality, and widespread poverty.

3.7.1.   HAZARDS AFFECTING THE MANDERA CLUSTER

The Mandera triangle is predominantly semi-arid, with most of the cluster receiving average annual rainfall below 250 mm[81]. In the last two decades, the triangle has faced a higher degree of vulnerability

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[81] World Vision, 'Responding to the Triple Challenge: Climate, Conflict and COVID-19 in the Horn of Africa,' March 2021, https://www.worldvision.org.uk/media/b11fo1zz/impact20213cs.pdf.

to disaster risk due to climate change. This has resulted in "threat multipliers" such as insecurity and unstable health, social, economic ecosystems in what is already one of the most fragile areas.

Sudden hot spells and intense rainfalls can paralyze agricultural and livestock production, disrupting ecosystems, and deepening tensions between rival communities already on the precipice of conflict. As a result, communities in the Mandera triangle are highly vulnerable to droughts, heat stress and moisture stress, hazards that affect the production, storage and sales of agricultural produce and livestock products. Flash floods also occur periodically, affecting both crop and livestock production including limiting access to inputs and markets for the sale of produce.

a) Sudden and Slow-Onset Events affecting the Cluster

The region experiences generally high temperatures and limited rainfall. Hence, the region has limited opportunities for crop growing and livestock rearing. This limits the inhabitants to keeping drought-resilient livestock, such as camels and goats. There are a few who still grow crops in these climatic conditions[82]. However due to a lack of good agricultural practices and limited land sizes, their crops don't do well. In this regard, a study participant from Dolo Ado noted, *"There has been an overall decrease in the number of cold days and nights and an increase in the number of warm days and nights."*[83]

Study participants also recognize an effect of climate change where heavy rains trigger flash floods, causing riverine flooding. FGD participants from Rhamu, Dolo Ado, and Dolow Somalia noted that challenges of flash floods and riverine flooding have hindered their potential for good harvests, displaced people from their villages, and killed humans and their livestock. Frequent floods are experienced by populations living along the major rivers in the region – the Shabelle and Dawa Rivers. Most at-risk populations live in Rhamu in Kenya, Dolow Ado in Ethiopia, and Dolow in Somalia. Additionally, most participants recalled the invasion of desert locusts in the region for the last three years. They feared another locust invasion could also seriously threaten crop production and animal feeds in a region already facing four failed rainy seasons, prolonged drought, and economic crises.

Climate change also creates conditions that allow mosquito vectors that carry dengue*,* malaria, *chikungunya,* and *zika* and their associated diseases to flourish. KIIs with NGO and government representatives in Kenya expressed fears that climate change will alter the distribution and burden of vector-borne diseases, potentially reversing the gains of control and increasing the threat of emerging diseases. According to the key informants, dengue and *chikungunya* are major regional health concerns across the triangle due to their continued spread and intensifying epidemic activities. All study participants in the triangle reported regular outbreaks of dengue and *chikungunya.*

Outbreaks of several diseases occurred in the Mandera triangle in 2020 and 2021, including cholera, acute watery diarrhea (AWD), c*hikungunya*, and dengue, among others. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as of February 2021, 32 human cases (14 confirmed positive) of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) led to 11 deaths (CFR 34%) in four counties in Kenya, including Mandera[84].

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[82] Interpeace, 'A Comprehensive Study of Health Gaps and Needs in the Mandera Triangle: The Cross-Border Health for Peace Programme,' 2021, https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2021-Cross-Border-Health-Policy-and-Practice-Report-Mandera_PRINT.pdf.

[83] Interview with key informant, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 22 September 2022.

[84] Ibid.

Effects of climate change are also seen in the declining groundwater levels, resulting in increased water processing and increased likelihood of conflicts over water. According to an environmental expert, water levels have dropped dramatically due to the increased drilling of boreholes. This is more so in densely populated or semi-urban regions. Most areas have degraded land as a result of decreased water and pasture. Reduced rainfall has compelled the inhabitants to assemble in relatively small areas incapable of supporting the high number of livestock[85]. Loss of livestock and increased rivalry over few resources result from these shifts and other macro issues. More than that, tremendous environmental damage and communal disputes have resulted from the inflow of so many animals into areas that still had water and pasture.

b) Main Causes and Drivers of Sudden and Slow-Onset Events

Unpredictable Weather

A few respondents noted that for over 40 – 50 years, the cluster communities could predict weather patterns, which informed most of their plans for their livestock. It was the role of the elders to study weather patterns and advise the community members on their next destination if they intended to move their animals in search of water and pasture. In recent years, however, it has become challenging to predict weather patterns due to prolonged droughts and reduced rainfall. There were four distinct seasons in previous years. Communities anticipated two wet seasons and two dry seasons, one of the wet seasons being long and the other short. They knew when to expect rain and when not to, based on their seasonal calendar of January-March (dry season also known as *Jilaal*), April-June (long rains known as *Gu*), July-September (dry season known as *Hagaa*), and October-December (short rains also called *Dayr*).

Today, however, it is difficult to distinguish the seasons, and the pastoralists cannot plan for their animals. The community describes this overlapping of the season as *sanad guur* or the vanishing of seasons[86].

As a study participant from Mandera, Kenya, observed,

> *"The seasons are no longer predictable. There was a prolonged drought in 2017-2018, prolonged rainfall in 2019-2020, and again prolonged drought in 2020-2022. It is as if the seasons are mashed together. Prior to that, the long rains and the short were just interchangeable in terms of length of the season and the volume of the rainfall."*[87]

In the past, severe droughts were uncommon, occurring every thirty or so years, and the community referred to them as *soddon guu* or a period of shortage that occurs at 30 years. Communities' timelines indicate that the most recent big droughts in the region happened every ten years and occurred in 1984, 1991, and 2011. However, respondents remarked that since the beginning of the 21st century, there have been notably more erratic weather patterns and persistent droughts.

Additionally, the amount of rainfall has become so variable that when communities anticipate enough rainfall, there will be minimal or no rain at all. Since 1997, a new phenomenon has been reported in which extreme rainfall causes *El Nino* and massive animal and property destruction.

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[85] Interview with elder, Mandera, Kenya, 4 September 2022.

[86] FGD with Male youth, Lafey, Kenya, 27 August 2022.

[87] Interview with elder, Mandera, Kenya, 29 September 2022.

