



FEED THE FUTURE

The U.S. Government's Global Hunger & Food Security Initiative

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS REPORT MANDERA CLUSTER



Community elders address a peace gathering along the Kenya Somalia border.

DISCLAIMER

This report was produced at the request of the Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity implemented by Chemonics and ACDI/VOCA through funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report was prepared independently by Rufino. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the USAID or the United States Government.



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FOREWORD

The Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity commissioned this Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a framework for building its knowledge base in the Mandera cluster. Particularly, the SNA is instrumental in understanding and mapping the actors across the three domains of the CBCR's interventions in the Mandera cluster: social cohesion, livelihoods and natural resource management (NRM).

The SNA also highlights the relationships, and information flows among the actors, as well as the gaps/roadblocks and the building blocks for systems level change. On this note, the SNA identifies three kinds of organizations or people: 1) central nodes -organizations or people who are well connected, are critical sources and repositories of information, and who have influence; 2) knowledge brokers - those who create bridges between groups; and 3) peripheral actors - those who are unconnected and can be at risk of exiting the network.

The SNA further investigates the types and dynamics of relationships (e.g., strong vs weak ties) between the various actors/organizations across the three domains. Overall, the results in this SNA support the CBCR Activity in identifying opportunities for fostering collaboration, minimizing risk of conflict and, ultimately, ensuring operational effectiveness.

Jebiwot Sumbeiywo, Chief of Party (CoP),

Cross Border Community Resilience Activity (CBCR).

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ACRONYMS

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ADA	Active in Development Aid
ARRA	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs
ASEP	Action for Social and Economic Progress
ATPU	Anti-Terror Police Unit
BORESHA	Building Opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa
CBCR	Cross-border Community Resilience
CBOs	Community-Based Organizations
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CEMC	County Executive Members Committee
CERID	Centre for Research and Integrated Development
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning Early Response Unit
CISP	Comitato Internazionale Per Lo Sviluppo Dei Popoli (International Committee for Development of Peoples)
CMDRR	Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction
COCOP	Consortium of Cooperating Partners
CoDHNet	Community Development and Humanitarian Network
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSG	County Steering Group
CSIC	County Security and Intelligence Committee
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CWW	Concern Worldwide
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRIDP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts
FADC	Focused Approach Development Concern
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGDs	Focused Group Discussions
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GPC	Gedo Peace Consortium
HAPPEN	Horn of Africa Peace Network
HAWENKA	Horn of Africa Women Empowerment Network
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HLP	Housing Land and Property
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMWG	Information Management Working Group
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organization
IRK	Islamic Relief Kenya
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
KLMC	Kenya Livestock Marketing Council
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
LLG	Lifeline Gedo
MC	Mercy Corps

MCAs	Members of County Assemblies
MCPAF	Mandera County Peace Actors Forum
MMC	Mandera Mediation Council
MPs	Members of Parliament
MSCF	Multi-Stakeholder Coordination Forum
MSF	Medicins Sans Frontieres
NAPAD	Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development
NARDO	Nasib Relief and Development Organization
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NFIs	Non-Food Items
NGAO	National Government Administration Officers
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NoFYL	Northern Frontier Youth League
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NSAs	Non-State Actors
NWWDA	Northern Water Works Development Agency
OCHA	UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OWDA	Organization for Welfare and Development in Action
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PWD s	Persons with Disabilities
RAAS	Rainwater Association of Somalia
RACIDA	Rural Agency for Community Development and Assistance
RDI	Raia Development Initiatives
REINVENT of Kenya	Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in Northern and Coastal Regions
SADO	Social-life and Agriculture Development Organization
SAMNET	Safe Mandera Network
SAMTEC	Sayid Mohamed Technical Education College
SCI	Save the Children International
SEE	Save the Environment Ethiopia
SEDHURO	Socio Economic Development and Human Rights Organization
SNA	Social Network Analysis, Somalia National Army
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management
TVET	Technical Vocational Education Training
UDM	United Democratic Movement
SACCOs	Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United Somali Congress
VDMCs	Village Disaster Management Committees
VSLAs	Village Savings and Loans Associations
WA-PAYDO	Women and Pastoralist Youth Organization
WARMA	Water Resource Management Authority
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WESCOD	Water Sector Coordination
WFP	World Food Programme

WFPD	Women for Peace and Development
WRUA	Water Resource Users Association
WSTF	Water Sector Trust Fund
WUCs	Water Users Committees
WVI	World Vision International
VERA	Vital Events Registration Agency

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides a Social Network Analysis (SNA) for the Mandera cluster in order to understand and map the actors in the Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity's areas of intervention (social cohesion, livelihoods, and natural resource management), their relationships, information flows, gaps/roadblocks, and the building blocks for systems-level change. The analysis identified three kinds of organizations or people: 1) central nodes - organizations or people who are well connected, are critical sources and repositories of information, and who have influence; 2) knowledge brokers - those who create bridges between groups; and 3) peripheral actors - those who are unconnected and can be at risk of exiting the network.

To evaluate the relationships and network structures in the Mandera cluster, the SNA was developed from a mixed method approach (quantitative and qualitative approaches). These included the collection and analysis of qualitative data, including literature reviews, key informant interviews (KIIs), and focus group discussions (FGDs) with a wide range of stakeholders, particularly those involved in promoting livelihoods, managing conflicts, building social cohesion, and managing natural resources in the Mandera cluster. Quantitative data was collected through an organizational survey. Key organizations, influential individuals, peripheral actors, and stakeholders in Mandera County, Kenya; Dollo Addo district in Ethiopia; and the Gedo region in Somalia were included in the sample. Surveys were conducted by trained enumerators, and administered in-person to representatives from all organizations currently in operation in the cluster that were identified through purposive and snowball sampling methods.

The data collection exercise was held across seven locations from September 10 – 23, 2022. A total of 100 organizational surveys, 14 FGDs, and 39 KIIs were conducted. Two additional follow-up interviews were held with representatives of two non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Ethiopia during the data analysis.

The following key findings emerged from the study:

The **social cohesion actors** in the cluster have better established channels in the government and community ecosystems compared to the NRM and livelihoods actors, as evidenced by the number of organizations and individuals they collaborate with. This, in turn, demonstrates that the social cohesion actors have ties within the communities that the CBCR Activity could leverage.

With regards to social cohesion, political leaders such as the Governor, County Women's Representative, and the Senator, the County Commissioner's office, prominent Islamic scholars and elders, the County Cohesion and Integration department, the Mandera County Peace Actors Forum (MCPAF), and NGOs such as Interpeace are **central nodes** in Mandera County, Kenya. In Somalia's Gedo region the district and regional commissioners are central nodes due to their broad influence and interaction with different segments of the community groups, private sector, and cultural leadership. Like in Mandera, prominent elders and religious leaders are also central nodes, along with a few organizations such as Belet Hawa Women for Peace. In the Liben zone in Ethiopia, the Somali Regional State (SRS) government, the zonal administration, *woreda* (district) councils, and *woreda* administrations also emerged as the central nodes due to their active involvement in peace, security and cross-border conflict, and networking with multiple stakeholders. The *wabar* (Degodia supreme leader) residing in Ethiopia was identified as a unifying factor in inter-communal relations among members of the Degodia clan and as a bridge of inter-clan diplomacy. The *wabar* is connected to many social cohesion actors and has unique links to others in the network within and beyond the Liben zone.

Similarly, the Garre clan sultan, who also resides in Ethiopia, was identified as the supreme cultural leader of the community and a symbol of unity.

Politicians are a source of strategic information, and are widely consulted by the security agencies, community leaders, and government departments across the cluster. Nonetheless, most of them have weaker links with their constituents, giving them peripheral placement in certain instances.

In Kenya's Mandera County, the County Commissioner maintains strong connections with the security agencies through the County Security and Intelligence Committee (CSIC) and Mandera County CVE Engagement Forum (MCEF), and has normal interactions with other government ministries and non-state actors (NSAs) through the County Steering Group (CSG), civil society actors (opinion leaders, clan elders, gatekeepers), neighboring countries' administrations, and the public through *barazas* (public meetings). The MCPAF is uniquely connected to a broad network of actors among NGOs and CBOs engaged in peace-building work. Additionally, it has strong links with ceasefire monitoring committees, local administrations, councils of elders, religious leaders, and village dialogue spaces.

The *Ugaas* and Sultanate in Baledhawa, Gedo region have effective working relationships with the religious leaders and politicians in a collaboration that unites them against the Jubaland authority. However, factions of the sultanate in Burhache (Elwak, Somalia) have a cordial relationship with the Jubaland State Government (JSG) primarily to protect political clan interests. Diaspora communities from Gedo who live overseas also have a cordial relationship with the religious leaders, primarily due to their trustworthiness in handling funds raised from the diaspora to help vulnerable communities. At the same time, however, the Gedo administration has been at loggerheads with the Jubaland state government, which has reduced engagement between the two levels of government. Control over Jubaland, Somalia's economic hub, has been and will probably continue to be a contentious issue.

Even though there has been a diplomatic row between Kenya and Somalia, local administrations in Gedo and Kenya still engage in security coordination and information sharing, and hold periodic meetings to discuss issues. The aftermath of the recent election in Somalia has seen this relationship become more apparent.

The Dollo Ado *woreda* administration and community watch groups have a good relationship. Specifically, the *kebele* is a strong security and surveillance network and has a good working relationship with the public. Due to the increasing terror attacks in Ethiopia, there is a renewed frequent interaction between the *kebele* and the Dollo Ado administration. For the past three years, the Liben zone has been generally peaceful, with lesser disputes emerging in water resource use and management.

Organizations and institutions such as the Mandera Women for Peace, youth football clubs, the Kadhi's court, councils of elders, and the media are the social cohesion **knowledge brokers**, creating bridges and providing avenues for interaction between the government institutions, politicians, highly influential customary institutions, and peripheral actors. Acting in the role of brokers, youth groups and women's groups in Gedo were frequently identified for their role in mobilizing the community and the cultural leadership when it comes to conflict resolution. Women's groups, religious leaders, and councils of elders from the different communities in the Liben zone were involved in many activities but lacked a unique role, thereby positioning themselves broadly as knowledge brokers.

Most of the youth organizations, community voluntary groups, human rights groups, minority community groups, and persons with disabilities (PWDs) in Mandera emerged as peripheral actors, with regards to social cohesion. In Gedo, security forces and militant groups earned a peripheral location

since only a few actors had interactions with them. In the Liben zone, youth and minority groups were the peripheral actors due to their low involvement in social affairs. Across the cluster, there are many youth groups, but they are generally not united. This has made them peripheral actors in all spheres. There is a worrying trend, especially in Mandera, that youth have formed clan enclaves and formed football groups using the clan identity. Thus, subsequent differences among the clans also affect the few structured and focused youth groups.

The **livelihood actors** in the cluster are varied and multifaceted, participating in diverse activities, such as natural resource management (NRM) and, more generally, under the resilience theme. Most livelihood players in Mandera County are strong, separate groupings that are primarily positioned as information brokers, powerful in their networks but lacking in specialty. The Building Opportunities for Resilience in the Horn of Africa (BORESHA) program, Kenya Red Cross, Islamic Relief, Kenya Livestock Marketing Council (KLMC), and commercial banks are a few examples of knowledge brokers. However, the County Steering Group (CSG), in which most of these groups are members, has generally emerged as a focal point for livelihoods-related activities. Due to their distinctive positions, the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries are central nodes. There are limited connections among women traders, PWD associations, and cross-border traders, putting them in disadvantageous positions and making them peripheral actors.

In Gedo, however, the private sector occupies a central position as a result of its good relationship with the local authorities. This is because of the vital role of business leaders in contributing resources for community dialogue, sending remittances, supporting displaced people, and raising funds for drought and other emergencies. However, SMEs, farmers' groups and most general traders tend to remain on the periphery and seldom have engagement with the rest of the livelihood actors, except in cases where some receive support from NGO programs.

A common trend is that private sector engagement with civil society organizations (CSOs) is confined to resource mobilization. Even though NGOs dominate the livelihoods sector in the Gedo region, they cannot be given a central status and they tend to fall in the position of brokers. This is because they do not hold the network together and their exit does not fragment the network. Every year, the network has different sets of active actors, while others hibernate and resurface after a certain period depending on funding availability or changes in priorities. In Liben zone, a few NSAs such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Save the Children International (SCI) have earned the central node status due to their strong and distinctive roles in supporting refugees and host communities, respectively. Majority of the NGOs and government departments such as Livestock, Agriculture and Water Offices play highly visible roles, either supporting refugee or host community interventions, but lack a unique role like the UNHCR, SCI, and Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA).

The **natural resource management (NRM)** sector mostly shares the same actors with the livelihoods sector. In Mandera, the most active NRM platform is the Water Sector Coordination (WESCOD), the water sector technical working group in the CSG hosted by the county Ministry of Water, Environment, and Natural Resources. WESCOD compiles and shares information with various stakeholders including the CSG, the county executive platform, national government agencies, and the Council of Governors. NSAs form the core of the knowledge brokers in the sector. NDMA was cited as the actor with most connections within WESCOD, and with other technical working groups in the CSG. NDMA acts as the coordination link between the CSG and technical working groups and is engaged in monitoring of multi-sectoral activities. Its primary role in the sector is the coordination of drought response and providing drought early warning information to stakeholders, positioning itself as a central node. NSAs

engaged in NRM activities are more connected to government agencies through CSG, and less connected with community structures such as water resource users' associations (WRUAs). The Mujitama WRUA in Mandera has connections with actors outside the county, such as the Water Resource Authority (WRA). However, at the local level, it lacks any tangible connections with the county government and NSAs and is, therefore, a peripheral actor.

The majority of NRM actors in the Gedo region sit in the periphery and have little connection with other actors in the network. The most active NRM actors were found to be CARE, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and a few NGOs like Action for Social and Economic Progress (ASEP). These NGOs, however, are typically viewed as knowledge brokers who work to connect local authorities with UN institutions. Active local village disaster management committees have also emerged, assuming the helm in disaster planning at the local level. By raising resources, merchants, women's organizations, and religious leaders actively participate in the drought response. In the Liben zone, disaster response is led by the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), although it has more of a peripheral role at the local level. The agency has no consistent presence in the zone but is represented by other agencies. At the *woreda* level, the Disaster Risk Management (DRM) authority is the agency responsible for coordination and collaboration among key actors in the disaster response sector, and has a more central position.

The Boresha Consortium brings together several international NGOs that deal with development projects i.e., DRC, CARE, World Vision, and Pact, which initiated an extensive resilience program stretching up to Dollo Ado, Mandera, Baledhawa, Elwak, Kenya, and Elwak, Somalia. Along with other actors, Boresha established the WESCOD which coordinates water-related activities. All NGOs working on water programs meet frequently, especially on a needs-basis to showcase to other actors what they do and new programs.

Although WRUAs, NRM committees, and water users' associations are present across Mandera County, they do not coordinate their activities despite sharing similar objectives. Despite being key actors in the NRM sector, farmers are not structured as a network, and only have fractured associations and groups. Water users' committees in Gedo exist in their numbers but act independently at the village level. These committees have a cordial relationship with the NGOs.

Regarding information sharing, 62 percent of the study participants indicated that influential groups forge better connections through building trust, while 50 percent indicated that it is through participating in shared activities (fundraising and charity activities, sport teams, community venture services, inter-departmental activities). For virtual spaces, WhatsApp was rated highly as one of the places where members in a certain network frequently interacted almost on daily basis.