Extinction of Wildlife and Vegetation

Beginning in the 1990s, the Mandera cluster communities began to detect reduced populations of wildlife such as elephants, lions, leopards, and others. Some respondents from Mandera County ascribed this to the increased hunting of wildlife as a result of the entrance of small guns through Somalia and Ethiopia. The disappearance of these wild animals, according to one respondent, has disrupted the ecology and led to a deficiency of nutrients in the soil, causing a decrease of vegetation in the area.

In addition to the extinction of some wildlife species, respondents from Mandera remarked that, as a result of the loss of pasture and greenery, some wildlife species such as warthogs and monkeys look for food near villages and families. In some cases, this has caused human-wildlife conflict, especially in Takaba town where water shortage was common in the past[88].

The locals have also noticed that many of the native trees they once relied on for food, shelter, medicine, and other necessities have now died out or been cut down. According to a respondent from Dolow-Ado in Ethiopia,

> *"Many indigenous trees have been lost and are becoming extinct because they were replaced by alien tress like* mathenge*, which are drought tolerant but add no value to either the community or their animals."*[89]

Decreased Water Levels

Water levels have dropped dramatically due to increased drilling of boreholes, according to an environmental expert[90].

Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 1: Water scarcity in Banisa, sub-county, Kenya

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[88] Interview with elder Mandera, Kenya, 30 August 2022.

[89] Interview with elder, Dolow Ado, Ethiopia, 29 August 2022.

[90] Ibid.

3.7.2. HEALTH, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, MOBILITY AND DISPLACEMENT IMPACTS OF THE HAZARDS

Due to climate change, there are vulnerabilities in several sectors, including water resources, agriculture and food security, animal husbandry, grazing and rangelands, health, and biodiversity. Vulnerability to climate change also varies by place of residence, as rural populations are more vulnerable than people residing in urban centers. Pastoralists tend to be more vulnerable than other groups, including agricultural farmers. Again, women and youth are considered particularly vulnerable groups.

Many of the drivers of climate vulnerability are also root causes of insecurity. Focus group participants voiced concerns on the current and worse implications of climate change: direct health impacts, threats to food security, and increased frequency and severity of natural disasters. In considering how climate change has been and should be addressed, they highlighted key ideas for incorporating climate change into current work educating and mobilizing communities. They also raised concerns related to perceptions of inadequate institutional and governmental action and reflected on climate protection messages and approaches that would be most effective in their communities.

Participants across the triangle expect climate change to impact food supply. In considering current and future effects of climate change, participants asserted that impacts would be – and in some cases already are – felt along the food supply chain from production to consumption. For example, they described challenges in cultivating crops and rearing cattle due to drought and extreme weather, and predicted outcomes ranging from food shortages to famines.

Natural disasters also cause loss of lives and property, displacement of people from homes, destruction of infrastructure like roads and telecommunication lines, and contamination of water sources, causing diseases or depletion of the same altogether. The magnitude of a disaster depends on the characteristics, the probability and intensity of the hazard, and the susceptibility of exposed elements based on the prevailing physical, social, and environmental conditions.

Natural disasters also lead to a decline in livestock market price, hence an increase in maintenance costs. Some key opinion leaders cited a reduction in livestock productivity, loss of livestock, reduction in livestock prices, and disruption in the market supply chain[91]. According to a study participant from Dolow, Somalia, *"The recurrent nature of climate shocks leaves little time for our people to recover, and the few remaining livelihoods and assets are put to test."*[92]

The combined effect of land degradation and extreme weather conditions has caused food insecurity among the pastoral communities in the study area. Livelihoods have suffered very much from consecutive droughts and most people do not see any future in pastoralism. As a result, there are increasing disruptions to families as well as increasing poverty.

Over the years, the Somali community has practiced an exclusively nomadic lifestyle as they freely move with their animals from one place to another in search of water and pasture. The community had no permanent residents and lived in makeshift homes. The changes in the environment and climatic conditions have forced the community to change their nomadic lifestyle to a more sedentary one. The nomadic lifestyle dropouts migrate to semi-urban areas in the respective countries of Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, establishing new settlements to adapt to their lifestyle changes. As a result, their livestock

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[91] Interview with elder, Lafey, Kenya, 5 September 2022.

[92] Interview with key informant, Dolow, Somalia, 18 September 2022.

numbers have decreased, and others found it difficult to rear the remaining animals. The rural-to-urban migration appears to be primarily associated with a combination of loss of livestock because of environmental degradation, unpredictable rainfall patterns, and prolonged droughts. Other factors include a need to move to the urban areas because the nomadic lifestyle has become difficult due to reduced rainfalls and an increased lack of pasture and water.

3.7.3. GENDERED AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE VULNERABILITIES

While climate change affects all sectors of society, some groups are more vulnerable than others. The elderly, children, women, and people with special needs and physical disabilities (PWDs) are at more risk of being greatly affected by climate change.

Gender vulnerability can be linked to women's lack of control over natural resources like water, the decision-making in the area of climate change, and the inequality of educational and employment opportunities. In addition, some related factors particularly expose women to the adverse effects of climate change. These include lack of political power, lower income and fewer economic assets, unequal division of labor, cultural norms, and biological differences[93]. Some of the most mentioned vulnerabilities that women face during natural disasters are discussed below.

Climate change intensifies economic crisis and family instability. Most respondents, irrespective of gender differences, explained that women are primarily responsible for farming and food production. As a result, they are disproportionately affected by droughts, flash floods, and locust invasions in the agricultural sector. Another central theme women participants identified was the lack of formal opportunities outside their households due to cultural norms around their gender roles as caregivers and household workers.

Women make up the majority of the world's poor and are more dependent than men on natural resources for their livelihoods and survival[94]. They tend to have lower incomes and are more likely than men to be economically dependent. When drought or unseasonable rain, for example, threaten agricultural production, men can use their savings and economic independence to invest in alternative income sources or otherwise adapt. In times of food scarcity and drought, women often prioritize their husbands' nutritional needs over their own.

Female heads of households who participated in the focus groups noted women's stress during disasters such as droughts and famine. This is due to their increased burden as caregivers and sometimes as primary household breadwinners when men travel long distances in search of water and pasture for livestock, thus leaving their families in distress. On this note, a female participant in one of the FGDs observed,

> *"We experience extreme stress and pressure during drought and famine as this not only threatens agricultural production, but we face family separation when our spouses leave us to fend for water and pasture for the livestock or seek market opportunities far from home."*[95]

As the female participant continued,

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[93] Karolina Lidsell, 'Women and climate change adaptation: A qualitative research of a gender perspective on climate change adaptation for national authorities in Sweden,' 2016, http://hj.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1068982/FULLTEXT01.pdf.

[94] Population Reference Bureau, 'Women More Vulnerable than Men to Climate Change,' December 2012, https://www.prb.org/resources/women-more-vulnerable-than-men-to-climate-change/ (accessed 10 January 2023)

[95] Participant in a FGD, Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, 29 August 2022.

"When there's drought, as women it is culturally recommended and expected that we meet the needs of our men before we attend to ourselves which leaves us more vulnerable."[96]

Study findings indicate that the impact of prolonged droughts had dried up natural water points like streams and rivers across the triangle. Key informants working on agriculture and natural disaster from the three countries, such as officials from Kenya's National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), Ethiopia's RRA and Somalia's Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) mentioned that water scarcity disproportionately impacts women, girls, and children since the responsibility of finding and fetching water falls primarily on them. Women collect water for domestic and agricultural purposes in many places across the triangle. During drought spells, women and girls have to walk longer distances in search for water which takes away from the time they are supposed to do domestic chores. It is worse for pregnant women and those with infants and children who need care, as they have multiple responsibilities.

As a female FGD participant in Lafey, Mandera County, Kenya, observed,

"It's so hard to walk in the scorching sun in search of water, and you are still expected to get back home and do the rest of the domestic work like washing clothes, cleaning, and cooking."[97]

Marginalized groups, including women, also face higher risks of violence, death, or injury as a result of climate vulnerabilities. From the study findings, the worsening drought in the Mandera triangle has resulted in women walking farther to access water and essential services, leaving them vulnerable to sexual violence. Pregnant, lactating mothers, PWDs, and the elderly are more susceptible to death and injury in the face of a natural disaster.

FGD participants mentioned that due to their gender roles as caregivers, women and girls often stay in a disaster to protect their children or adults while men sometimes migrate in search of alternative economic opportunities. Deeply ingrained social norms dictate that women and girls sometimes have to wait for permission from their male heads of households to leave their houses. Hence, if the men are away the women and girls are forced to stay, and are thus exposed violence, death, or injury. Many cases of sexual and physical violence have been reported during droughts and associated climate change related disasters.

According to a male FGD participant in Rhamu, Kenya, *"Girls are always attacked in bushes while walking for long distances to fetch water."*[98] A female key informant opined, *"When women are left behind to take care of children, the sick, and elderly when there is drought, they risk being attacked by unknown or known people.''*[99]

School is considered a lower priority in times of climate risks. In periods of crisis, girls are often the first to drop out of school to help their families make money, do domestic chores, or look after their brothers and sisters, and are at risk of ending up in early/child marriages. Parents who can no longer afford to pay for schools prioritize boys over girls. If girls are out of school, they are less likely to learn about climate change and how to deal with its effects.

Furthermore, the study reveals that most families prefer to marry off their girls as a way of 'restocking'. When livestock die, families try to recover by marrying off girls in exchange for dowry, which is in

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[96] Ibid.

[97] Female participant, FDG, Lafey, Mandera County, Kenya, 29 August 2022.

[98] Female FGD Participant in Rhamu, Kenya, 29 August 2022.

[99] Interview with key informant, Banisa, Kenya, 29 August 2022.

form of livestock. As such, girls are forced to drop out of school for marriage, and they can be married off as second, third, or fourth wives as tradition and the Islam religion allows. Confirming such sentiments, a female study participant observed thus,

> *"We have a neighbor who lost all his livestock after the drought last year and he had two school going girls. We were invited for the wedding ceremony where they got married and he received livestock which has enabled him to resume life."*[100]

3.7.4. HOW GENDERED AND SOCIAL INEQUALITIES EXACERBATE CLIMATE VULNERABILITIES

Women and men are affected by climate disasters differently due to their different vulnerabilities and capacities to deal with climate change. Gender-related restrictions, such as limited physical mobility, care work burden, and lack of resources and assets constrain women's capacity to respond to climate disasters. Women are also more vulnerable because they have less access to education and information that would allow them to manage climate-related risks to agriculture and livestock. In the Mandera triangle, many women have considerably less access than men to critical information on weather alerts and cropping patterns, affecting their capacity to respond effectively to climate variability.

Women's lack of access to and control of productive assets limits their response to disasters. Findings from the study showed that communities in the triangle are patriarchal by nature, with male heads of households. Most decision-making responsibilities of the household and family at large rest squarely on the shoulders of the household head. Matters pertaining to property ownership and distribution are also handled and managed by men.

Women's lack of rights to land ownership reduces their decision-making power, including over implementing climate mitigation measures, such as planting trees. In addition to inequitable decision-making, lack of land and asset ownership negatively impacts women's access to finance as they have less collateral. The fact that they do not have the power to decide and plan their lives makes it difficult to cope with the challenges of climate change, rendering them vulnerable.

Women in the focus groups indicated that they stay at home to care for children and the elderly sick members of their families while their men migrate in search of better economic conditions. These movements place men in a better position to adapt to climate change. However, male migration often increases the women's workloads, as they are left behind to manage the households by themselves in addition to their usual tasks.

About two-thirds of the women who participated in this study revealed that they did not have access to any financial or credit facilities. According to the women, this lack of access was mainly attributed to not qualifying for loan services, the culture and tradition of not allowing women to take loans, the unavailability of financial institutions in the areas, and their lack of education and interest in accessing loans. More specifically, women respondents from Mandera highlighted challenges they experience when accessing credit facilities. Some of the obstacles mentioned include a lack of financial literacy, the requirement by financial institutions that there must be a male guarantor, a lack of security/collateral to access loans, and a lack of support from men to enable them to access financial services.

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[100] Female FGD participant in Dolow, Somalia, 29 August 2022

3.7.5. MANAGEMENT OF CLIMATE RISKS

When asked how communities are addressing climate change, respondents voiced several concerns related to current efforts. These concerns range from a lack of accurate information in the media to the important role that the government and corporations have in showing leadership to mitigate climate change. Most of the community-level participants were generally far more aware of the problems posed by climate change than of specific solutions directly addressing climate change.

Traditional and Community-Led Initiatives

The Mandera cross-border communities have built climate change resistance mechanisms over time. For example, women in Dolow, Somalia, sought skills and knowledge such as traditional handicrafts and *henna* artworks from other skilled women, enabling them to be self-reliant. Findings indicate that women are more open to change, and that gender roles were changing in their households because they were now providing for their families more than their husbands. They did not seem to have a problem with these changing roles.