Most NGOs lack specialization, which affects their consistency in terms of membership in each network. Depending on the type of funding available, NGOs move from one priority area to another, therefore making irregular appearances in different networks. It was also found that over the years, cross-border interactions and engagements have ceased, apart from infrequent need-based engagements, mostly due to limited funding. This has caused the information flow to not be reciprocal.

The conflict dynamics in the Mandera Cluster are centered on contestation over pasture and water resources, devolved governance resources, and climate change effects. In terms of power dynamics, the marginalized communities are not well represented. Minority communities such as the 'corner tribes' in Mandera were particularly mentioned as not being included in major decision-making.

In terms of funding for CSOs, there are reported cases of selective funding for specific CSOs due to their connections with donors, leading to relatively weaker organizations getting access to funding at the expense of more vibrant and active organizations. Transparency in resource allocation is a key concern in Mandera County. Some of the respondents in Mandera gave a new perspective where indirect marginalization is perpetuated by supporting political gatekeepers who serve the interests of politicians. Whereas politicians and elders were mainly mentioned as the power brokers, the *ulamaa* (religious leaders) and women were mentioned as the brokers, carriers of peace, and backyard influencers.

There is mushrooming of settlements with the primary intent of channeling projects to new areas by constructing water tanks and roads. In Mandera, there is an old yet worrying trend where settlements are created to primarily influence boundary delimitation.

Regarding the CBCR Activity's indicators, the survey measured participants' awareness on any United States Government (USG) food security assistance programs and male and female access to socio-economic and political resources. According to the survey results, 78 percent of the participants from Kenya were aware of USG-funded food security programs in their areas. From the survey results, only 15 percent of the participants indicated that they were aware about a project or program with USG assistance meant to support male and female equal access to social, economic, and political resources and opportunities, while 85 percent indicated otherwise.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Networking and Influence

- Kenya has significant sector networking, which Ethiopia and Somalia might also adopt. In order to create a more collaborative system where organizations within the sector have a common vision, goals, and strategies for carrying out their programs, networking must go beyond the coordination of projects to learning, and developing awareness, local buy-in, and sustainability of social cohesion, NRM, and livelihoods initiatives in the cluster. There is a need to facilitate learning trips between actors in the cluster so that measures that worked in Kenya can be replicated in Somalia and Ethiopia.

Relationships among Actors

- There is a need to develop engagements that provide the youth across the cluster with a more central, decision-making role in community interactions. The most practical youth networks that can communicate across borders are football teams. However, they need to be regionally organized, their activities supported, and connections made with other stakeholders. Overall, relationships among actors follow a similar pattern guided by service provision and minimizing duplication. There is a need to extend to coordination, collaboration, and continuous capacity building of local actors, localization of aid, and institutional strengthening.

Information Sharing and Network Sustainability

- In Mandera, in particular, all coordination platforms i.e., CSG, MCEF, MCPAF, have WhatsApp groups where they share information and discuss issues. These can be revamped into live report and response platforms to widely engage diverse actors.
- The networks have good overall connectivity and information exchange, but there are no venues for interacting with local organizations and peripheral actors to share information. There is a need to identify information sharing and dissemination practices that can ensure information flow is seamless. There is also a need to develop an effective communication strategy to engage with other organizations that have roles in the different sectors but lack the resources to be fully engaged. The use of WhatsApp forums, which was adapted by existing coordination platforms,

can be revamped into systematic feedback and response mechanisms using GIS (Geographic Information System) and related technology.

Conflict and Power Dynamics

- The Activity must consider marginalized communities' involvement and their representation when engaging the communities, particularly in the Liben zone. The community leaders should be involved in this to guarantee that beneficiaries are targeted fairly. The boundary delimitation in Kenya is a ticking bomb that should be programmatically addressed to avoid relapse of inter clan conflict in Mandera. Creating working relationship between the *Wabar* (Degodia king) and Garre sultan is essential in subsequent CBCR Activity programming to quell inter-clan tensions in Ethiopia.

Cross-border Collaboration

- Cross-border engagements have largely been halted due to lapses in funding. Thus, it is prudent to have sustainable cross-border engagements while building increased dependability among actors for regular interaction and engagements. For example, this could be by establishing a more active and transparent border management system, reviving the dead cross-border networks, and establishing sector response units.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Cross-Border Community Resilience (CBCR) Activity is a five-year project financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and implemented by Chemonics International and ACDI/VOCA. The CBCR Activity is designed to enhance resilience and thus reduce the need for humanitarian assistance among communities in the cross-border clusters of Karamoja, Moyale, and Mandera. Focusing on communities that live across the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, and Somalia, the Activity aims to empower local entities, including communities, civil society, private sector, and governments, to chart their own pathways for addressing conflict, improving livelihoods and/or reducing the risks of shocks and stresses. The CBCR Activity works to foster local ownership of development investments by supporting local leadership in work planning, implementation, and monitoring. The purpose is to contribute to the resilience of cross-border communities in the Karamoja, Moyale, and Mandera clusters, with the goal of reducing the need for humanitarian assistance among communities in the cross-border clusters.

To understand the context in which the CBCR Activity operates, a Social Network Analysis (SNA) is imperative. A SNA is a study of the relationships among different actors, which can either be formal or informal¹. Networks of actors can be in the form of coalitions, partnerships, associations, unions, and communities of practice. A SNA can, therefore, lead to better understanding of the partnerships, with a view to improving them and helping them better serve their purposes².

A Social Network Analysis entails mapping and measuring relationships and flows among actors (individuals, groups, and organizations). A network is simply several points (or ‘nodes’) that are connected by links³. The nodes represent the people, while the links are the social relations between them, for instance family, clan, faith, business, or political relations.

The Mandera cluster is a tri-border area in the Horn of Africa where Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia geographically converge. It comprises the Gedo region of Somalia; the Dollo Addo district of Ethiopia; and Mandera County in Kenya. Although separated by international borders, the three regions are inhabited by a near-homogeneous ethnic Somali population that largely professes Sunni Islam and is ordered along clan lines that straddle the borders. The Mandera triangle is marked by porous borders that allow for the fluid movement of people, goods, and services across the three countries. The porosity of the borders also breeds instability due to the easy spill-overs of clan conflict due to clan interdependence⁴.

The different actors in the Mandera cluster share cultural, religious, and economic ties. The clusters’ tri-border set-up brings together different clans, divided by national borders, but who also share cultural and linguistic relations. Clan membership and identity lies at the heart of the predominantly Somali society living in the triangle, and the whole society is organized around them. This is perhaps shown

¹ Yang, S., Keller, F., & Zheng, L. (2017). *Basics of Social Network Analysis*. SAGE Publications, Inc, <https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781071802847> (accessed 2 September 2022); Michael H. Zack (2000). *Researching Organization Systems Using Social Network Analysis*, <http://web.cba.neu.edu/~mzack/articles/socnet/socnet.htm> (accessed December 31, 2022)

² Ibid

³ UK Home Office (2016). *Social Network Analysis: ‘How to Guide’*. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491572/socnet_howto.pdf (accessed August 30, 2022)

⁴ Interpeace (2022). *Voices from Mandera: stories of hope and peace from the Mandera County in Kenya*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/voices-mandera-stories-hope-and-peace-mandera-county-kenya> (accessed August 30, 2022)




more clearly by the present situation, where the lack of a strong central government in Somalia has made the clan system vitally necessary for individual protection, day-to-day survival, and law and order. Clan identity, however, is not the only social factor in the region. In many places, clan identity coexists alongside other elements such as geographical background, class, gender, and religious groupings. This has given rise to a very fluid political landscape in the region⁵.

The purpose of the SNA of the Mandera cluster was to understand and map the actors in the areas of the CBCR Activity's interventions (social cohesion, livelihoods and natural resource management) their relationships, information flows, gaps/roadblocks, and the building blocks for systems level change. The analysis identified three kinds of organizations or people:

- 1) central nodes - organizations or people who are well connected, are critical sources and repositories of information, and who have influence;
- 2) knowledge brokers - those who create bridges between groups; and
- 3) peripheral actors - those who are unconnected and can be at risk of exiting the network.

The SNA was conducted in seven locations across Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, namely, Mandera East, Banissa, and Elwak in Kenya; Dollo Addo in Ethiopia; and Belet Hawa, Dollow, and Elwak in Somalia. These locations were selected due to their positions as cross-border towns and for their different ethnic and linguistic compositions. Each of them either shares borders with Somalia and Ethiopia or both countries, as in the case of Mandera East. Different actors and organizations (government and non-state actors) operate in the area, and are focused on conflict resolution, natural resource management (NRM), improving livelihoods, and reducing the risks of shocks and stresses.

Figure 1: Map showing study locations



Source: Author's sketch

The findings of the report identified a cross-section of both formal and informal networks of organizations and individuals operating in the cluster. Several key organizations and individuals in the cluster emerged as central nodes. These are better represented and more central across the core groups in each thematic network. The relationships among the actors are dynamic and fluid in nature, where some organizations have more lasting interactions while others are more seasonal and irregular.

⁵Haider, H (2020). Conflict analysis of North-Eastern Kenya. K24 Emerging Issues Report 36. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development of Studies.
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/15570/EIR%2036_Conflict_analysis_of_Northern_Kenya.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed on August 30, 2022)

Information sharing follows a similar pattern and is broadly associated with activity implementation and joint monitoring of interventions. The conflict and power dynamics are generally centered on unequal resource sharing, lack of transparency, exclusion and marginalization of minority groups.

The diverse actors in the livelihoods, humanitarian, peace-building, and cultural leadership are fragmented and do not work towards a common vision⁶. This is generally attributed to mistrust and suspicion caused by competition for resources and clan supremacy. On the other hand, these actors lack specialization and are involved in different activities depending on the resources available⁷.

The lack of thematic roles, apparent in the different portfolios held by local civil society and international NGOs, has led to duplication of roles and lack of a harmonized networking structure⁸. While there is occasional need-based networking in the event of crises like drought or conflicts, some important actors, such as the business community, seem to be isolated. Religious leaders are somewhat active but their relations with governments have recently become wrapped in mistrust.

Cross-border engagement, which was vibrant 10 years ago, is almost non-existent at present. Border management is the preserve of the Border Management Committee (BMC), custom and immigration authorities, and security agencies, and public engagement is widely lacking⁹. While there are several initiatives that are meant to enhance service delivery, such as the County Steering Group on the Kenya side, there is no effective accountability¹⁰.

The region's economic potential is overshadowed by the threat of insecurity and, therefore, mega projects such as the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPPSET) and Northern Corridor have been halted¹¹.

Organization of the report

This report is made up of five parts, beginning with this introduction that highlights the background of the study, the objectives, and geographic scope. The second section illustrates the methodology of the study, followed by the findings section. The report's findings identify the main actors in the network, taking into consideration the CBCR Activity's main areas of intervention i.e., social cohesion, NRM, and livelihoods. It then discusses the influential groups in the network as well as groups or individuals that lack influence, highlighting the barriers that impede their participation. Next, the findings discuss the relationships among the actors in the network by categorizing them into the CBCR Activity's thematic areas. The section also highlights the strength and frequency of the relationships.

The final parts of the findings discuss conflict sensitivity concerns vis-à-vis the power dynamics in the network, and cross-border dynamics, illustrating how interventions within it create or exacerbate conflict. Shorter sections of the findings discuss the CBCR Activity Indicators and the sustainability of the network. The final parts of the report are the conclusion and recommendations, and key areas of programming/potential activities based on the research findings.

⁶ Authors' observations

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

⁹ BMC's role is to promote inter-agency and cross-border cooperation and coordination of border management.

¹⁰ Rufaa Ahmed (2017). *Border Security Needs Assessment (BSNA) -Mandera and Wajir Counties*. Danish Demining Group (accessed on August 30, 2022)


¹¹ Wikipedia (2014). *Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor*.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamu_Port_and_Lamu-Southern_Sudan-Ethiopia_Transport_Corridor (accessed August 30, 2022)

2. METHODOLOGY

The Social Network Analysis (SNA) employed participatory mixed methods involving both quantitative and qualitative approaches of collecting primary data for triangulation purposes. The relevant literature, including reports from governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), were also reviewed to add to the knowledge base and provide context for the qualitative findings. The primary data collection methods included key informant interviews (KIIs), and focus group discussions (FGDs) with a wide range of stakeholders. These stakeholders included those engaged in community resilience, social cohesion, conflict management, livelihoods promotion, and natural resource management (NRM) across the Mandera cluster (Mandera County, Kenya; Dollo Addo district, Ethiopia; and the Gedo region of Somalia).

Figure 2: SNA implementation stages



Source: Author's sketch

The organization survey respondents were first selected through purposive sampling followed by snowball sampling in the target cluster locations to target respondents that are not easy to identify.

The data collection process began with the identification, selection, and training of enumerators and research assistants. A total of five enumerators and five research assistants were recruited from the seven districts and trained from September 7-8, 2022. The training was done to ensure that they understood the essence of the assignment and the content of the data collection tools for quality data collection. During the training, enumerators and research assistants were given a detailed review of the data collection tools, study objectives, approach, and the standard fieldwork procedures, which were to be implemented during fieldwork. After the training, the enumerators and research assistants were taken through a pre-test/piloting session. The aim was to test for accuracy and the coherence of the tool, the logic programming, proper translation of the tools, the timing for tool administration and completion, clarity of the questions, and understanding by the respondents. A few of the survey questionnaires were shared and filled by the respondents.

The organizational survey questionnaire was originally programmed into SurveyMonkey and, subsequently, Google Forms. However, this came with some challenges so the questionnaire was later transferred to an online server (ONA) KoBoCollect. The questionnaire was translated into Somali for ease of administration and understanding. Enumerators who speak the local Somali language administered the questionnaire with the selected respondents. The lead consultant and the assigned field supervisors supervised the team.

Once all tools were signed off, the enumerators were deployed for data collection. Given the mixed-method approach for this participatory SNA, the data collection for both qualitative and quantitative methods was carried out concurrently.

2.1 Data Collection

The data collection exercise was held across seven locations from September 10 – 23, 2022. A total of 100 organizational surveys, 14 focus group discussions (FGDs), and 39 key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted.

The quantitative interviews were carried out using questionnaires scripted onto the mobile platform while the qualitative KIIs and FGDs were carried out using discussion guides. For qualitative interviews, moderators asked the questions and probed for further information where clarification was needed. This ensured that the data collected was detailed, relevant, and that no information was left out.

2.2 Interview Schedules

The enumerators conducted a total of 100 organizational surveys (79 percent male, 21 percent female respondents) out of the target 100. A total of 39 KIIs out of the 45 targeted were conducted across the three regions in the Mandera cluster, and were held with government departments, non-state actors (NSAs), key stakeholders, and community actors.

A total of 14 FGDs out of the 19 targeted were conducted among community organizations and professional networks (e.g., Mandera Peace Actors Forum). Where some targeted KII respondents were not available, participants engaged in similar activities were interviewed. For the FGDs, some groups in the same network were combined due to lack of a quorum (at least six participants per group), thus the 14 groups interviewed.

Table 1: Respondents by country, location, and region

Region	Districts	Country			Total
		Kenya	Somalia	Ethiopia	
Mandera	Mandera East	28			28
	Banissa	4			4
	Elwak-Kenya	9			9
	Total	41			41
Gedo	Elwak-Somalia		10		10
	Belet Hawa		11		11
	Dollow		12		12
	Total		33		33
Liban Zone	Dollo Addo			26	26
	Total			26	26

Table 2: No of FGDs by location

	Mandera East	Banissa	Elwak Kenya	Elwak Som	Belet Hawa	Dollow	Dollo Addo	Total
FGDs	2	1	1	3	2	3	2	14

Table 3: No of KIIs per region

	Mandera County	Gedo Region	Liban Region	Total

KIIs	18	11	10	39
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2.3 Validation of the findings

A validation workshop to discuss the findings of the SNA was held in Mandera, Kenya, on October 6, 2022. The aim of the workshop was to present the findings of the study and integrate proposals and suggestions from participants. A total of 25 participants, drawn from the government agencies in the Mandera cluster (15 from Kenya and five each from Ethiopia and Somalia), NSAs, community groups, business associations, and civil society actors attended the workshop.

After the presentation of the findings, the participants made inputs and comments on the various aspects of the findings, which were incorporated into the report.

2.4 Data Analysis

Once the qualitative data was collected, the audio recordings were transcribed verbatim, and summaries of each transcript created for use in writing the report. Once the quantitative data was collected, they were cleaned, processed, and analyzed to provide descriptive analysis in forms of frequency tables, smart charts, percentages, and cross-tabulation of variables disaggregated by gender, age, roles and by region.

The quantitative and qualitative data were analyzed using SPSS, programs such as Cytoscape, Gephi, and content analysis, respectively, to write the findings.

2.5 Research Limitations

The original target for the organizational survey was 100 respondents through purposive sampling. This was anticipated to increase using the snowball methodology. However, the purposive sampling had 55 percent response rate, and another 47 percent of the respondents were, therefore, reached through snowball sampling.

Insecurity in certain areas, the biting drought situation at the time of the study, and internet problems delayed data collection in certain areas. Additional supervisors were deployed to certain areas to help address challenges experienced by the research assistants and enumerators.

The dearth of literature on SNA in the region is limited or almost non-existent. Hence, the researchers gathered information related to mapping actors working in the cluster and analysis of SNA reports from other jurisdictions.

3. FINDINGS

The findings illustrate that social cohesion actors in the cluster have better established channels in the government and community ecosystems than the NRM and livelihoods actors, as evidenced by the number of organizations and individuals they collaborate with. This, in turn, demonstrates that the social cohesion actors have ties within the communities that the CBCR Activity could leverage. There are relatively more social cohesion actors than livelihoods and NRM actors, thus showing a higher level of interaction between the social cohesion networks.

NRM and livelihood networks, in some cases, share the same actors. For instance, the County Steering Group (CSG) in Mandera County, Kenya, hosts state and non-state actors (NSAs) drawn from the livelihoods and NRM sectors.

Coordination and information sharing between network members is generally based on basic service provision and joint monitoring, while research and learning is fundamentally lacking. Most NSAs make irregular appearances in the networks, and their participation is determined by availability of funds. In terms of conflict sensitivity concerns and power dynamics, recurrent conflicts between clans, exclusion and marginalization of minority communities, and unequal development are key recurring themes.

3.1 Main actors in the network

The different actors in the Mandera cluster include government agencies, NSAs, civil society organizations (CSOs), professional networks, cooperatives, business associations, and communities of practice. The individual SNA actors were mapped at micro and macro levels. These include individuals/persons, social groups (clans, societies), organizational sub-units (departments and teams), and national/state/county governments.

In the survey, participants were asked to list the name, position, and organizational affiliation of up to 10 people. They were able to nominate any individual, inside or outside their network of organizations. The results show over 50 organizations were named across government, NSAs, and community actors.

3.2 Mandera County

County Steering Group (CSG): the CSG is a coordination platform that convenes government and NSAs to mobilize resources, approve programs, and devise a concerted effort to respond to drought and other humanitarian challenges. The platform is chaired by the County Governor, co-chaired by the County Commissioner, and has the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) as the secretariat. The CSG's members are drawn from line ministries such as agriculture, water, health, livestock, education, and the children's and social services department. NSAs such as the Boresha Consortium (DRC, World Vision, and CARE), Save the Children International (SCI), Islamic Relief-Kenya (IRK), Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development (NAPAD), Rural Community Development Agency (RACIDA), Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), Consortium of Cooperating Partners (COCOP), and Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) are members.

In total, the CSG has a membership of 30 individuals representing at least eight government ministries and 10 NGOs¹². The CSG has technical working groups, key of which are the Water and Sanitation Coordination (WESCOD), agriculture, livestock, health and nutrition, and cash transfer working groups. The NSAs are mostly active in the CSG forums when they have financial resources at their disposal. The CSG, or its constituent technical working groups, meets once a month, but also hold *ad*

¹² Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 13, 2022.

hoc meetings in case of emergency interventions or in the event of the introduction of new programs. The CSG members are diverse and belong to the different intervention areas of the CBCR Activity.

County Executive Members Committee (CEMC): The CEMC is a separate network that is made up of members of the county executive. Its role is to coordinate cabinet activities and development projects. It plays a role in social cohesion e.g., through the Ministry of Cohesion and Integration, NRM through the Ministry of Water, and livelihoods through the Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture, and Fisheries. Among the CEMC members is the Head of Delivery Unit, responsible for coordination, monitoring, and accountability checks on county government projects.

Political leadership: The political leadership does not belong to a single cohesive network but some of them are central figures with very visible and central roles. The key political leaders include the Governor, Senator, Women’s Representative, and Members of Parliament (MPs). As was observed, politicians can sometimes fragment networks and create disunity in program intervention areas. According to the qualitative interviews, politicians play their roles at national, county, sub-county, and ward levels.

The United Democratic Movement (UDM) party is a strong grassroots party currently dominating the county assembly and won the majority seats in the recent elections. An opposition outfit known as Mandera People’s Assembly was recently formed to perform an oversight role on the UDM-dominated Mandera County administration.

Mandera County Peace Actors Forum (MCPAF): Formed in 2017, MCPAF is an active social cohesion network that brings together peace stakeholders ranging from state and NSAs. The mandate of the forum is to coordinate and complement peace activities as well as to create synergies between peace actors in the county¹³. The MCPAF is chaired by a representative from the County Commissioner’s office and co-chaired by the Chief Officer, County Cohesion Department. MCPAF has a membership of around 25 organizations and 74 individuals¹⁴. Apart from NGOs, county government departments, such as the Cohesion and De-Radicalization Department, are members.

MCPAF has active grassroots representation including ceasefire monitoring committees (CMCs), chiefs, and village dialogue spaces. NSA members include IRK, RACIDA, Interpeace, DRC, NAPAD, Women for Peace and Development (WFPD), Mandera Mediation Council (MMC), and Focused Approach Development Concern (FADC), among others¹⁵.

Mandera County Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Engagement Forum: The forum was formed in 2018 and was formed from various wards in Mandera¹⁶, to create public awareness on methods of countering violent extremism. It is jointly chaired by the County Commissioner and the Governor and is made up of national and county government agencies. It works with the police and security agencies, including the Anti-Terror Police (ATPU), to identify radicalized individuals.

The forum, which can be categorized under the social cohesion component, has a wide community and civil servants’ membership of women, youth, religious leaders, teachers, civil society, and the private sector. The different groups represent the several pillars of the County Action Plan on CVE, including the economic, religious, education, security, and political pillars.

¹³ The MCPAF has a collaboration framework and ethical guidelines for peacebuilding, which is a requisite for member organizations to append their signatures before becoming a member. The key guidelines enshrined in the framework include commitment to political impartiality, strengthening local ownership as well as dedication to long-term engagement (sustainability)

¹⁴ Participant, Focus Group Discussion, Mandera town, Kenya, September 14, 2022.

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ Interview with key Informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 14, 2022.

CSOs and community-led networks: The community and civil society organizations (CSOs) belong to different networks. In terms of social cohesion, Manderla Mediation Council (MMC) and Women for Peace are some of the most active structures. NRM structures at the community level are strongly linked to the NGOs and government departments and are active at community level. In Manderla, the Mujitama Water Resource Users Association (WRUA) is one such structure. However, other WRUAs in the county remain dormant and disengaged. The clan councils of elders are mostly active during periods of heightened tension, and play a key role in resolution of inter-communal conflicts. MMC and religious leaders have also played a central role in the containment of the conflicts, especially by increasing blood compensation rates to deter killings.

The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) was also identified as playing a role in social cohesion. Previously active advocacy groups such as the Manderla Vital Voices network, Champions 4 Change, and Safe Manderla Network (SAMNET) are currently inactive, largely due to lack of funding. These latter groups created awareness on youth radicalization by targeting at-risk youth, school children, teachers, parents, and school boards. Inter-faith coordination is weak and there are no regular platforms of engagement. Additionally, apart from the football clubs, youth groups currently remain inactive. Some groups such as the Manderla County Human Rights Network largely operate in solitary fashion, but occasionally work with the courts, the police, paralegals, victims of various forms of abuse, and the judiciary.

The private sector: In terms of livelihoods and cross-border interactions, business groups and cooperatives are active although there is a lack of a joint forum in which they regularly interact. The Chamber of Commerce is a link between the business community and the national government, especially when it comes to cross-border trade and smuggling issues. The Kenya Livestock Marketing Council (KLMC), the umbrella organization of livestock producers and traders in arid and semi-arid areas supports livestock marketing. It has cross-border connections and is affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce. In addition, several informal trader groups, farmers' associations, village savings and loans associations (VSLAs), quarry miners, and savings and credit co-operative societies (SACCOs) are present.

Overall, the private sector plays an important role in the network and maintains unique links with some of the actors in the different networks. For instance, the Chamber of Commerce engages the county government and the County Commissioner's office when addressing issues related to cross-border trade, taxation, and animal health policies. However, their position in most networks is viewed as peripheral and they are only engaged when deemed relevant. For instance, CVE engagement forums connect with the private sector only when addressing issues such as terrorism financing.

Cross-border networks: The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) recently set up a coordination office in Manderla town to support its regional resilience, stability, and development cross-border initiatives. Previously, IGAD was active through its rapid response funds support to the district peace committees (DPCs) via the Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN). Since the advent of devolution, however, the DPCs have not received any support thus weakening their operations. In addition to IGAD, there is a wide informal network of women in cross-border trade, merchants, and livestock traders operating in the triangle, stretching to Mogadishu.

County Steering Group (CSG)	<p>Members from key sectors such as agriculture, health, water, livestock, agriculture, education and Children's department, and NDMA</p> <p>NGOs - RACIDA, Boresha consortium (DRC, CARE and World Vision), NAPAD, ACTED, IRK, SCI, COCOP, CBCR and KRCS</p>
Mandera County Peace Actors Forum (MCPAF)	<p>Programs, govt agencies, NGOs and CBOs engaged in peace work e.g., NCIC, Interpeace, IRK, PACT, CBCR, REINVENT, FADC, DRC</p> <p>County government: Cohesion, De-Radicalization departments</p> <p>Grassroots representation: peace committees, CMCs</p>
Political Leadership	Governor, Senator, MPs, MCAs, political parties, kinomakers, trade unions (KNIUT), Mandera People's
Community, CSOs, youth and advocacy groups	<p>Women for Peace and Development, HAWENKA</p> <p>Mandera Mediation Council and Muslim scholars, SUPKEM, church leaders, Youth for Peace</p> <p>Councils of elders</p> <p>WRUAs, NRM committees, relief committees, Mazingira Alliance</p> <p>Peace committees, youth groups, PTAs</p>
Private Sector	Chamber of Commerce, KLMC, SACCOs, farmers' groups, informal livestock traders, fruit and vegetable vendors, merchants, VSLAs, quarry miners
Security Sector and Judiciary Networks	<p>National Government Administration Officers (NGAO), ward admins, chiefs, NPRs</p> <p>County Security and Intelligence Committee (CSIC)</p> <p>Police, DCI, prisons, <i>nyumba kumi</i></p>
County Executive Committee (CEC) cabinet committee	Chaired by the Governor
Mandera County CVE Engagement Forum	<p>Chaired by the County Commissioner, co-chaired by County Governor</p> <p>Members: NCTC, DCC, ATPL, Police, CVE</p>
Cross-border networks	ICAD Liaison office in Mandera, cross-border livestock and

3.3 Gedo Region

Government and local administrations: Gedo region is at the center of what was previously a protracted standoff between the Jubaland State Government (JSG), and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Further, relations between the Marehan and Ogaden clans are fractured due to power wrangles over the control of Jubaland¹⁷.

Out of the six districts in the region, only Elwak district has good relations with the Jubaland administration. This presents a fractured network and unhealthy power dynamics that cascade from national politics down to local clan and political tensions. Gedo region currently has no relations with the FGS, although the Somali National Army (SNA) installed by the previous regime is still present in the area. The regional and district administrations have operational offices.

At the district level, there are well-connected and structured district management teams, including the District Commissioner, Head of Social Affairs, District Humanitarian Coordinator, and District Officers in charge of health, education, environment, and other portfolios. The Humanitarian Coordinators are responsible for overseeing development and humanitarian interventions in the district implemented by NGOs¹⁸.

Peace and social cohesion networks: There are active civil society actors in the region, such as the Belet Hawa Women for Peace, which is a women's organization implementing several peace-building and livelihoods interventions in Belet Hawa. The Gedo Peace Consortium (GPC) was previously an active NGO in the cross-border area as a local partner of PEACE I, II, and III projects, but is presently dormant. Across the three districts targeted in this study, there are district peace committees established by the Somalia Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU) of IGAD.

FGD participants identified youth groups as active structures playing a role in several voluntary activities. Clan elders and religious leaders are a key source of conflict management and prevention in the region. They maintain a wide network of stakeholders, including local authorities, Jubaland administration, the FGS, humanitarian agencies and militant groups. In recent years, the role of elders in resolving conflicts was hampered by the magnitude of conflicts, and by their involvement in politics.

Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG): Due to the absence of an effective central government, the region has relied on humanitarian actors' support in key sectors such as health, education, water infrastructure, and protection. The cluster coordination in Gedo region is led by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), and has a network of organizations drawn from UN agencies, INGOs, NGOs, and local Humanitarian Coordinators. Agencies have different roles in the cluster coordination forums e.g., in food security, shelter/non-food items (NFIs), water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), health and nutrition, protection, or education clusters. NGOs with similar mandates belong to one or more clusters. The ICCG is a cooperative effort among sectors and clusters of humanitarian actors in Somalia and the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) with the role of ensuring a coherent strategy and operational response across all sectors.

In Gedo, there are currently over 60 active humanitarian actors across the various clusters. There is a sub-national cross-cluster coordination based in eight locations covering 11 regions¹⁹. The clusters are primarily coordinated by UN agencies, and they have regional offices in Dollow. According to the latest UN OCHA data, FAO and WFP are the lead agencies in the food security and livelihoods cluster, and it has active member organizations such as Centre for Research and Integrated Development (CERID), Active in Development Aid (ADA), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mercy Corps

¹⁷ Interview with key informant, Elwak, September 12, 2022.

¹⁸ Interview with key informant, Belet Hawa, September 13, 2022.

¹⁹ Ibid

(MC), Nasiib Relief and Development Organization (NARDO), NAPAD, Rainwater Association of Somalia (RAAS), SCI, Community Development and Humanitarian Network (CoDHNet), WVI, and ASEP. UNICEF is the lead agency in the WASH cluster and there are several NGOs currently implementing programs such as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Concern Worldwide (CWW), COOPI, DRC, Lifeline Gedo (LLG), Trocaire, WVI, ZamZam Foundation (Zam), and ASEP.

Other key clusters in the region include shelter, camp coordination and camp management (CCCM), and mine action²⁰. In the mine action cluster, UNMAS (United Nations Mine Action Service) is the lead agency. The shelter cluster is led by International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR, and it has active membership from Horn of Africa Peace Network (HAPPEN). The CCCM cluster is led by IOM and UNHCR and has membership of Northern Frontier Youth League (NoFYL). The different cluster meetings are held in either Mogadishu for Somalia-wide clusters, or in Dollow for the Upper Juba clusters member organizations. Inter-cluster coordination is led by four technical working groups, namely, cash coordination, the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSANU), Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM), and Information Management Working Group (IMWG).