Furthermore, findings from the women's focus groups in Dolo Ado IDP camps indicated that women had grouped themselves to find a solution to sustain their livelihoods, and even further make them stay on top of climate change. Women identified small-scale businesses, such as milk resellers, vegetable sales, and household labor, which they engaged in as a source of income to sustain their families. Government officials from Mandera, Kenya, estimated that about 6000 *waleytas* (women from Ethiopia) migrated to Mandera in search of household laborer jobs to help sustain their families.

According to Somali and Kenyan women study participants, some popular business activities among them include poultry keeping, selling charcoal and firewood, and keeping goats. Income from these activities went towards food purchases, school fees, purchasing of household items, and medical expenses.

Some study respondents from Dolow, Somalia, narrated that a few women formed income-generating groups and merry-go-rounds. The formation of these social groups is meant to foster social networks within the community as a form of empowerment. As a result, the women benefitted economically and socially from the other group members.

Additionally, communities in the Mandera triangle have switched to raising fewer livestock to make them easier to handle and stronger to endure drought-induced famine. Instead of foraging, communities have adopted climate-smart techniques like fodder cultivation and grass planting for their animals[101].

Communities reported diversifying family economic systems to reduce income dependence. As pastoralism became riskier, they started small-scale farming as a substitute. Climatic change adaptations included picking domestic animals based on their climate shock resistance and planting grass. The table below summarizes communities' adaptation strategies from across the triangle.

Table 2: Community Adaptation Strategy Summary

Assets	Identified Adaptation Strategy
Social Networks	In-kind assistance from neighbors and the community
	Loans from friends and family/relatives
	Information on sudden onset events (early warning)
	Migration to urban centers or greener pasture

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[101] Interview with Elder, Mandera, Kenya, 5 September 2022.

Natural Resources	Place hay on top of trees
	Diversification of crop farming, i.e., onions, vegetables
	Use eco-fertilizer (manure)
	Use chemical fertilizers
	Store rainwater during the rainy season
	Water tracking from families, governments, or NGOs
Livelihoods	Sell healthy reproductive livestock to buy fodder and water to feed the weak livestock
	Migrate further to find pasture and water
	Feed the livestock with the farm products
	Give away cattle to relatives in nearby villages
	Sell part or the entire farm
	Shifting or diversifying livelihoods, i.e., construction, petty trade, household help (clothes washing)
	Loading and offloading of vehicles

Source: Authors Summary

During the study, household respondents were asked to state climate change adaptation mechanisms. Most respondents across the triangle indicated investment in climate-smart agriculture, livelihood diversification, and use of clean green energy resources such as LPG for cooking. Moreover, a few mentioned commercialization of livestock and livestock products. Other adaptation strategies included strengthening alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and practicing agro-forestry. Key informants from communities also indicated the use of alternative fuel to replace wood in order to discourage deforestation and charcoal burning. The majority of KII and FGD respondents from Ethiopia cited migration to areas with water and pasture, praying for rainfall through special prayers, split herds, sharing of food and sending the other family members with relatives, and resource mobilization for water tracking and destocking as community measures to help survive the effects of climate change.

3.7.6 INITIATIVES BY GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The extreme drought highlights the vulnerability of the cluster to weather hazards, which are anticipated to intensify with climate change. According to key informants, while government actors highlight concerns about managing natural resources and water, in particular, they have only a nominal function. This mismatch between regulation and management of resources (on the government side) and service provision (on the private sector or non-governmental actors' side) is a significant gap in the fight against harmful and maladaptive stakeholder practices.

This lack of enforceable government regulation – and government oversight power – has meant a significant role for the private sector in the water supply. Key stakeholders, both private and non-governmental, emphasized the central role of private actors in the absence of government support and action.

The private sector is represented mainly at the individual level. While some companies are involved in water management, most of the supply is managed by individuals with shallow wells, which are challenging to coordinate and almost impossible to regulate formally. Despite the lack of regulation, some actors noted the positive benefits that a private approach to water management has brought. Other

interviews with non-governmental actors highlighted this critical tension between service provision and environmental conservation.

The National Climate Change Policy 2016 and the Climate Change Act 2016 put forward Kenya's driving philosophy in responding to climate change as moving 'towards a low carbon climate resilient development pathway.' The National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2018-2022, National Action Plan (NAP), and National Determined Coordination (NDC) further state that adaptation is the country's priority, and set out the actions that will help the country achieve this goal. These documents identify priority adaptation actions that help households and communities manage climate risks, while prospering economically and socially under a changing climate and keeping emissions low. The strategic objectives of the NCCAP 2018-2022 are aligned with the former government's Big Four Agenda that prioritized enhanced manufacturing; food and nutrition security; affordable housing; and universal health coverage.

According to the Development Initiatives, the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) plays a major role by providing the platform for long-term planning on disaster management and contingency planning, something that is appreciated by the actors in Mandera. While the NDMA's focus is on matters relating to drought management, the manner in which disaster preparedness has been organized in Mandera County encompasses other natural disasters, including disease outbreaks and floods. Flood early warning systems have been installed by the Water Resource Management Authority (WARMA) along the river to alert communities of rising water levels when floods are approaching.

In order to increase the accessibility and availability of hydro meteorological and early warning systems (EWS) services, the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems Initiative (CREWS) has initiated a new US$ 5.2 million project titled "Greater Horn of Africa – Strengthening Early Warning and Early Action Systems for Meteorological, Hydrological, and Climate Extremes". The purpose of the project is to improve the ability of regional and national institutions to create and utilize climatic, meteorological, and hydrologic services, particularly EWS. In Ethiopia, the communities will benefit from actionable EWS, early actions, and the development of climate and warning information services driven by demand. For Somalia, it will support the development and delivery of hydro-met facilities and institutional strengthening[102].

With recent and relative stability, Somalia has made progress in the development of policies and institutional frameworks relevant to climate change, natural resource management (NRM), and overall national development. For example, Somalia has the National Development Plan (2020 – 2024), the Somalia National Climate Change Policy (2020), the National Adaptation Programme of Actions (2013), the National Environment Policy (2019), and the Somali National Disaster Management Policy (2018), which have all been developed to mitigate the effect of climate change. The existence of policies and regulatory frameworks are steps in the right direction, although implementation challenges still exist at both federal and state levels. These national policies, plans, and strategies have set the foundation for preparing Somalia's revised National Determined Contributions (NDC).