Community groups: There are numerous community groups carrying out activities related to social cohesion, NRM, disaster risk mitigation, and livelihoods that were identified by the different respondents. In Belet Hawa, there are village disaster management committees (VDMCs) trained to mitigate natural disasters and with action plans to implement related activities. In addition, across the districts, there are relief committees, village committees, IDP groups, VSLAs, sanitation groups, and cash-for-work groups that are organized into single associations with representation of men, women, youth, persons with disability (PWDs), IDPs, and minority groups.

Private sector actors: Private sector actors offering financial, energy, telecommunications services, water, and general trade services operate in the area. Some of the key private sector players include Horumud and Dahabshiil. The private sector actors form a strong network that is either a resource for economic and social development, or a force for violence. The sector is a key stakeholder in economic development, a principal job creator, and social capital driver.

²⁰ UN OCHA (2022). *Somalia: Operational Presence*. Accessed at <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/somalia/infographic/somalia-operational-presence-3w-january-2022> (Accessed on August 30, 2022).




Figure 4: ICCG network structure (Adapted from UN OCHA, 2022)



3.4 Liben Zone

Zonal and woreda administrations: The *woreda* and zonal administrations are decentralized structures tasked with the management of *woreda* (district) and zonal affairs. The *woreda* administration has an expansive role in managing security, justice, economic development, and financial domains of a district. The Economic and Development Coordinator oversees the work of health, education, water, agriculture, municipal and livestock offices. The *woredas* are led by woreda councils, which are made up of representatives elected directly by the people from the various *kebeles* (locations). At the location level, there are *kebele* councils and *kebele* administrators.

Multi-Stakeholder Coordination Forum (MSCF): Formed in 2020 in the Liben zone, particularly Dollo Addo and Boqolmayo districts, the primary role of the MSCF is to improve the life of refugees and host communities through effective and efficient management and utilization of resources. Dollo Addo and Boqolmayo host a refugee population of 154,489 people²¹. The coordination forum has members from the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Filtu zonal administration, Dollo Ado *woreda* administration and other relevant sector offices, Bokolmayo *woreda* administration and other relevant sector offices, two *woreda* development projects, namely, the Development Response to Displacement Impacts (DRDIP) and Public Sector Partnership (PSP), other development and humanitarian actors, private sector, government higher educational institutions, government research institutions, and refugee and host community representatives.

The platform is chaired and co-chaired by the representatives from AARA, UNHCR, and the local authorities. It has technical committees of protection & documentation, education, livelihoods, health and nutrition, WASH, shelter, and energy. In addition, the forum has a General Assembly that is composed of different stakeholders, including NGOs, private sector, research/education institutions operating in the area, and other development agencies.

Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG): This is the coordination forum for local and international NGOs and is jointly led by UN OCHA and government counterparts i.e., zonal focal persons. Overall, almost 60 humanitarian agencies operate in the Somali region, and many of these have presence in Liben zone. The organizations belong to different clusters including health, education, shelter, nutrition, early recovery, logistics, and WASH.

This network brings together dozens of local and international NGOs and UN agencies. The humanitarian actors in Liben zone, particularly in Dollo and Boqolmayo districts, which host large refugee population, can be categorized into host community and refugee actors. UNHCR and ARRA are the lead agencies in the refugee front, while DRM and OCHA lead in the host community target organizations.

Table 4: Host community and refugee actors (Authors compilation)

Host Community Actors	Refugee Actors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lead agencies: OCHA, DRM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lead agencies: UNHCR, ARRA

²¹ UNHCR (2019) *Melkadida (Liban Zone) Somali Regional State 2019 Pledge Progress Report*. Available at <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/78983> (accessed September 2, 2022).

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>UN agencies:</i> WFP, OCHA, FAO, UNICEF ● <i>Woreda offices:</i> woreda administration office, livestock office, bureau of agriculture, water office, woreda women’s office ● <i>Zonal offices:</i> Filitu zonal administration, zonal agriculture and natural resource department ● <i>Kebele Admin:</i> Kebele chairman, kebele executive committee ● <i>Local NGOs:</i> RACIDA, ZOA²² ● <i>INGOs:</i> SCI, World Vision, Mercy Corps, International Committee for Development of People’s (CISP), <i>Cooperazione Inetrnationale</i> (COOPI), Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), CARE ● <i>Community Structures:</i> elders, youth, women, religious leaders, PWDs forums ● <i>Private sector:</i> microfinance institutions, general traders, cooperatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● <i>UN agencies:</i> WFP, IOM, FAO, UNICEF ● <i>Woreda offices:</i> woreda administration office, livestock office, bureau of agriculture, water office, woreda women’s office ● <i>Zonal offices:</i> Filitu zonal administration, zonal agriculture and natural resource department ● <i>Local NGOs:</i> Women and Pastoralist Youth Development Organization (Wa-PAYDO), Organization for Welfare and Development in Action (OWDA), Relief Society of Tigray (REST) ● <i>INGOs:</i> NRC, DRC, IRC, Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) ● <i>Community Structures:</i> RCC, women’s associations, relief food committee, refugee security committee (community watch), youth committee, community services women’s volunteer committee, child protection committee ● <i>Private sector:</i> Refugee cooperatives (farmers, pastoralists, and business cooperatives), microfinance institutions
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Civil society and community actors: there are several forums that convince the youth, women, religious leaders, elders, and PWDs. Cultural institutions like that of the *wabar* (Degodia supreme elder) are recognized as a legitimate informal governance structure. There are strong clan ties that transcend beyond borders.

The private sector: There are some well-organized community actors such as farmers’ cooperative societies that support cross-border markets for farm products.

3.5 Knowledge Networks

The SNA also mapped knowledge-based networks, where the different groups in the three regions were classified into different groups as shown below. Across the three sub-clusters, research agencies and academic institutions tend to remain on the periphery since most organizational networks are generally activity-related, and there is lack of research-oriented focus on the key themes of social cohesion, NRM, and livelihoods

In MCPAF, Rufino is the only research organization that has membership. Most government agencies work with external academic institutions and there is minimal involvement of local institutions. In general, this tabulation illustrates how the wider network can be viewed from a knowledge network perspective. For detailed specific examples, see appendix 2.

²² The three letters ZOA are the abbreviation of the Dutch translation of South East Asia, the area where the organization started its initial activities.




Figure 6: Knowledge networks

3.6 Networks and Influence in the Mandera Cluster

Overall, connections among humanitarian actors and government agencies are strong but involvement of community actors is weak. The community networks did not refer to government agencies as dominant in their networks. Participation in the coordination forums was largely based on the immediate contributions of an actor e.g., financial resources. In the survey, 66 percent of the participants indicated that they interacted through problem-solving support or thought partnering, 65 percent indicated through information or resource sharing, and 54 percent indicated through collaboration on projects. This suggests most interactions are aligned to pooling resources and coordination. However, community members maintain strong informal ties through cross-border trade, social capital bonds, conflict resolution, and clan and political alliances.

3.6.1 Mandera County

The MCPAF is uniquely connected to a broad network of NGOs and CBOs engaged in peace-building work. Additionally, it has strong links with ceasefire monitoring committees, local administrations, the councils of elders, religious leaders, and village dialogue spaces. As a FGD participant in Mandera town, Kenya observed,

“The network starts from the grassroots all the way to the county and transcends even the boundaries (to other countries). We start from the grassroots, we have community structures on the ground [such as] council of elders, we have village committees, peace committees, ceasefire monitoring committees, and then local administrators both at village level and sub-county (chiefs, DCCs), and even at county level.”²³

The study found that there are diverse influential organizations and individuals, including government, civil society, and community actors, attesting to the strength of these networks and ability of the central nodes and knowledge brokers to capitalize on formal structures in fostering collaboration.

Central nodes within the national and county government structures have close connections to their respective departments, portraying their unique roles. At the same time, they are connected to many individuals and organizations outside their work environment. For instance, the County Commissioner

²³ Participant, focus group discussion, Mandera, Kenya, September 14, 2022

maintains strong connections with the security agencies through the CSIC, despite having regular interactions with other government ministries and NSAs through the CSG, civil society actors (opinion leaders, clan elders, and gatekeepers), neighboring countries' administrations, and the public through *barazas* (see Figure 7 for detailed illustration).

Politicians from both the county and national governments were described by the respondents as a powerful group with a conflicting role, supporting peace and development process on one end, and fueling conflicts on the other end to drive their agenda²⁴. The county administration has taken an increasingly important role in the past 10 years as service delivery functions in key areas such as health, water, land, and agriculture have devolved from the national government.

The county Governor and Senator are central figures with diverse connections and unique links to others in the network. The county government has a significant impact in policy areas related to the CBCR Activity, including NRM, disaster response, environmental protection, and community dialogue. Interviews with different respondents suggest the political class are heterophilous in their interactions, and have more connections outside their government, including with prominent businessmen, influential clan elders, national leaders, and bureaucrats, making it difficult to determine their exact position in the network²⁵.

The politicians are sources of strategic information and are widely consulted by the security agencies, community leaders and government departments. However, the majority have weaker links with their constituents after their election into office. Some of the respondents interviewed noted politicians and businessmen are responsible for mushrooming settlements, thus hampering service delivery. This means that the CBCR Activity must ensure politicians and gatekeepers should not be the entry points. Consultation with relevant government departments, beneficiary communities, and an assessment of the context would be an ideal conflict-sensitive approach to employ.

Youth actors form another group. Besides holding frequent location-level tournaments, youth clubs undertake town cleaning exercises, have a savings bank account, and act as gatekeepers. Any youth issues in their respective locations are addressed through them and they have locational territories that are respected by other clubs. In this regard, a youth leader in Mandera noted, *“These groups have financial connections and engage in ‘merry-go-round’ investment and savings systems.”*²⁶




Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 7: County Commissioner, Mandera influence

²⁴ Interview with key Informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 9, 2022.

²⁵ In some instances, they acquire peripheral placement while they tend to appear central nodes in most cases, with high betweenness scores and high connectedness.

²⁶ Interview with youth leader, Mandera, Kenya, September 10, 2022.

The County Social and Gender Department has influence on youth football clubs, youth-owned TVET enterprises, and CBOs running TVET training centers in Mandera town supported by the county government. While these can be identified as knowledge brokers, the majority of the youth-led organizations maintain no links with other main actors in the network, and are thus largely peripheral actors.

A past youth organization with good influence was the Youth Bunge in Mandera town. It collapsed in 2015 due to internal wrangles, and allegations of funds misappropriation by the group's leadership²⁷. The funds were provided by the National Assembly Women's Representative for Mandera. The collapse is also attributed to the involvement of politicians, who are central figures with the ability to fragment networks. In Elwak however, the Youth Bunge is still active and running. In the far-flung areas of the county, the Youth Bunge was never formed, and this was attributed to lack of funds. According to the County Chief Officer-in charge, the youth docket is not entirely devolved and only 2 percent of the funds reach the counties²⁸. While many CSOs and youth organizations that were previously active have exited the network, others such as Mandera Vital Voices, Champions for Change, and SAMNET have transformed into different forms to survive. In the survey, youth were among the groups that participants have mostly interacted with.

From the survey results, 12.9 percent of the participants interacted most with community groups such as youth and women's groups. Due to critical challenges of funding, the only available means of engagement for these networks is through FM radios where they communicate their ideas as activists. In the quest to earn income, the youth recently formed the Mandera Got Talent Group, which recites poems and entertains people for cash.

Politicians have been identified as a key obstacle to youth and advocacy groups endeavors, as noted by one key informant:

*"Despite their active roles, activists have responsibilities to bear and dividing time between looking for clean wealth and active community engagements is never an easy task. It is worth noting that the political leaders always made efforts to sabotage our efforts as we formed a great critique of their undertakings. Thus, we were left between unsupportive citizenry and antagonistic governments."*²⁹

Clan elders are another group with strong networks. They play the role of insider-partial mediators in inter-communal conflicts. They are also the face of resilience since they can mobilize social capital and resources beyond their immediate domain. The clan elders have internal governance structures. Although they work with established women's organizations, women representation is lacking. This is attributed mainly to cultural barriers that prohibit women from being members of the council of elders.

The main clans in Mandera County, including the Garre, Degodia, Murule, the 'corner tribes', and the Marehan, have councils of elders with approximately 21 members. The high-level clan elders have titles such as *sultan*, *ugaas*, *malaag*, *nabadoon*, or *wabar*, depending on the clan. They primarily negotiate on behalf of their clans in major political decisions, territorial claims, and peace agreements. An influential group of high-level clan elders-cum-businessmen, mostly based in Nairobi, also play the role of political kingmakers and have huge stakes in determining beneficiaries of government tenders and appointments. This influence was particularly strong during the first dispensation of devolved governance (2013-2017), but weakened in the last two election seasons.

²⁷ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 9, 2022.

²⁸ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 15, 2022.

²⁹ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 9, 2022.

According to a study by Interpeace/NCIC, the traditional elders' role in negotiated democracy has positioned them as political power brokers, further compromising their neutrality³⁰. Elders interviewed were of the view that their influence in politics has diminished, as noted by one FGD respondent,

*“Politics these days is played in boardrooms in Nairobi and as elders, we have withdrawn our [active] involvement. The Garre council of elders was successful during the first term [of devolution] nominating and anointing leaders, but the status quo has so far changed.”*³¹

The low-level elders are mostly based in the sub-counties and represent the clan interests in terms of *diya* (blood money) payment, resolution of disputes, and take care of clan affairs. This group of elders usually serves as community gatekeepers with unique roles and comprises highly visible figures with multiple connections. Engaging with elders is inevitable, but the CBCR Activity should engage the communities in planning and decision-making when making a program entry.

Elders work directly with NGOs, county and national government agencies, women's groups, religious leaders, and traders. In most cases, they interact with these groups through different platforms, especially where they are invited to participate in meetings or conferences. The County Cohesion Department, and the Interpeace and NCIC Kenya Peacebuilding Programme has, over the last few years, actively engaged clan elders and religious leaders as impartial mediators. In precarious situations that require de-escalation of tensions, elders are among the first to respond, either by seeking external actors to support the logistics or mobilizing local resources. In such situations, elders either interact as the interest-bearing groups of affected clans or neutral mediators.

Besides leading inter- and intra-clan dialogue, elders are, at times, sent as cross-border to engage with elders from Ethiopia or Somalia. Other elders' roles mentioned by respondents include acting as interlocutors in cross-border peace dialogues and communicating with their counterparts in Somalia to mediate the release of people abducted by Al-Shabaab or hijacked vehicles.

Religious leaders in Mandera make up a solid group with a prominent role in social cohesion, dialogue, and coding of peace agreements. The most vocal faith-based organizations playing these roles include MMC, SUPKEM, and the Council of *Ulamaas*. All men's organizations lack representation of women, except in positions where they are recruited as employees. Recently, with the support of NCIC/Interpeace, the religious leaders developed codes for resolution of inter-clan conflicts, increasing the traditional blood money compensation rates to deter killings. Previously, the amount paid to families of victims was around KES 1 million, but this was raised to KES 4.5 million. The significance of their influence in raising the blood money compensation was explained by one of the religious leaders interviewed:

*“It was accepted by the locals and county government, and this was able to reduce unjust killings. We also changed the judgment on rape cases with primal focus on the damage caused to the victim. Spending time in the prison never helps the victim, imprisoning violators is just the law taking its course and does not replicate justice at personal level. It lacks the inclusiveness of the personal damage and effects on the victims.”*³²

³⁰ NCIC/Interpeace (Jan 2017). *Mandera County Note. Voices of the People: challenges to Peace in Mandera County*, Available on <https://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-ECA-Kenia-Mandera-County-Note.pdf> (accessed on August 29, 2022), p.28.

³¹ Participant, focus group discussion, Mandera town, Kenya, September 19, 2022.

³² Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 11, 2022.

Prominent religious leaders in collaboration with other *ulamaas* have spearheaded the resolution of inter-clan conflicts, key among them the Garre-Degodia and Garre-Murulle conflicts³³. In recent years, the religious leaders, to some extent, pulled back from their position in the network due to the global war on terror, which undermined their role, making them targets of personal attacks, harassment, and extra-judicial killings. These negative impacts made many religious leaders keep a low profile.

Despite the setbacks, religious leaders still command respect and are trusted to handle the most pressing problems affecting the society. There has been improvement in how religious leaders interact with government agencies in the last few years, especially with the County Commissioner's office and the county government. The religious leaders work with a range of stakeholders, including women, clan elders, NGOs, and local authorities to prevent conflicts and mobilize resources to help communities recover from natural disasters.

Muslim religious leaders, however, have no active engagement with their Christian counterparts, and there were no direct engagements reported. This was attributed to lack of sponsored regular platforms like those in the past that were supported by previous programs such as *NiWajibu Wetu* (NIWETU). A section of the Muslim clergy belonging to the Sufi order are also disengaged. Although they are invited to meetings and joint social events like praying for rain, they are not organized into groups that respond to social and economic challenges like the mainstream *ulamaas*.

Women's organizations have stronger networks in the social cohesion and livelihoods sectors. Women for Peace and Development (WFPD) and its NGO wing, HAWENKA, display strong affinity towards organizations with similar interests within and across the border. Other women's organizations such as Maendeleo ya Wanawake are also well-connected in terms of advocacy and engagement.

WFPD was the first peace organization formed in Mandera in the year 2000 and registered as an NGO in 2010. The organization plays a unique role in the peace-building arena by engaging women stakeholders during inter-clan conflicts through traditional trauma healing approaches that focus on promoting reconciliation. The organization has shown a significant degree of homophily when using this approach by interacting with a broad membership of women from all clans, businesswomen, milk sellers, cross-border women's networks, and professionals. It is the only organization that has recently included non-local women professionals in their activities with the view of building cohesion and trust between non-locals and the ethnic Somali communities. To this end, a representative of the organization noted, "*Women professionals and elites tend to be the most active in the network by virtue of the huge understanding of the local contexts.*"³⁴

The most active NRM platform is WESCOD, the water sector technical working group in the CSG hosted by the county Ministry of Water, Environment, and Natural Resources. The platform brings together state and non-state actors (NSAs) dealing with WASH activities. In addition, the forum hosts national government actors directly implementing activities on the ground such as Northern Water Works Development Agency (NWWDA), which is based in Garissa, and the National Irrigation Board. WESCOD compiles and shares information with various stakeholders including the CSG, the county executive, national government agencies, and the Council of Governors.

The Boresha consortium, IRK, Action against Hunger (AAH), NAPAD, and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) were mentioned as some of the most active NSAs in the platform supporting various water-related activities in the county. NDMA was cited as the actor

³³ County Government of Mandera (2021). Resolutions of Sheikh Umal Peace Accord 2 between Garre and Murule Communities. <https://mandera.go.ke/resolutions-of-sheikh-umal-peace-accord-2-between-garre-and-murule-communities/> (accessed Aug 30, 2021).

³⁴ Interview with member, Women for Peace, Mandera, Kenya, September 14, 2022.

with the most connections within WESCOD and other technical working groups in the CSG. NDMA acts as the coordination link between the CSG and technical working groups, and is engaged in monitoring multi-sectoral activities. Its primary role is the coordination of drought response and providing drought early warning information to stakeholders.

Figure 8: Types of people and organizations in Mandera County network

Central nodes	Knowledge brokers	Peripheral Actors	Central Nodes (People)
Governor County Commissioner Senator Women representative Prominent clan elders Prominent Muslim Scholars County Water Services Dept NDMA Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries County Cohesion and Integration Department NCIC/Interpeace CSG WESCOD	BORESHA Kenya Red Cross SCI Islamic Relief KLMC County chief officers - Water, Cohesion, Gender and Social Services Depts Council of elders Women for Peace/HAWENKA Football clubs Khadi's court Star FM, Dawa FM	Champions for Change Youth organizations Private sector SAMNET WRUAs Mandera Got Talent Mandera Vital Voices Network Human Rights Network PWDs and other vulnerable groups Women traders Non-local women Religious groups (Sufis, Christian clergy)	Ali Ibrahim Roba, Senator Mohamed Adan Khalif, Governor Onsemus Kyatha, County Commissioner Haji Barre, clan elder Mohamed Dahir, Peace chairman-Takaba Abdirahman Mudo, Clan elder Mohamud Khalif, Businessman Sultan Yusuf, Clan elder Chief Bishar, Banisa Adan Kala, clan elder Kasim, elder Lafey Ugas Adow Harun, Clan elder Sheikh Mohamud Abdikarim, religious leader Sheikh Abdirizak, religious leader Sheikh Ahmed Sudan, religious leader Bashir Abdullahi (MP) Billow Kerrow, Politician Mohamed Hussein Qaras, Politician Hussein Yusuf, Government official Sheikh Mohamed Alasow, Religious leader Abdille Sheikh Billow, Businessman Amina Hassan, Women leader

Source: Author's compilation

NSAs have stronger connections with other civil society actors, religious leaders, clan elders, and government agencies than with community structures that have similar mandates. For instance, NSAs engaged in NRM activities were more connected to government agencies through the CSG and less connected with community structures such as water resources users' associations (WRUAs.)

Interestingly, the Mujitama WRUA in Mandera has connections with actors outside the county, such as the Water Resources Authority (WRA) and the Water Sector Trust Fund (WSTF), and established links with the U.S. Embassy to support the rehabilitation of Kamor water pan. However, at the local level, the WRUA lacks any tangible connections with the county government and NSAs and is, therefore, a peripheral actor.

In the livelihoods sector, the county Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries plays a lead role in local planning and development processes. Through the CSG meetings, agriculture and livestock technical working group meetings, the ministry has a broad engagement with both state and non-state

actors. Key NSAs that maintain good links with the ministry and NDMA include Boresha, SCI, RACIDA, Kenya Red Cross, IRK, and HAWENKA. Externally, WFPD works with NDMA and Equity Bank since it manages the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP). Through the HSNP, it engages vulnerable groups such as orphans, widows, people living with HIV/AIDs, and other beneficiary households. In addition, WFPD works with religious leaders, clan elders, the county government, and the County Commissioner's office on specific issues.

The private sector's influence in the network tends to gravitate to relevant actors and less with government and CSOs. Local livestock markets are connected across the cross-border regions. Mandera, a central hub for trade in the region, provides market for livestock from Ethiopia and Somalia. In addition, there are informal livestock marketing networks that extend to Mogadishu.

3.6.2 Gedo Region

Local administrations in Belet Hawa and Dollow districts, except for Elwak, have no connection with the Jubaland administration and have a minimal interaction with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), except through the Somali National Army (SNA) that was deployed in the area for the first time since the collapse of the central government by the previous regime in Mogadishu. The relationship with the FGS remains thorny and it is still a challenge uniting the Gedo regional administration and the Jubaland State Government³⁵. It will be important to ensure a delicate balance in the interactions made with different levels of administrations to minimize any conflict risks.

The district administrations extend their influence through four key departments, namely, the Social Development office, NGO Coordination and IDPs Resettlement, Finance and Revenue Office, and the Police Department.

The NGO Coordination office maintains constant relationships with NGOs operating in the area, but its influence is localized around the district. Local administrators have the leverage to ensure NGOs target the most vulnerable communities when they launch projects. It is one of the most significant structures when it comes to building social cohesion, and they resolve problems in the public domain with the help of women, religious leaders, elders, and youth.

In strengthening social cohesion, the stakeholders interviewed affirmed that the involvement of the community structures is critical, noting that it will be difficult to resolve issues without broad consultations. This suggests there is broad consensus in resolving issues affecting the community. As a key informant in Balet Hawa observed,

*"We use the sports teams to strengthen social cohesion. Other avenues include trainings on social cohesion for the NGOs. We also mobilise for them the participants so that they reach out to the most deserving community members."*³⁶

Humanitarian organizations have better networks with donors, UN agencies, and other development partners as compared to the local administrations. This implies that the CBCR Activity must build stronger relationships with local administrations in the target districts and ensure their views are accommodated. Analysis from the key informant interviews suggests that formal networks available to the local administration and the communities in the region include local NGOs and a few INGOs. This is not adequate in building a strong collaboration among network actors.

³⁵ Interview with key informant, Belet Hawa, Somalia, September 14, 2022.

³⁶ Interview with key informant, Belet Hawa, Somalia, September 17, 2022.

Most of the NGOs in the area are members of the ICCG and they regularly participate in the monthly or quarterly cluster meetings. An NGO may belong to a broad range of clusters depending on the projects they run, indicating their level of control. NGOs have inconsistent relationships with various community actors, including women, youth, and clan elders depending on the project they are implementing, making their influence limited and time bound.

Some local organizations such as the Belet Hawa Women for Peace have nevertheless raised resources from local sources for interventions such as creating a revolving fund for vulnerable households affected by drought and other disasters. In the late 1990s, the Belet Hawa Women for Peace (then called Halgan Women Group) helped end a bitter conflict between Somali National Front (SNF) and United Somali Congress (USC) forces using women’s soft power and poetry. To date, it remains one of the most influential women’s groups with the capacity to build social cohesion.

The Belet Hawa Women for Peace is also a major cross-border actor, collaborating with Mandera Women for Peace in planning, joint response, and implementation of livelihood and social cohesion activities. This makes it one of the most active local NGOs, along with CERID, ASEP, Sedhuro, RDI, and Lifeline Gedo. Trocaire is one of the oldest INGOs operating in Gedo region and it has strong influence in the health sector, but also implements livelihood activities. UN agencies with considerable influence in the humanitarian agencies network include WFP and FAO, who are supporting food security interventions, and UNHCR and IOM, who are mainly involved in returnee and refugee affairs, especially in the areas of food security and livelihoods strengthening.


Clan elders, religious leaders, and village administrators have strong influence on the community and local authorities. Clan elders maintain multifaceted relationships with federal/local/state agencies, clans, religious leaders, and even outlawed groups such as Al-Shabaab, as shown in Figure 9. In recent years, however, the role of clan elders has diminished partly due to the magnitude of conflicts they have to confront and their active involvement in politics. The clan elders assist the local authorities in resolution of intra-clan conflicts and disputes related to land.

The respondents mentioned that there are many cases of land disputes that remain unresolved, and when elders are overwhelmed, the cases are referred to civil law courts run by the religious leaders. The clan elders also work with the religious leaders in dispensing justice and seeking *Sharia* interpretation.

Additionally, the elders form the district peace committees and key members are drawn from the *ugas* and *sultans* of the different communities. The Somalia CEWERU initially trained the DPCs in the region, and the IGAD field monitor acts as a focal point for conflict early warning and response.

In the Gedo region, the Marehan is the dominant clan, with a council of elders consisting of 21 members. Of these members, 12 are active and operate voluntarily, while the rest are called upon in the event of serious conflicts. The council has a head sultan who is appointed by elders drawn from 12 *jufu* (sub-

Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 9: Clan elders influence in Gedo region



clans) of the community. Clan elders are some of the few community structures that can engage with Al-Shabaab when it comes to negotiations and payment of ransom money in cases of kidnapping.

For example, one NGO respondent noted that his organization experienced a challenge in the construction of a sand dam in Garbaharey after Al-Shabaab assumed the dam's wall was a bridge that would enable access to the area they controlled. It was the elders that were able to persuade the Al-Shabaab that the structure's role was to enable access to water for communities and livestock, and not for military purposes³⁷.

Thus, the ability of clan elders to be connected to many groups, and their unique links to others in the network, demonstrates that they are central figures that should not be overlooked. Religious leaders interviewed acknowledged the role of clan elders, saying, "*Clan elders are those with the highest influence in the network because they are always at the forefront and make the most effort.*"³⁸

Another influential group in the ranks of community structures are the religious leaders. Traditionally, the religious leaders shared power with the clan elders in the Somali society. The position of the religious leaders in the post-civil war period was amplified by the need to have central figures who command respect and prestige in the absence of a central government. Thus, several Islamic organizations emerged, taking diverse roles that included mediation in conflicts, propagating Islam (*Dawah*), providing spiritual guidance and healing, and playing the role of judges. It was apparent from the discussions with respondents that religious leaders strongly re-emerged during this period as they ran several charities and schools, and opened businesses.

Gedo region has seen several ideological groups, such as the *Al-Ittihad al Islamiyah*, who took arms to engage in conflict. Al-Shabaab is believed to be an offshoot of these groups. This weakened the status of the religious leaders and they partially lost their status as respected scholars and impartial mediators.

Despite the shortcomings, religious leaders are generally identified by the respondents as bearers of the Islamic faith and the last resort when situations get tough. The clergy in the region still command respect due to their religious status and embedded trust, although they are viewed differently by people belonging to various schools of thought. They own many businesses, and they mobilize resources during periods of crisis. It is crucial that a religious leaders' council like that in Mandera is formed to strengthen their influence and role as mediators.

³⁷ Interview with key informant interview, Dollow, Somalia, September 12, 2022.

³⁸ Interview with key Informant, Elwak, Somalia, September 11, 2022.

Figure 10: Type of organizations and people in Gedo region

Central nodes	Knowledge brokers	Peripheral Actors	Central Nodes (People)
Regional Admnstratiion Local Administrations Belet Hawa Women for Peace District Commissiners, Belet Hawa , Elwak and Dollow districts Humanitarian Coordinators Business leaders Clan elders Religious leaders	District Peace Committees Somalia CEWERU CERID ASEP SAMTEC Socio Economic Development and Human Rights Organization (Sedhuro) Gedo Lifeline Trocaire NCA IDF RDI famien Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) SWALIM WFP UNHCR Youth groups Women groups	IDP comittees SMES VDMCS Farmer groups General traders WUCs Self help groups KDF SNA Al-Shabaab	Abdirashid Abdi Arog, District Commissioner Belet Hawa Abdi Adan Hassan, Elder Abdiwahid Ismail Osman, Balet Hawa Youth Chairman Hassan Ali Kulan, Religious leader-Dollow Hibo Hassan Hashi, Dollow Women Group Chairlady Batula Ibrahim Hassan, Women leader Anab Sheikh Hassan, Belet Hawa Women Group Anab Abdi Abdillahi, Women leader Abdille Salbay, Peace Chairman Hussein Gosar, Elder Luul Mohamed, Executive Director -Belet Hawa Women for Peace Sheikh Ahmed, religious leader Sheikh Adan, religious leader

Source: Author’s compilation

Decades of violent conflicts have left the local economy dependent on the informal sector and diaspora communities. The private sector players run the economy and critical services³⁹, SMEs, and general trade. The local administrations maintain good relationships with the private sector and the diaspora given the vital role of business leaders in contributing resources for community dialogue, sending remittances, supporting the displaced people, and raising funds for drought and other emergencies. On the other hand, business leaders and diaspora actors are known to profit from the war economy, by either creating inter-clan chaos to get market for small arms or indirectly funding violent extremist groups by paying taxes.