According to the NDC, the successful implementation of both adaptation and mitigation actions requires provisions of adequate and predictable financial resources, transfer of environmentally sound technologies, and capacity-building support. Therefore, financial support through multilateral and

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[102] World Meteorological organization update, 'Greater Horn of Africa faces 5th failed rainy season,' August, 2022, https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/greater-horn-of-africa-faces-5th-failed-rainy-season (accessed 10 January 2023)

bilateral channels and sources will be critical to facilitate transparent and successful implementation of the NDC. In addition, the private sector is already involved in climate mitigation and adaptation interventions in forestry, energy, waste, water, transport, and disaster risk response, among others. Therefore, there is a need to focus strategic efforts and engagements with the private sector to leverage these entities' potential to support a more resilient and greener Somalia[103].

Ethiopia's National Adaptation Plan (NAP-ETH) 2019 builds on ongoing efforts to address climate change in the country's development policy framework, including the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy and the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), as well as sectoral climate resilience strategies and regional and municipal adaptation plans. The main goal of the NAP-ETH is to reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate change by building adaptive capacity and resilience. NAP-ETH aims to strengthen holistic integration of climate change adaptation in Ethiopia's long-term development pathway, supported by effective institutions and governance structures, finance for implementation and capacity development, and strengthened systems for disaster risk management and integration among different sectors. The plan and its implementation are guided by the principles of participation, coherent interventions, stakeholder empowerment, gender sensitivity, equitable implementation, and partnership.

Most respondents were unaware of the presence of organizations that support activities that improve people's resilience against the impact of climate change. However, a few of the key informants were able to list some of them. Organizations mentioned by respondents include the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), World Vision, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Trocaire, RACIDA, and National Drought Management Authority. In addition, the Somali Drought Management Agency (SoDMA), the Risk Reduction Committee (RRC), and Islamic Relief were also mentioned. Furthermore, from the literature reviews conducted, the UNDP, the World Bank, the WFP, and several others are involved in climate risk and early warning actions.

Social protection in developing countries has recently emerged as a policy framework for addressing poverty and vulnerability. In the Mandera cluster, where chronic poverty affects large sectors of the population, social protection programs include elements of promotion and protection. The social safety net mapping analysis shows that the cluster's social protection system comprises safety nets, social security, and employment promotion and protection programs.

In Kenya, as part of the Drought Intervention Program, Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development (NAPAD), with funding from Oxfam, has supported 370 beneficiaries from Arabia, Kamor, Liban, Kabo, and Alungu locations in Mandera East and Lafey sub-county with unconditional cash transfers of about $50[104].

In January 2019, the Kenya government and the World Bank signed a financing agreement to implement the Kenya Social and Economic Empowerment Project (KSEIP), consolidating all cash transfer programs. It is implemented using a disbursement linked indicators (DLI) framework for results, under

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[103] Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 'Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy: National Adaptation Plan,' 2019, https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Documents/Parties/NAP-ETH%20FINAL%20VERSION%20%20Mar%202019.pdf

[104] Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development, 'Unconditional Cash Transfers: Life-Saving Support to Drought Affected Communities In Mandera County, March 2022, https://www.napad-int.org/napadsite/2022/03/22/unconditional-cash-transfers-life-saving-support-to-drought-affected-communities-in-mandera-county/ (accessed 10 January 2023)

which the World Bank is expected to release funds to the National Treasury upon achievement of pre-agreed targets as defined in the financing agreement. Funding is through government contribution, a grant from the Foreign & Commonwealth Development Organization (FCDO), and a loan from the World Bank's International Development Association. Under KSEIP, the third phase of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP III), which started in April 2019, continues operating in four counties, i.e., Marsabit, Turkana, Wajir, and Mandera. Currently, 101,800 households in the four counties are covered under regular cash transfers. In addition, HSNP expanded to four additional drought-affected counties - Garissa, Isiolo, Samburu, and Tana River - where it will provide regular cash transfers to approximately 32,000 additional households[105].

In Somalia, the World Bank is funding a Safety Net for Human Capital Project (BAXNAANO), an effective government-led program that aims to support the poorest and most vulnerable households in Somalia. Specifically, in Jubaland, BAXNAANO-SNHCP targets three districts in the Jubaland state of Somalia (Luuq, Afmadow, and Bardhere), where a total of 24,523 beneficiaries are supported[106]. In addition, the World Bank is also funding the SAGAL project, which supports over 3,000 beneficiaries in Dolow and Belet Xaawo in the Gedo region.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), as a partner of the Somali Cash Consortium and funded by the European Union, targeted families affected by the drought. The families received three months of cash assistance worth $US 270 through mobile money to improve household living conditions and mitigate the impact of the drought in Dolow[107].

On the Ethiopian side of the cluster, several social safety net initiatives have been reported. The Women and Social Affairs Minister, Ergoge Tesfaye, and UNICEF Ethiopia officials launched a humanitarian cash transfer program in Gode Zone, Somali Region, in May 2022. The program has delivered US$2 million in support to people affected by the drought.

In March 2021, the United States, the Government of Ethiopia, and development partners launched the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) five-year phase. The PSNP is the Government of Ethiopia's multi-billion-dollar food security, public works, and social safety net program for millions in need across Ethiopia. This phase of the PSNP received a $2.2 billion investment from the government and Ethiopia's international partners[108]. This funding was expected to reach up to nine million people yearly as it provides food assistance and services that will lift vulnerable families out of poverty.

[105] The Hunger Safety Network Program, 'Government disburses Ksh 537 million to poor families to mitigate drought effects,' 2022, https://www.hsnp.or.ke/index.php/latest-testing/159-government-disburses-ksh537-million-to-poor-families-to-mitigate-drought-effects, (accessed 10 January 2023)

[106] Shock Responsive Safety Net for Human Capital Project (BAXNAANO), 'Facts and Figures,' December 2022, https://baxnaano.so/status/ (accessed 10 January 2023)

[107] Somalia Cash Consortium, 'Cash Transfer for Drought-Affected Families in Dolow town, Gedo region of Somalia,' November, 2022, file:///Users/mac/Downloads/Success%20Story_%20Cash%20Response_Dolow%20%20(2).pdf

[108] US Embassy in Ethiopia, 'U.S. and Ethiopia Launch New $2.2 Billion Phase of the Productive Safety Net Program, March 202, https://et.usembassy.gov/u-s-and-ethiopia-launch-new-2-2-billion-phase-of-the-productive-safety-net-program/ (accessed 10 January 2023)

3.7.7 BARRIERS TO ADDRESSING CLIMATE RISKS IN THE MANDERA CLUSTER

1. **Lack of governance frameworks and institutions to manage drought** in the cluster. Different cluster countries have unique efforts guided by the respective policies of the governments. For example, Kenya has a drought management authority, in Ethiopia, there is a Risk Reduction Committee (RRC), and in Somalia, there is the Somali Disaster Management Agency (SoDMA). Overall, climate risk-addressing efforts in the cluster remain focused mainly on reactive, short-term emergency or relief responses. Poor coordination among authorities, institutions, and communities has slowed reactions to climate risks and increased associated costs from its effects. The absence of a cross-border coordination body or policy has also impeded access to the budgetary, human resources, and technical expertise needed to support more proactive climate risk management efforts in the cluster.

2. There is a **lack of climate risk data and information** on the affected communities in the cluster. Early warning information is essential in disaster mitigation and risk reduction. It usually provides a basis for preparedness and commitment of resources in disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery, and reconstruction in vulnerable societies. The communities in the cluster have no access to climate data and climate forecasts, and the concerned agencies are not providing or disseminating it. The communities use their traditional methods of climate prediction; methods whose reliability and accuracy have decreased in recent years. They are generally inaccurate and cannot be relied on to address the climate risks affecting the communities in the cluster. There are human resource constraints, restricted capacity to collect and disseminate data, and the need for greater real-time data collection and transmission capacity. There is no existence of meteorological systems that would have helped address some of these concerns.

3. Government agencies such as Kenya's National Drought Management Agency (NDMA), metrology and climate change departments do not provide and share early warning information to the affected communities, but compile it in their respective meetings' minute files, databases, and websites without dissemination. Moreover, no information is transmitted to the affected local populations since most are illiterate and cannot access information communication technology (ICT) infrastructure. This impedes climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.

4. **Lack of understanding** by the communities in the cluster. The communities and the concerned agencies, including the civil society organizations (CSOs) and local development organizations (LDOs), have little or zero knowledge on current and anticipated environmental, topographic, economic, and social conditions associated with climate risks. Furthermore, CSOs and climate risk management actors in Mandera, Suftu, Ethiopia, and Gedo who are supposed to collect and analyze this data have no capacity, and their efforts remain largely uncoordinated. As a result, data availability, accuracy, and accessibility remain a challenge. Examples include limited information on significant water catchment areas in the cluster.

5. **Human, technical, and financial constraints**. Many technical and human capacity constraints exist from the national/federal to community levels in all locations in the Mandera cluster, thus impeding climate risk management efforts. Considerable gaps in capacity exist regarding:
   - Awareness among the communities and policymakers of climate change, its potential consequences, and possible ramifications for each country's development goals.
   - Risk assessment, development of options for managing risks, and the ability to integrate climate risk into ongoing adaptation efforts in the cluster.
   - Designing, funding, and implementing projects and programs on risk management.

- Systematic collection of lessons learned and dissemination of information among a wide range of stakeholders active in different sectors and jurisdictions.
- Coordinated strategies and policy frameworks to facilitate oversight of climate risk management in the cluster.
- Financial constraints at community, village, district, and broader cluster levels.

6. **Government efforts to address climate risks are concentrated at the sub-national level**, and there is a lack of appropriate horizontal and vertical coordinating bodies in the cluster to support climate risk prevention, response, and recovery. Efforts, so far, to strengthen institutional and human capacity to manage and coordinate climate risks have mainly focused on significant towns and the national level (in Kenya) and federal levels (in Ethiopia and Somalia). As a result, less capacity has been built at the district level, limiting the implementation of climate risk management actions.

7. **Establishment of unplanned settlements**. This is rampant in Mandera, Kenya, but also practiced in Belethawa and Dolo Ado districts. People in the cluster form remote locations and villages so they can access relief food exclusively. This kind of unplanned settlements are increasing deforestation, as people cut more trees for them to settle in these locations. Loss of tree cover reduces canopy interception/evaporation and soil infiltration, resulting in more significant run-off during rainfall seasons. In addition, they destroy water catchment areas to pave the way for their settlements, causing agencies to struggle to address climate risks in the cluster.

8. **Vulnerable groups such as women and children in the cluster have little or no understanding of climate risk**, and their restricted access to resources accentuates their natural vulnerability. For example, most women do not have full access to or control over land, capital, or livestock ownership. Therefore, compared with men, they are less able to implement climate risk management measures such as agriculture that could reduce their vulnerability to climatic events. They also have less capacity to seek off-farm income-generation opportunities. On the other hand, women have capabilities as natural resource managers and community leaders, which can increase their ability to cope and take part in addressing the various climate hazards in their communities. Therefore, climate risk management efforts need to focus on capacity-building for women by improving their understanding of the implications of climate change, deepening how to develop and implement adaptation measures that minimize adverse impacts on these groups, and integrating this knowledge into intervention implementation.

4   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, this report identified the major cross-border conflicts in the Mandera cluster, the actors involved, conflict trends, as well as differential impacts of conflicts on men, women, and other traditionally marginalized groups. The main cross-border conflicts range from inter- and intra-clan conflicts and violent extremism. They largely result from competition over inadequate resources such as grazing land and water points for livestock, lack of employment opportunities for the youth, or are ethnically or politically motivated. The incidents occur at various levels of intensity and frequency across the cluster. While it is clear that the area's conflict lines are caused partly by the same drivers, it is also important to note that these drivers are strongly interconnected and influence each other, making a clear thematic separation difficult. Land disputes, poor service delivery, clan rivalry and supremacy, porous ungoverned spaces, and gender inequality all drive conflict within the Mandera triangle. Clan elders, civil society organizations (CSOs), women, youth, and religious leaders are also connected and mitigating factors along the triangle's conflict lines. Specific causes have been outlined for each of the described cluster zones.

The study also identified capacities for peace in the triangle, which include clan elders, CSOs, such as women's and youth groups, were highlighted as essential drivers of peace during the conflict analysis. Women were described as the "glue" that binds and grips clans, including those in conflict, thus mitigating conflicts. Religious leaders, government agencies, the business community, community-based organizations (CBOs), local development organizations (LDOs), local peace committees, and local leaders were not left out as key influencers of peace in the cluster.