Across the cluster, traders have limited engagement with CSOs except during resource mobilization. Neglecting the private sector and the diaspora means pushing them to refuel the war economy or creating opportunities for spoilers to hamper creation of employment opportunities and income for much of the population.

SMEs, skilled craftsmen, and community groups have little influence but are critical to the livelihoods of the population. These include women traders, farmers, laborers, loaders, sanitation groups, and disaster response committees. SAMETC and Luuq Agriculture College, both run by CERID, were identified as educational institutions producing local manpower with diverse TVET skills critical for employment creation and development of the social structure.

In Gedo, most of the NRM actors sat in the periphery, and there was less engagement and interaction among them. CARE and DRC emerged as the most active NRM actors, as well as a few local NGOs

³⁹ Telecommunication, banking, forex, energy, water services, media, healthcare, education etc.

such as ASEP. However, these actors are generally seen as knowledge brokers acting between the UN agencies and local authorities. There also emerged active local village disaster management committees taking the leadership in disaster planning at local level. Religious leaders, women associations and businessmen were also taking an active role in drought response by raising funds.

3.6.3 Liben Zone

The Liben zone administration office engages with the community via the *woreda* administrations through the development of local plans. The office is involved in several thematic areas such as cross-border conflict and trade, peace and security, gender equality, youth and development, refugee and IDP affairs, health, water and sanitation, and education. In terms of promoting peace, each *woreda* and *kebele* in the zone has a district peace committee in line with the Ethiopian CEWERU Operational Guidelines No. 001/2001 (2009)⁴⁰.

The peace committees are composed of seven members, including three elders and four administration staff. Despite elders being recognised as members, they are not actively engaged by the *woreda* administrations and, therefore, the different *woreda* peace committees lack broad community influence and representation of women and youth.

The involvement of CSOs in social cohesion is greatly limited by the Charities and Societies Proclamation (Proclamation No. 621/2009), which has had a considerably negative impact on civil engagement in conflict transformation⁴¹. The legislation made it impossible for many CSO actors to participate in peace-building interventions except in two cases i.e., where CSOs operate in one region and do not have members in other regions, or where an entity is an international organization operating in Ethiopia through a bilateral agreement. The first exception allowed NGOs such as Wa-PAYDO to facilitate rapid response logistics during periods of inter-clan tensions.

Due to lack of a consolidated platform, relationships between the community actors are weak and groups such as youth, women, and sports clubs are often categorized as peripheral actors. However, the youth and women's groups have a strong relationship with *woreda* and zonal administrations in terms of information sharing, usually related to security. This is reflected in the *woreda* plans via *kebele* administrators. Dollo Youth Sports has influence among the youth but maintains weak relations with the *woreda* authorities. This was attributed to limited skills and capacity of the *woreda* administration to engage the youth.

Key influencers have a strong informal network, especially among clan members and other communities living in the zone. The key informants identified the *wabar* as a unifying factor in inter-communal relations among members of the Degodia clan and as a bridge of inter-clan diplomacy. The *wabar* system is one of the most popularly used traditional jurisprudence, conflict resolution and leadership system applicable among the Degodia clan⁴².

⁴⁰ The guidelines vest the local *woreda* and *kebele* peace committees with a broad spectrum of engagement. *Woreda* peace committees provide both rapid and long-term responses and foster cross-border cooperation, while the *kebele* peace committees help to formulate response strategies, implement peace agreements, and act as key early warning informants.

⁴¹ In 2009, the Ethiopian government adopted the According to the Proclamation, CSOs receiving more than ten per cent of their funding from foreign sources cannot engage in the advancement of human and democratic rights, the promotion of the equality of nations, nationalities, people, gender, and religions, the promotion of disabilities and children 's rights, the promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation, or the promotion of the efficiency of the justice and law enforcement services.

⁴² Abdinasir Barre (Jan 2020). "Causes of Conflict and the Role of the Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanism Among Degodia Clan: In case of Dollo Addo District, Somali Region, Southeast Ethiopia": American Journal of Applied Psychology

The Garremaro, Guryantes, and Rahanweyn (Leysan and Reer Barre) clans also have cultural leadership that binds the clans together. As one key informant noted, “*there are two levels of administrations in the area; one is the government and the other are the customary institutions.*”⁴³

The *wabar* is the king of Degodia, and he has a palace in Boqolmayo district. The *wabar* is a hereditary position and the office is assumed through succession. The *wabar* comes from the Abrisha sub-clan and during his coronation, all the Degodia sub-clans gift the Abrisha 100 camels to avoid the claim that the king belongs to one sub-clan. The *wabar*'s council of elders have representatives in each *kebele* and each *woreda*. The *Guurti* (council of elders), besides running the affairs of the clan, resolves intra and inter-clan conflicts.

Moreover, the *wabar* has 14 executive delegates who he reaches out to when there is a problem. The delegates are selected from the ten sub-clans of the larger Degodia clan. In each *kebele*, there is a representative who is the chairman of that village. Whenever there is a conflict, this elder reports to the council and the issues are addressed structurally. The *wabar*'s authority also transcends borders and he has representatives in Kenya and Somalia. He sends emissaries where he cannot reach himself. The *kebele* and *woreda* administrations work in parallel with these local structures. A similar role is played by the Garre Sultan (cultural leader), who is also based in Ethiopia and has a prominent role in resolution of conflicts and maintaining intra and inter-communal unity.

Religious leaders form another key customary institution in the region tasked with resolution of conflicts among the different clans. When inter-clan tensions and hostilities fail to subside, it's usually the religious leaders that intervene. The religious leaders also resolve civil disputes related to marriage, inheritance, and divorce by applying *Sharia* law. In addition, they determine blood compensation to be paid to victims in reference to the *Sharia* provisions.

Humanitarian agencies are key development partners of the local authorities, and they target a substantial population of refugee and host communities. The humanitarian coordination units have representation of local authorities and I/NGOs. They include Save the Children International (SCI), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), South East Asia (ZOA), Mercy Corps, International Committee for Development of Peoples (CISP), Women and Pastoralist Youth Development Organization (Wa-PAYDO), and the Organization for Welfare and Development in Action (OWDA).

Through MSCF, partnership between the regional and local authorities has been enhanced to promote host communities and refugees' collaboration in economic and social development interventions. Projects that have key influence among the refugees and host communities include the self-reliance focused investments implemented by UNHCR and funded by the IKEA Foundation in Melkadida camp and Dollo Addo, and by Development Response to Displacement Impacts (DRDIP) funded by the World Bank and implemented by the government through the Bureau of Agriculture⁴⁴.

The IKEA Foundation project supported farmers' cooperatives that have strong cross-border linkages and market their products in Mandera, Kenya, and Dollow, Somalia. Dollo Bay and Dollo Addo form the main markets for livestock, and traders have good connections that start at village level to the district markets. There are strong cooperatives and membership-based income generating activities in the refugee camps and among host communities. RCC, the refugee self-governing body, has significant influence in identifying candidates for cooperative membership⁴⁵. ARRA has extensive partnerships

⁴³ Virtual interview with key informant, September 17, 2022

⁴⁴ UNHCR. (2019). *Melkadida (Liban Zone) Somali Regional State 2019 Pledge Progress Report*. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/78983> (accessed September 2, 2022)

⁴⁵ University of Oxford and Refugees Studies Centre. (2019). *The IKEA Foundation and livelihoods in Dollo Ado lessons from cooperative model*” RSC Research in Brief

with UNHCR, IOM, and Vital Events Registration Agency (VERA) in coordinating the refugee targeted projects.

Although the farmers’ and livestock cooperatives form strong associations running irrigation schemes, the livestock owners emerged as peripheral actors. This can be partly attributed to the Ethiopian government policy, which discourages pastoral mobility and supports the transition to a more sedentary lifestyle. Due to this policy, land enclosures are increasing in frequency and there is more competition for land that is close to rivers and water sources.

The livestock value chain cooperatives, on the other hand, serve as effective middlemen with connections on both sides of the border between the herders and the consumers. The CBCR Activity needs to consider engagement with the local authorities and communities on the type of support to be provided to livestock herders to minimize the risks of conflicts between sedentary farmers and pastoralists.

In one study, the multi-donor Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), which is a joint effort of the Government of Ethiopia and development partners, was reported to have shown that the regimes of practices and technologies of PSNP enhanced the trend towards sedentarization in the Somali pastoral peripheries⁴⁶.

Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 11: Type of people and organizations in Liben Zono network

Central Nodes	Knowledge Brokers	Peripheral Actors	Central Nodes (Names)
Somali Regional State (SRS) Government Zonal Administration Woreda Councils Woreda Administrations Wabar SCI UNHCR ARRA	Woreda and Kebele Peace Committees Council of Elders Religious leaders Community Policing Units Humanitarian clustres MSCF Dedebit Microfinance Institution Somali Microfinnace Institution WFP IRC DRC NRC CISP RCC ZOA CISP Livestock, Agriculture and Water Offices Agriculturaal Cooperatives	General Traders Livetstock owners Youth groups NDRMC	Feisal Hussein Buqay, Woreda Chairman, Dollo Abdi Hassan Jehow, Bqoolmayo Woreda Chairman Abdullahi Yusuf Ali, Liben Zone Chairman Ali Ibrahim Ali, Head of Livetsock Office-Liben Zone Ali Farah, Trade and Transport Zonal Office Mohamud Abdullahi, Zonal DRM Office Mohamed Abdi Mullah, Zonal Peace and Security Head Wabar Abdille Wabar Abdi, Degodia King Sultan Haji Mohamed Gababa, Garre clan sultan Ugas Yunis Omar Maalim, Garremare Ugas Ugas Ibrahim Abdullahi, Leysan Ugas

Source: Author’s compilation


The types of actors and their interactions are highlighted in this section. The conclusions in the next part highlight the relationships between actors and the strength (strong vs. weak) of these interactions, as well as the information-sharing strength and the platforms used.

⁴⁶ Getu Alene, Jesica Duncan and Han van Dijk.(2021). Development, governmentality and the sedentary state: the productive safety net programme in Ethiopia’s Somali pastoral periphery. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 49(6),1158-1180.

3.7 Relationship among actors and information sharing

When asked to indicate who they interacted with most in their networks 12.9 percent of survey respondents across the cluster interacted most with community groups (youth and women), 11.29 percent indicated religious leaders, 9.68 percent indicated businesspeople and the community, and 8.06 percent indicated community leaders (chiefs and elders), which indicates the weak relationship between the populations and local administrations.

Figure 12: Individuals respondents interacted with most in their networks



Source: Author's compilation

The respondents were also asked to indicate the types of interactions they had. From the findings, 66 percent of the participants indicated that they interacted through problem-solving support or thought partnering, 65 percent indicated through information or resource sharing, and 54 percent indicated through collaboration on projects.

In Kenya, 70.7 percent of the participants indicated that they interacted through information or resource sharing, 63.4 percent indicated through problem-solving support or thought partnering, and 51.2 percent indicated collaboration on projects. In Somalia, 39.4 percent of the participants indicated that they interacted through information or resource sharing, 60.6 percent indicated through problem-solving support or thought partnering, and 45.5 percent indicated through collaboration on projects. In Ethiopia, 65 percent of the participants indicated that they interacted through information or resource sharing, 66 percent indicated through problem-solving support or thought partnering, and 54 percent indicated through collaboration on projects.

3.7.1 Mandera County

Social Cohesion Actors

There are relatively more networks under this sector than in livelihoods and NRM, thus showing a higher level of interaction among the social cohesion actors. Among the key networks analysed under this section are government institutions, coordination platforms such as MCPAF and MCEF, the elders, and religious networks, all of whom are viewed as central nodes. The youth in the region are peripheral actors whose interactions with other actors and among themselves are not frequent. The CSOs, among whom is the once vibrant Vital Voices Network, are essential knowledge brokers but they lack the capacity to sustain their engagements.

There is a strong working relationship among the MCPAF, the County Government of Mandera, and NCIC/Interpeace program. This relationship is based on guidelines stipulated in a collaboration framework signed by all peace actors upon registering as a member. The framework entails ways of enhancing programmatic coordination, synergy, collaboration, resource mobilization, learning, and monitoring and evaluation. In terms of cross-border relations, the forum closely works with structures within Banissa who have good relations with those in Ethiopia. However, the MCPAF does not have any relation with peace actors in Somalia.

The ceasefire monitoring committee (CMC) also has a good working relationship with the councils of elders from the Garre and Degodia clans. This is primarily due to the influence the elders had on the formation of this committee to resolve the Garre – Degodia conflict. Since then, the CMC has been the focal point for addressing issues arising between the clans in Banissa and Mandera North. It is interesting to note that, the CMC has gained so much trust with the local clans that dispute resolution in Banissa and its environs is less costly as the council of elders delegate the local structures to engage in dialogue.

The Kadhi's court is one of the oldest institutions that exists with regards to resolving conflict between families and giving religious guidance to the Muslim population in Kenya. However, for many years the Kadhis were appointed from communities from the coastal region who, despite having the knowledge of the contexts, lacked adequate understanding of the culture. The current Kadhi, being a local, has created a shift from systemized adjudication to creating awareness on key issues using the pulpit. One key achievement of such engagements is the improved relationship with the mainstream Muslim scholars.

In the adjudication of cases at the grassroots level, beyond the Kadhi's reach, Muslim scholars complement his efforts. For this reason, the Kadhi's office respects and appreciates the informal work undertaken by the Muslim scholars.

Literacy on formal adjudication processes and documentation is still a key challenge that hinders more vibrant engagement between the Kadhi's office and the *ulamaa* (Muslim Scholars). The *Maslaha* system, where cases of murder and manslaughter are adjudicated, is not constitutionally within the jurisdiction of the Kadhi's office, therefore, as a judicial officer, the Kadhi cannot collaborate with the *ulamaa* on such issues.

CSOs reported a good working relationship with Islamic Relief Kenya (IRK). This is primarily due to its Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)-funded Resilience in Conflict Context program, which supports the vulnerable from conflict backgrounds to reconstruct their lives after the conflict. This gave IRK the opportunity for constant interaction with local CSOs such as youth and women's groups. Youth respondents mentioned IRK had supported them by providing trainings on entrepreneurship, advocacy, and networking.

Youth organizations form another network that is visible in some forums, but they largely lack influence in others. The County Social and Gender office maintains strong links with youth football clubs and youth-owned TVET enterprises.

The County Commissioner's office has good relationships with the clan elders and government security machinery. The clan elders have a unique way of interacting with the County Commissioner's office to influence government decisions on settlement creation, recruitment of chiefs etc. At cross-border level, the County Commissioner's office has structured monthly meetings with the Belet Hawa administration in Mandera and, sometimes, in Elwak⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ Interview with Mandera County Commissioner, Mandera, Kenya, September 23, 2022.


There is a weak relationship between religious leaders and the county De-Radicalization Department, which was formed as a complement to the Cohesion Department due to increased terror activities in the county and radicalization of youth and vulnerable groups. However, due to misconceptions on the war on terror and the government's heavy-handed measures that put the religious leaders on the periphery, the department had no direct linkages with the religious leaders. In recent times, however, there was a complete shift to a softer approach in countering violent extremism (CVE), thanks to the County Action Plan for CVE. It is under this venture, which at the time of this analysis was at its inception stage, that the De-Radicalization Department had started engaging samples of religious leaders to spearhead the religious pillar of the MCAP implementation⁴⁸.

The Mandera County Engagement Forum (MCEF) is a replica of the Mandera County Peace Actors' Forum (MCPAF), with the exclusive mandate of address P/CVE issues in the county. It was formed long after the peace actors' forum. At the time, many of the proposed MCEF members were also members of the MCPAF, and this was seen as a duplication of an ongoing effort since coordination on both security and peace could be done through the MCPAF. So, from the onset, there has been no direct linkage between the two forums and, to some extent, no linkages between the Cohesion Department and the MCEF.

The village dialogue spaces have a weak relationship with CSOs primarily due to their traditional set-up, and because few CSOs operate in Banissa. However, organizations that are members of MCPAF have had the opportunity to interact through the coordination of the MCPAF secretariat. There is also a weak relationship among cross-border peace actors, MCPAF, and the peace committees. Respondents in Baledhawa noted that a very vibrant cross-border peace network existed from 2010 to late 2013, but it is currently defunct due to lack of funds to sustain their activities. Much as there are active peace-building programs in the triangle, there has been little effort to revive this network.

⁴⁸ Interview with County Chief Officer, Mandera, Kenya, September 14, 2022.

Figure 13: Mandera County cohesion actors relationships



Livelihoods Actors

The livelihood sector is dominated by non-state actors (NSAs) who implement fund-based humanitarian programs. Even though there is some level of relationship building, livelihood actors are not strategically institutionalized. There are no tangible knowledge brokers that identify with the livelihoods component besides government ministries who lack basic connection with the local population. The disabled and disadvantaged minority communities are peripheral actors who don't take part in livelihoods programming.

The County Steering Group (CSG) is the central node primarily due to its coordination role. The CSG coordinates development programs by the government and NGOs. The platform is recognized and respected across the region as it puts into check the implementation of development programs. One commendable mandate it has is the scrutiny and approval of projects before they even commence. As such, it shares a strong and cordial relationship with development actors in the cluster. However, it has little to no jurisdiction over cross-border projects. Key development actors who are members of the platform include RACIDA, Boresha, IRK, Kenya Red Cross, and the Ministries of Water, Agriculture, and Livestock.

The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) and banks share a strong relationship as the organizations that fund the safety net program have an MOU with the banks to avoid embezzlement of funds. This has also created a quasi-relationship between the banks and the local population.

Local and cross-border traders share a strong informal relationship and collaborate to move merchandise from Somalia to Kenya and Ethiopia. Even though the border is partially closed and there has been a persistent diplomatic row between Kenya and Somalia, the networking between the traders has been continuous.

There is no active funding for people living with disabilities (PWDs) except for spontaneous assistance from the county and national government. There is a weak link between PWDs and CSOs and, to some extent, other government agencies. The Chamber of Commerce operates on its own as an independent entity. Despite its impact on the business community, it is not monitored by the CSG. This explains why most NGOs and CSOs in Mandera have weak relationships with the business community. It is essential to note that the Chamber of Commerce, despite being a business-oriented institution, does not have a direct linkage with SACCOs and VSLAs.

Figure 14: Mandera County livelihoods actors relationships





Figure 15: Mandera County NRM actors' relationships



NRM Actors

The Boresha Consortium brings together several international NGOs that deal with development projects i.e., DRC, CARE, World Vision, and Pact. These organizations initiated an extensive resilience program stretching up to Dollo Ado, Mandera, Baledhawa, and Elwak in Somalia. The CBCR Activity and World Vision have recently established a partnership for drought mitigation in the county, but the activities are yet to pick off.

Along with other actors, Boresha established the Water Sector Coordination (WESCOD), which coordinates water-related activities. All NGOs working on water programs meet frequently, especially on a need-basis to showcase to other actors what they do and to introduce any new programs. WESCOD is chaired by the Deputy Director for Water in the county government, and has a close relationship with the CSG. WESCOD occupies the core when it comes to water issues and has connectivity not only with internal actors but with the Water Resource Management Authority (WARMA), the Northern Water Works Development Agency (NWWDA), the Kenya Water Institute (KEWI), and private companies such as Davis and Shirtliff, among others.

Although NRM committees and water users' associations are present across the county, they do not coordinate their activities despite sharing similar objectives. Similarly, although farmers are key actors in the NRM sector, they are not structured as a network, and only have fractured associations and groups. Interestingly, NGOs in the NRM sector do not have adequate relationships with farmers. WESCOD does not have a relationship with the water resources users' associations (WRUAs). One respondent who represents WRUAs noted thus,

“We have made several attempts to seek support from the county government, but we are yet to receive anything. The WRA alerts if there is funding somewhere; recently we wrote proposals on gabions for Kamor and riverbank protection in Neboi and we are planning to undertake those activities. The proposals are sent to WSTF through WRA.”⁴⁹

3.7.2 Gedo Region

Social Cohesion Actors

The *Ugases* and Sultanate in Baledhawa have effective working relationships with the religious leaders and politicians in a collaboration that unites them against the Jubaland authority. However, factions of the Sultanate in Burhache (Elwak, Somalia) have cordial relationships with the Jubaland administration, primarily to protect political clan interests. The stand-off between Gedo and Jubaland is embedded in interdependent layers of clan interests within Marehan and Ogaden sub-clans.

The strong relationship between the high-level clan elders and politicians is derived from their power to anoint political leaders to both the upper and lower houses of the Federal Parliament in Somalia. In the recent elections, there was a stiff stand-off among the Marehan sub-clans on who to represent the region in parliament.

The District Commissioner, the Head of Social Affairs, and NGO coordinators are the most influential local authority officers in the three districts. They maintain relationships with the village administrators, the private sector, school heads, clan elders, religious leaders, women's groups, sport groups, and IDP camps.

⁴⁹ Interview with farmer, Mandera, Kenya, September 19, 2022.

Reconciliation Development Initiatives (RDI), a local NGO, was mentioned as a key social cohesion actor in the cluster. This is because it has implemented programmes with Pact, and is a key partner of CEWARN's Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU), Somalia. It has good CSO engagements with Women for Peace (both Belet Hawa and Mandera chapters) and Integrated Development Focus (IDF)⁵⁰. Another program mentioned in Gedo is the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) which supports youth and women empowerment activities in Baledhawa.

The Jubaland administration, Elwak administration, and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and, to some extent, the Kenyan government security machinery have a tangible working relationship. Jubaland, just like Kenya, had a diplomatic stand-off with the previous regime of President Farmajo, creating a mutual interest between the two and KDF.

Even though there is a diplomatic row between Kenya and Somalia, local administrations in Gedo and Kenya still engage in security coordination and information sharing, and hold periodic meetings to discuss issues. The aftermath of the recent election in Somalia has seen this relationship become more apparent.

Women activists work with the local administrations in Baledhawa by engaging in regional activism against the Jubaland administration. They also help in fundraising during droughts and cleaning of the town.

Diaspora communities from Gedo also have a cordial relationship with the religious leaders primarily due to their trustworthiness in handling funds raised from the diaspora to help vulnerable communities. Respondents mentioned that the local administration and elders have several times failed the accountability test and that diaspora funds are no longer entrusted with them.

One weak relation is between IGAD and local structures including women, elders, and the religious leaders. It is viewed that this is due to IGAD's lack of recognition of the local administrators and affiliation to Jubaland's stand on security matters. This explains why there is no active engagement by IGAD to resolve the current stand-off in Gedo.

⁵⁰ Antoine Mansour (2020). *Stakeholders Mapping and Analysis: Support for Effective Cooperation and Coordination of Cross-border Initiatives in South West Ethiopia-Northwest Kenya, Marsabit-Borana & Dawa, and Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia (SECCI)*. UNDP https://resilience.igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Stakeholders-mapping-and-analysis_Final-Report_Antoine-Mansour_3.2.pdf (Accessed on August 30, 2022)




Figure 16: Gedo social cohesion actors' relationships

Livelihood Actors

Overall, the livelihoods sector has a complex network. The local administrators have a stronger connectivity with inter-cluster technical working groups. Among the key organizations running livelihoods programs in Gedo are ICRC, Lifeline Gedo (LLG), DRC, World Vision, and NAPAD, all of whom have good relationships with the local administrators. SAADO and Action for Social and Economic Progress (ASEP) have active funding through the Somali Humanitarian Fund (SHF), hence they interact to complement each other on project implementation. They implement WASH and livelihood projects in Gerilley, Belet Hawa, and Garbaharey.

A review of OCHA data reveals that the network's core actors have been shifting as a result of funding availability, and the most stable actors are the UN agencies. Currently, the core organizations in the food security cluster include Active in Development Aid (ADA), the Centre for Research and Integrated Development (CERID), SCI, and NAPAD.

NRM Actors

There is a cordial relationship between CERID and local professionals in terms of getting access to courses on climate mitigation through their research center located in Baled Hawa. However, these courses are periodic and are often not recognized by other institutions. Periodic reporting on climate-related hazards by FEWSNET and WFP was mentioned by respondents. FEWSNET provides information on drought early warning information and works closely with WFP, FAO and OCHA. This information, however, does not get disseminated to the local populations.

In the WASH cluster, COOPI, DRC, Trocaire, LLG, and Zamzam Foundation are the network's core organizations working with UNICEF, the cluster lead.

There are several NRM committees and water users' committees present, but they act independently at the village level. These committees have a cordial relationship with NGOs working in humanitarian and development sectors without seeking approvals from the local administrations. This is primarily due to lack of trust between the committees and the administrations whom they accuse of embezzlement of locally contributed monies for maintaining water points and other social amenities.

Clan elders have a good relationship with the local administrations when it comes to disaster response. Similarly, sanitation groups have connections with WUCs.




Figure 17: Gedo NRM actors' relationships




Figure 18: Gedo region livelihood actors' relationships

3.7.3 Liben Region

Social Cohesion Actors

The Dollo Ado *woreda* administration and community watch groups have a good relationship. Likewise, the *kebele* is a strong security and surveillance network, and has a good working relation with the public. Due to the increasing terror attacks in Ethiopia, there are renewed frequent interactions between the *kebele* and the Dollo Ado administrations. Interviews revealed that there is networking between *kebele* constituents and *kebele* administrators in terms of collecting their views on the *woreda* plans.

The relationship between the *woreda* administrations and the communities is, however, lacking, limiting the influence of *woreda* officials. There is low community participation in *woreda* planning and development. The *woreda* and *kebele* administrations maintain direct relationships with clan elders, religious leaders, and the women's affairs office.

Key *woreda* departments such as water, livestock, and agriculture are instrumental in local planning and development. However, they have limited engagement with the communities, especially when it comes to involving them in identification of key priorities in each sector. Often, administrators notify the communities about the plans developed in offices without consulting them during the planning process⁵¹.

Overall, the *kebele* administrations are well-connected to the *woreda* and zonal administrations, but less connected among themselves. This partnership has more to do with administrative hierarchies and reporting, and less to do with lack of interest in learning from other *kebeles*.

WA-PAYDO and clan elders share a mutual relationship, where the sultanate gives advice on how and whom to engage in their program activities. However, all engagements are managed by the Ethiopian civil society regulations. Across the Liben zone, the youth are peripheral actors in NGO programs, as they have no linkages with NGOs.

The women's affairs office, a member of the *woreda* council is more active in Dollo than in Boqolmayo district since the latter was only recently established. The peace council (*Golaha Nabadda*) has weak links with Filitu zonal administration and the *woreda* administration. It is more active at the regional level and has good ties with the Somali Regional Government (SRG), and its members are appointed according to experience.

Marginalized communities such as the Reer Barre and the Guryantes lack representation in the *kebele* executive committee despite some of them having lived in the urban centers for 25-30 years⁵². The Garremaro and the Degodia are the majority clans, thus their domination of the local administration. Other minority groups such as the Dir and the Darod clans in Dollo Addo are also not adequately represented in the local administration.

The *wabar* has a close working relationship with elders in Kenya and Somalia. However, his relationship with the Garre Sultan has not been effective since the Garre-Degodia conflict heightened in 2013. Although the two clans are currently not in active conflict, bringing these two leaders to

⁵¹ Meskerem Shiferaw.(2007). *Status of Local Governance at Woreda and District Level in Ethiopia*. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1120&context=africancenter_icad_archive (accessed September 2, 2022)

⁵² Interview with key informant, Dollo Addo, Ethiopia, September 17, 2022.

collaborate in the peace-building effort has not been easy. The assessment strongly recommends such engagement can be initiated through the CBCR Activity's programming.

Livelihood Actors

UN agencies like IOM, UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR and NGOs such as SCI, CISP, DAI, NRC, RACIDA, WVI, IMC, COOPI, Mercy Corps are well connected with the *woreda* and zonal administrations. The different NGOs are also connected through information sharing and problem solving relationships in the different cluster networks, but have weaker individual connections with each other. One respondent claimed that the reputation of ZOA and DRC with the local administration was damaged due to allegations of fraud but this could not be verified⁵³.

SCI and CISP have strong relations with the *woreda* administrations and the Filitu zonal administration since they have worked in the region for a long time. SCI previously implemented the multi-donor PSNP safety net program with the Government of Ethiopia. CISP's and SCI's strong relationship with government agencies is manifested in the period it takes to finalize a launched project. While it will take other NGOs two months or more to sign a proposal agreement with the government, it takes the two INGOs only two weeks .

In the refugee sector, ARRA and UNHCR are the most active agencies. They have strong ties and linkages with the government agencies. Local NGOs working in the refugee sector include the Organization for Welfare and Development in Action (OWDA), WA-PAYDO, and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST). The *woreda* Livestock and Agriculture Bureau is closely linked with UNHCR, ARRA, OCHA, and DRM.

Farmers' cooperatives and meat cooperatives have a good relationship with UNHCR and ARRA⁵⁴. Pastoralists and animal owners also share strong links to livestock trading, and meat and milk selling cooperatives. The cooperatives are also closely connected to private sector institutions such as the Dedebit Microfinance Institution and Somali Microfinance.

The Refugee Central Committee (RCC) is a resident coordination and leadership body that is consulted on multi-sectoral issues related to the refugee camps. One of the main mandates of RCC is to oversee food distribution among the vulnerable communities. The RCC is also responsible for local resource mobilization during droughts. As such, they engage the business community who contribute to their kitty. Their main recipients are internally displaced people (IDPs) living in the camps and refugees from neighboring Somalia. They, therefore, work efficiently with IDP committees in the camps. Its membership is nominated by the clan so that there is equal representation of all communities. As such, it has a good relationship with clan structures and local administration as they represent their clan interests within the institution. This is the agency also responsible for coordinating humanitarian aid and relief distribution by NGOs.

Closely connected with the RCC are the community actors working in the refugee camps such as refugee camps, women's associations, food distribution committees, youth committees, community watch, community services women's volunteer network, and child protection committees.

⁵³ Interview with key informant, Dollo Addo, Ethiopia, October 14, 2022.

⁵⁴ Between 2011 and 2019, the IKEA Foundation, through UNHCR and the Ethiopian government, invested around \$100 USD in supporting agriculture and livelihood programmes in and around the refugee camps in Dollo Addo (Betts et al, Refugee Studies Centre, 2020). The project established a number of cooperatives involving both refugee and host communities that are well connected to UNHCR, ARRA, and the government.

NRM Actors

The National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) is the Ethiopian government agency responsible for disaster early warning and coordination. The agency has no consistent presence in the zone but is represented by other agencies. For instance, as the focal agency for camp coordination and camp management (CCCM), it is currently represented by two UN agencies i.e., UNHCR and IOM, with Action for the Needy in Ethiopia (ANE) representing the national NGOs.

Save the Environment Ethiopia (SEE) supports energy cooperatives that deal in renewable energy and has working partnerships with WA-PAYDO. SEE provides solar mini-grid installations targeting health facilities and communities in Dollo Addo (both host and refugee communities).