While the relationship between climate and conflict is nuanced and context-specific, there is increasing evidence of climate change amplifying and compounding existing sources of economic, social, and political risks that drive violence. These challenges are most pronounced in fragile regions, such as the Mandera triangle, that are already grappling with weak governance, high rates of poverty, income inequality, as well as current or historical violent conflict.

The intensification of climate change may further escalate conflict risks, exacerbating threats to peace and stability. Furthermore, many of the people facing protracted crises are also some of those that are predicted to experience the greatest effects from climate change.

Conflict and climate change are multifaceted, including historical, economic, cultural, social, and political variables. A complex system connecting climate and insecurity is creating micro- and macro-level changes in communities. Indirectly, these components interact.

Changes in weather patterns, modes of subsistence, and the engagement and decision-making of politicians are a few of the repercussions of climate change on the local population. These changes have both positive and negative effects on the individual and the community. Ironically, the integration of social contacts is facilitated by participation in new government systems, notwithstanding the merits of increased education accessibility. Nevertheless, social safety nets and mutual aid are diminishing. This represents a widespread belief that cultural practices that would have buffered climate change have been lost or weakened in significance and application as cultural norms evolve in response to environmental conditions.

Rural-urban migration, which is largely induced by climate change and partly linked to broader shifting patterns of movement and settlement (due to a variety of factors), affects various elements of community members' lives, such as economic, social, and political conditions, and behavior. These actions may potentially exacerbate environmental stresses and, consequently, the impacts of climate

change on fragile ecosystems and livelihood systems where women, the elderly, the sick, and people with disability are adversely affected. The study reveals that women are more vulnerable than men to the effects of climate change, primarily because they constitute the majority of the cluster's poor and are more dependent for their livelihood on natural resources that are threatened by climate change.

Women living in the Mandera triangle continue to face social, economic, and political barriers that limit their coping capacities. They are also solely responsible for securing water, food, and fuel for cooking and heating. Other challenges they face include unequal access to resources and to decision-making processes, and limited mobility.

It is, thus, important to identify gender-sensitive strategies to respond to the environmental and humanitarian crises caused by climate change. It is important to remember, however, that women are not only vulnerable to climate change, but that they are also effective actors or agents of change in relation to both mitigation and adaptation. Women often have a strong body of knowledge and expertise that can be used in climate change mitigation, and disaster reduction and adaptation strategies. Furthermore, women's responsibilities in households and communities, as stewards of natural and household resources, positions them well to contribute to livelihood strategies adapted to changing environmental realities.

RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1.1   CONFLICT - RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS
1.   **Support for sustainable coordination and advocacy for peace in the cluster**

Several years of conflict in the larger Mandera triangle have had a devastating impact on the region's socio-economic situation. Consequently, the intrinsic nature of the conflicts needs multi-stakeholder, multi-sectoral, and cross-border collaboration in order to enhance the prospect of sustainable peace and local capacity for conflict resolution. These processes should include and enforce quotas for women's participation, but must go further. The extension of leadership training to women, especially those involved in formal peace-building activities, is important in order to provide participants with the confidence not to be undermined by perceptions held by both sexes of women as uneducated and ill-equipped to participate. Without the confidence to participate, the experience of informants in this research shows that, often, women remain side-lined even when given the opportunity to take part.

Information sharing and coordination of peace efforts between Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia are crucial for achieving peace in the Mandera triangle. The stabilizing process should look beyond military actions towards building a resilient society and state. The continued physical security challenges across Somalia – the consequence of a weak national security sector – mask the broader and more fundamental challenges resulting from a lack of investment in infrastructure, education, and health services. If these challenges are to be addressed, a significant resource investment is needed urgently. Ensuring a commitment at a national and international level for this purpose should be prioritized.

2.   **Establish regular coordination mechanisms**

The CBCR Activity should help create a linkage between formal and informal justice systems to ensure information sharing between legal authorities, community structures, community organizations, and support service providers to foster coordination for referrals, understand gaps and barriers, and facilitate cooperative solutions to unmet justice needs in the triangle.

3. **Design more tailored capacity-building training for local CSOs, local leaders, media, business leaders, and government officials**

The CBCR Activity should consider organizing climate and conflict related training programs to empower these actors with the proper skills and tools to address climate and conflict risks holistically and collaboratively through the common ground approach. A mutual understanding of each stakeholder's role will ensure higher levels of collaboration and coordination in the establishment of a platform to address climate and conflict risks and promote peace in the triangle.

4. **Strengthening and capacity support for local community structures**

In order to boost efficiency and broaden the impact of key sectors like agriculture, livestock, trade, and local administration in the Mandera triangle, it is essential to strengthen local structures and establish coordination between community committees and government departments. Capacity building efforts such as training, logistics, and material support will need to be supported if this objective is to be achieved.

Local communities must drive the process of identifying the core causes of conflict as well as potential options for peace-building to be sustainable. This is due to the fact that they are the ones who suffer the most when arguments escalate into violence. Likewise, it is essential to involve all stakeholders and highlight the resilience characteristics that prevail among the feuding populations e.g., a shared history, tradition, faith, language, shared infrastructure, etc. On the basis of these qualities of resilience, an enduring peace can be formed.

The legitimacy of social movements that seek to uproot gender identities that produce social inequality can be difficult to establish if a gendered awareness is not embedded throughout processes aimed at social transformation. A gender-responsive approach to community involvement needs to be embraced in identifying the core causes of conflict, as well as for potential options for peace-building to be sustainable. Women and youth must be involved, and their voices must be heard as they suffer the most when conflict arises and escalates.

5. **Promote conflict-sensitive climate change strategies**

Gender-responsive climate change policy and programming must consider conflict, gender, and power dynamics while developing adaption solutions. If this does not happen, response methods could escalate emotions and lead to violence. For example, Kenya's National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) recognizes climate change's impact on conflict and security dynamics, and creates and implements conflict-sensitive response plans. Gender-responsive climate change initiatives must also consider the dynamics of local and regional conflicts. Local communities are in the best position to evaluate conflict risks and solutions, and provide feedback on intervention outcomes. Thus, consultations with the community should be used to create and implement adaptation programs. Consult representatives of all important groups, including ethnicities, gender, and ages to avoid exclusion issues.

6. **Learn from and improve existing traditional dispute settlement techniques**

The value and effectiveness of traditional institutions and procedures for resolving disputes and managing conflicts are frequently mentioned, and sometimes overstated. In the past, elders' councils and women's groups assisted in local dispute settlement. In many cases, however, these institutions have deteriorated over time due to a variety of factors, including escalating conflict (especially in relation to the rise of SALW) and the emergence of state institutions with responsibility for conflict management. Strengthening traditional institutions will enhance the communities' ability to arbitrate and settle

disputes. Government agencies need to recognize the need to improve these institutions, and to strengthen them to ensure ownership and cultural relevance of interventions in each conflict setting.

4.1.2   CLIMATE-RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

1.   Diversification of livelihoods

Diversification of livelihoods has a high chance of promoting crop farming, cross-border trading, and skill development. Thus, initiatives to support various livelihoods need to be done in a cohesive way. To ensure their success, it is necessary to sustainably manage the existing natural resources (particularly strategic water systems), assist in the opening of new markets, and develop the business management skills and technical competencies required to market these operations and strengthen value chains.

2.   Strengthen and expand community adaptation mechanisms

Implementation of response strategies at the grassroots level should be based on pastoralist communities' traditional adaptation and coping mechanisms. Without oversimplifying these systems or overlooking the actual realities of the Mandera triangle, there is much to be learned from indigenous communities' traditional practices. Pastoralists' adaptability and low-intensity use of natural resources may offer lessons for securing livelihoods in climate change-affected regions that are becoming increasingly severe. To facilitate this, consideration should be given to supporting traditional forms of governance and natural resource management, including local organizations such as elders' councils and women's networks or the existing water users' associations, and so on.

Encourage local communities to develop and institutionalize community-based and traditional disaster risk mapping tools and methodologies to establish preparedness and response plans, with the support of local and national authorities, civil society, and the private sector.

3.   Building a harmonized data analysis and information dissemination system

During the study and the validation workshop, stakeholders insisted on the need for data to help enhance knowledge on cross-border disasters. While understanding of the causes, dynamics, and magnitude of disasters has been growing in recent years, these phenomena are still not fully understood and conceptualized across countries. Therefore, better data, concepts, and evidence are needed to develop adequate policies, and better coordinate and collaborate among the respective agencies working separately in each of the three countries. Therefore, the CBCR Activity should highlight the need to bring together and link all agencies to address cross-border information dissemination that, to date, have been uncoordinated, and call for the increased collaboration of actors in these fields.

From these collaboration and coordination platforms, the CBCR Activity should aim to help develop bilateral and regional contingency plans that identify trans-boundary risk scenarios and formulate comprehensive disaster risk management measures to reduce vulnerability and strengthen capacity to respond to cross-border disasters.

4.   Develop awareness raising, education, and training on climate change and environment

There is a clear need for education on climate change. Modules and media messages should be tailored to specific audiences. These audiences include IDP communities, who fight for their survival and are less likely to focus on long-term priorities, CSOs, and governmental counterparts. It is recommended, in particular, to focus on awareness raising among climate-induced IDP and host communities, and helping people understand why and where flooding happens to prevent them from opening a business in a flood plain. Developing the awareness of religious and cultural leaders is also useful, as they play

a bridging role in raising the awareness of communities on the spiritual dimension of the fight against the consequences of climate change. To be considered as well is the training and capacity strengthening of governmental counterparts.

5. Need for comprehensive, consistent, and complementary national, regional, and local initiatives

Since Somalia's militia, i.e., the Al-Shabaab and weaponry are part of the conflict system in the Mandera cluster, national and local leaders, including elders and Mandera County peace-building institutions and initiatives, must be integrated with regional ones in order to establish lasting peace in the cluster. Kenya's military action in Somalia, Somali refugee repatriation plans, and the Kenyan-facilitated peace talks in the Somali area of Ethiopia are examples of IGAD's Conflict and Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN).

6. Incorporating gender perspectives and involving women as agents of change in responses

The consultation and participation of women in climate change initiatives must be ensured, and the role of women's groups and networks strengthened. Discussions during the research revealed that, currently, women are underrepresented in the decision-making process on environmental governance. They should be equally represented in decision-making structures to allow them to contribute their unique and valuable perspectives and expertise on climate change.

Women can make substantive contributions through their knowledge and experience on issues related to the management of natural resources. For example, women in leadership positions (at national, local and community levels) have made a visible difference in natural disaster responses, both in emergency rescue and evacuation efforts, in post-disaster reconstruction, and in the management of essential natural resources.

Financing mechanisms must be flexible enough to reflect women's priorities and needs. The active participation of women should be factored in the development of funding criteria and allocation of resources for climate change initiatives. Gender analysis of all budget lines and financial instruments for climate change is needed to ensure gender-sensitive investments in programs for adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer, and capacity building.

Technological developments related to climate change should consider women's specific priorities, needs, and roles, and make full use of their knowledge and expertise, including indigenous knowledge and traditional practices. Women's involvement in the development of new technologies can ensure that they are user-friendly, affordable, effective, and sustainable. Gender inequalities in access to resources, including credit, extension services, information, and technology, must be considered in developing activities designed to curb climate change. Women should also have equal access to training, credit, and skills-development programs to ensure their full participation in climate change initiatives.

Governments of Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia should be encouraged to incorporate gender perspectives into their national policies, action plans, and other measures on sustainable development and climate change. This can be achieved by conducting systematic gender analysis; collecting and utilizing sex-disaggregated data; establishing gender-sensitive benchmarks and indicators; and developing practical tools to support increased attention to gender perspectives.

7. Gender-responsive emergency response and natural disaster management

The UN has identified environmental degradation as a key threat to human security. All conflict and post conflict countries in the Mandera triangle face serious environmental issues that could undermine

peace-building processes, if left unaddressed, and specifically affect women who are faced by a combination of hardships[109].

It is, thus, important to identify gender-sensitive strategies for responding to human security needs and environmental and humanitarian crises caused by climate change. These efforts should focus on reducing women's vulnerability, in tandem with men's susceptibilities; promoting gender sensitive emergency responses; and enlisting women as key environmental actors in natural disaster management decision-making processes, alongside men, tapping on women's skills, resourcefulness, and leadership in mitigation and adaptation efforts[110].

8. Supporting women's organizations to work toward gender equality

Designing activities that seek to promote gender equality is important. To achieve this, there is need to empower local women's organizations so that they can design and implement their own agenda toward gender equality. This can be achieved by supporting women's analytical, networking, and organizational capacity, and providing support for women's advocacy activities that bring together both men and women in social and political engagements.

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
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ANNEXES

Source: Health Care Africa https://www.healthcareafrica.info/east-african-countries-link-up-for-cross-border-cooperation-in-healthcare/