At the *woreda* level, the DRM is the agency responsible for coordination and collaboration among key actors in the disaster response sector. The Zonal Agriculture and Natural Resource Department has normal ties with the *woreda* administrations, the Filitu administration, and the DRM. The NGOs in the sector, such as CARE and ADRA, are predominantly connected to the *woreda* water office but also reported connections with livestock, DRM, and women's affairs offices.




Figure 19: Liben Zone livelihood actors' relationships




Figure 20: Liben zone social cohesion actors' relationships




Figure 21: Liben zone NRM actors' relationship

3.7.4 Information sharing in the cluster

Survey participants were requested to indicate how influential groups forge better connections. From the findings, 62 percent of the participants indicated that influential groups forge better connections through building trust, 69 percent indicated through exchange of information, and 50 percent indicated through participating in shared activities (fundraising and charity activities, sport teams, community venture services, and inter-departmental activities). The participants were also asked to indicate how they interacted with their network members. From the results, 83 percent of the participants indicated that they had direct interactions, while 41 percent indicated that they had interactions facilitated by leaders.

Information sharing is active across the different networks. Members shared information through meetings, social media, and reports. In certain forums, information sharing was the core business. For instance, WESCOD was described as a platform of communicating ideas, sharing information (bottom-up), and to have a shared understanding of what transpires around water issues. The Mandera County Chief Officer for the Water Department noted, *“Whatever we discuss at WESCOD, we again cascade it to CSG level. By the time it reaches the CSG we have established our internal understanding as water actors.”*⁵⁵

In Gedo region, the sub-national ICCG cluster coordination is strong, with UN agencies and INGOs taking the lead. Apart from monthly meetings, the different actors participate in inter-clan cluster joint needs assessments, and the cluster leads call for emergency meetings as necessary. There is a high level of information sharing among actors but relatively low density in terms of resource sharing.

Survey respondents were asked to indicate whether they had received information from the people that they needed to perform their work or societal roles at least twice in the last month. From the results, 80 percent of the participants indicated that they had received information at least twice a month from the person they were most connected to, 56 percent indicated from Person 2, 35 percent indicated from Person 3, 27 percent indicated from Person 4, 22 percent indicated from Person 5, 14 percent indicated from Person 6, and 10 percent indicated from Person 7.

The qualitative data suggests that there is increased periodic cross-organizational strategic information sharing across the various government departments. In Gedo region, the sub-national level ICCG regularly reported to the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and addressed issues of duplication. The frequency of contact between the ICCG and the HCT was mostly on a weekly basis, either face-to-face or virtually, but information sharing with local actors was limited. Most actors would attend a cluster coordination meeting held every two weeks in the Dollow WFP office. Unlike Kenya’s CSG technical working groups, inter-cluster coordination working groups in Somalia, such as FSNAU and cash coordination, have a sporadic sub-national presence.

Gedo region and Liben zone have the highest number of sub-national clusters present in a single operation area, compared to Mandera. In Liben zone, a monthly coordination meeting is held at the zonal level, where all the implementing partners working with the host community participate. The network of information sharing in Ethiopia was also characterized by strong ties among government agencies and I/NGOs. At the *woreda* level, the meetings at sub-cluster level are organized by a food security taskforce together with the DRM office. Actors targeting the refugee communities hold weekly meetings that are jointly organized by the cluster leads, ARRA and UNHCR.

⁵⁵ Interview with County Chief Officer, Water Department, Mandera, Kenya, September 10, 2022.

MSCF serves as a bridge between refugee and host community actors, suggesting an opportunity to support advocacy to promote host community and refugee relations. At the camp level, an inter-agency camp coordination meeting, co-chaired by ARRA and UNHCR, is held bi-weekly at the ARRA Camp Coordinator's Office.

Community actors and CBO participation is largely lacking in these forums across the three countries, and they remain at the periphery of information sharing. However, the refugee camps have organized self-governance structures, led by RCC, which meet with partners and help them address multi-sectoral camp issues. The Community Mobilization Meetings, co-chaired by ARRA and UNHCR, are held bi-weekly at the Melkadida UNHCR camp office.

In Gedo region, local authorities are also attached to their constituents, especially when considering local clan dynamics in implementation of projects and to avoid escalating issues to the regional level. A common pattern that defines participation across the three regions is that an NGO must be actively implementing a project to participate in these forums. As one key informant noted, *“Once you are implementing a project owned by a host community, it is mandatory to participate in the cluster meetings.”*⁵⁶

“Our slogan is the Somali proverb that says ‘Gacmo geel jireed hoos ayaa loo dhaqaa’ (the hands of the camel herders are washed facing downwards), meaning we resolve issues internally.”

District Officer, Gedo

The information collected by the various ministries in Mandera County is consolidated and shared with the different actors through the Mandera County executive platform, CSG forum, WESCOD, and other technical working groups. Information is also shared vertically at the Council of Governors level and during the regional Frontier Council Development Council (FCDC) meetings. At this level, county executive members (CEM) and chief officers discuss policy gaps and issues to do with their ministerial portfolio in terms of policies, regulations, and support services. Information is also regularly shared with national government agencies. For instance, the county Ministry of Water engages the national government's Ministry of Water, Sanitation, and Irrigation and agencies such as the Water Resource Authority (WRA), the Ground Water Resource Agency, the Water Sector Trust Fund, and KEWI. This demonstrates the homophilic relationship among actors and networking patterns that are heavily influenced by centralized forms of decision-making around the key priorities.

The NDMA is the main supplier of consolidated information on drought early warning information to the CSG through its monthly bulletin. However, some of the respondents were concerned that most of this information is desk review. Additionally, FEWSNET Kenya was reported as another key source of early warning information and analysis on food insecurity. As one key informant observed,


*“If there is a burning issue in terms of livestock deaths, we normally consult veterinary and livestock departments for verifications of this information for inputs. We get information from all sectors, the Met department, for instance, provides us with updates on weather forecasts and this information is consolidated and published on a monthly basis.”*⁵⁷

Study findings show that CSOs and community organizations employ more vertical engagements as compared to the government agencies. County or state governments' engagement with the community is usually top-down, even where a bottom-up process was adopted, such as when collecting their views on the County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP).

⁵⁶ Interview with key informant, Dollo, Ethiopia, October 12, 2022

⁵⁷ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 13, 2022

The information sharing platforms employed by the government when engaging the community are mostly through public *barazas*, town hall meetings, and training. According to some of the respondents, national government officials engage the community only when collecting intelligence information. At the ward and sub-county levels, information sharing was more frequent, and meetings were held either *ad hoc*, weekly, monthly, or on a quarterly basis. These meetings are initiated by chiefs, Assistant County Commissioners or ward administrators and sub-county administrators.



The County Commissioner’s office described opinion leaders as good entry points for community engagements and indicated interactions with this group happens on daily basis, sometimes weekly, fortnightly, or every two months. At the cross-border level, information sharing among governments in the triangle happens sporadically, with occasional quarterly or monthly meetings. Due to the nature of their work, some government agencies, such as the Youth and Gender Office at county and national levels, have closer community networking than other agencies. This largely revolves around an ‘advice network’ characterized by information sharing related to government policies, decisions, and action plans. The county Youth and Gender Office regularly engages the youth through face-to-face platforms, training sessions, and meetings, as well as through digital interactions on phone and WhatsApp forums. Other agencies lack such frequent interactions even with community actors that implement activities related to their mandate at the grassroots. For most community-based organizations (CBOs) and other peripheral actors, FM radios are a good platform to communicate with the community and policymakers, and to amplify their voices.

Actors such as Women for Peace share information on a need-basis and hold their meetings monthly. The religious leaders, besides using the pulpit to communicate with the community, have an internal resource network involving a morning call using Whatsapp to share updates. Mujitama WRUA has a WhatsApp forum to reach out to members and water stakeholders, and a Facebook page to engage the public and international audience. As one key informant noted, *“We do meetings on a need basis. Some of these take place either quarterly or annually. We meet as many times as possible.”*⁵⁸

For virtual spaces, WhatsApp was rated highly as one of the places where members in a certain network interacted, almost daily. With limited spaces to interconnect between the formal networks and the community, consideration can be made to include WhatsApp as a cost-effective method for communicating material relevant to the CBCR Activity, to connect informal networks shared by actors, as well as for mobilizing participation. As it was identified by 75 percent of the research participants, this is a space that is important to them.

⁵⁸ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 22, 2022.

3.8 Network Sustainability

Overall, 89 percent of survey participants indicated that they expected to gain knowledge from the network, while a significant 58 percent indicated resources, 53 percent indicated connections, and the same percent (53 percent) cited support. This suggests that reciprocity was a key element of network members' relationships. Across the three countries, government agencies and some well-established NSAs were the most sustainable institutions.

According to KII and FGD respondents, the NGO space is shrinking due to changes in donors' priorities. In this regard, a study participant from Mandera County observed,

“Devolution also has an impact, and the donors don't want to invest again where there are billions. They see from the news that Mandera is getting 11 billion, they will ask you where the 11 billion is. Devolution, donor fatigue, and change of priorities by the donors are the main causes.”⁵⁹

Most NGOs lack specialization and this affects their consistency in terms of membership in a given network. Depending on the type of funding available, NGOs move from one priority area to another, therefore, making irregular appearances in different networks.

Another key challenge affecting network sustainability is lack of learning. Previously, active programmes such as Pact's PEACE III, NIWETU's CVE program, the IGAD-FAO partnership on resilience (livelihoods support and basic social services) were successfully implemented but exited without sharing the key learnings. There is a lack of a knowledge hub that archives information that should be utilized by the primary users. An exception is OCHA which uses its website to share mission and assessment reports from the various stakeholders.

Information sharing is frequent but this tends to be ephemeral with no proper documentation. In cases where documentation is produced, such as through bulletins, there is lack of a dissemination strategy. The CBCR Activity needs to invest in an actors engagement strategy to enable it decide on appropriate levels of engagement, promote learning, and align the Activity better with long-term perspectives.

3.9 Conflict Sensitivity and Power Dynamics

3.9.1 Mandera County

Conflict in the region is centered on clan dynamics and contestation over pasture and water resources. The Dire complex, a vast grazing land in Ethiopia has been the epicentre of the Garre-Degodia conflict. For the past decade, the two clans have been engaged in a series of violent clashes over grazing lands in Ethiopia, which also had subsequent effects on the Kenyan side⁶⁰. This shows that clan networks across the borders are very strong and conflict spillovers can be experienced beyond the settlements where the disputes originate. Even though there are vibrant peace-building structures on the Kenyan side, the same is not true for Ethiopia.

Analytically, therefore, it is viewed that approaches that have so far been fruitful in Kenya could be helpful in Ethiopia as the context and conflict drivers are almost the same. In this regard, therefore, the CBCR Activity's engagements around building cohesion should cover both regions of Mandera and

⁵⁹ FGD participant, Mandera, Kenya, September 14, 2022.

⁶⁰ Interpeace (2017). *Voices of the People: Challenges to peace in Mandera*. <http://interpeace.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017-ECA-Kenia-Mandera-County-Note.pdf> (accessed on September 2, 2022)

Liben, and leverage on the structures built by previous programs i.e., village dialogue spaces and ceasefire monitoring committees.

There is an emerging conflict over devolved government resources such as political posts, recruitments into plum county positions, contracts, and development projects. In the recently concluded elections, there were clear changes in the political alliances that existed since the inception of devolved governance.

There are diminished interactions between the Garre and the Murulle clans, who clashed in the past but enjoyed a strong alliance in the last decade. Even though there is no active conflict between the two clans now, recent disputes over new settlements in Rhamu's Waldiri area, the diminishing relationship, and the oncoming boundary review create a strong prediction of looming conflict between the Garre and the Murulle clans.

Another emerging conflict trigger is the effect of climate change because of persistent droughts and mushrooming settlements which have largely depleted the scarce pasture resources. Competition over prime vegetation in Gari, Bambo, and Malkamari area has heightened clashes in those areas in recent years. There is a growing affinity towards agitating for clans to respect the colonial boundaries. Claims of ownership of community land among the Murulle, Garre, and Degodia has been rampant of late. Respondents viewed that, should this be left unresolved, there is likelihood of fresh clashes erupting between clans soon.

What this means for the CBCR Activity's resilience programming is that interventions need to be carefully crafted using a conflict-sensitive lens. Against the backdrop of a devastating drought, fresh conflict between the clans would only add salt to an already declining livelihood. As a result, there should be unique and timely engagements on preventing inter-clan conflict well before it ends up in a crisis. A unique area of engagement would be the role played by the CBCR Activity in the oncoming boundary review processes. This is because land is becoming a prime cause of conflicts, and with the unmarked boundaries and disputes surrounding several settlements in Mandera North, Lafey, and Elwak, there could be fresh clashes after the boundary review.

In terms of power dynamics, the marginalized communities are not well represented. Minority tribes, such as the 'corner tribes', were particularly mentioned as not being included in major decision-making. According to a respondent, "[The corner tribes] have been pushed to the corner and they are sitting on the fence."⁶¹ Minority clans face marginalization in accessing job opportunities and development projects. According to a youth respondent, there is a new phenomenon where minority communities are marginalized from within. While outwardly it looks like the minority communities are included into development projects since contracts are given to some gatekeepers from minority communities, the resources are confined to only a few individuals. Another form of marginalization is the diversion of development projects meant to uplift minority communities to areas dominated by larger clans as explained by one youth respondent in Mandera,

"Some economic recovery projects also don't reach some groups as implementing agencies often tend to concentrate in areas dominated by their clans. This is evident in drought response projects which tend to address urgent stress calls to starving populations, and because the few resources these agencies give cannot satisfy everyone, priority is given to who is close to the source. I also need to mention that organizations do undertake needs assessments before undertaking projects, but these assessments are sometimes corrupted to suit the self-interest

⁶¹ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 14, 2022

or clan interest. In the process, minority clans are left in the periphery since they have no influence in mainstream humanitarian agencies. For instance, we have seen cases where health facilities were allocated to areas dominated by minority clans diverted to less deserving areas."⁶²

Respondents also mentioned the exclusion of certain areas such as Lafey and Elwak North due to “insecurity” tags and automatic obstruction of their residents from accessing development projects. In terms of funding for CSOs, cases of selective funding for specific organizations due to their connection with donors was cited. This leads to relatively weaker organizations getting access to funding at the expense of more vibrant and active organizations.

While the CBCR Activity’s local partnerships are yet to take root, CSO actors are watching to see how these partnerships will be dispensed. The same can be said for the county government, where multiple respondents argued that there is lack of transparency in dispensing projects. In the words of one respondent:

*“There is no transparency. Favoritism and corruption are rampant, which doesn’t consider the ones in need or deserving of support. The county government has tree planting activities, but they only engage groups with no environmental vision. The contracts for such works are issued to friends and cronies without consideration. I once came up with a program of making charcoal briquettes but was not supported by the county government. Sometimes a contract for tree nursery development is awarded to a person who ends up planting just 2-3 trees and does it for monetary gain only.”*⁶³

There is mushrooming of settlements with the primary intent of channeling projects to new areas by constructing water tanks and roads. Mandera has shown an old, yet equally worrying, trend where settlements are created to primarily influence the boundary delimitation. With new sub-counties on board, politicians will be tempted to hijack the process to suit their clan interests. This, if not managed, might trigger conflict between clans.




Figure 22: Conflict Map for Mandera (ABC Model)

⁶² Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 9, 2022.

⁶³ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 22, 2022.

Transparency in resource allocation is a key concern in the county. Some of the respondents in Mandera gave a new perspective of where indirect marginalization is perpetuated by supporting political gatekeepers who serve the interest of politicians. Whereas the politicians and elders were mainly mentioned as the power brokers, the *ulamaa* (religious leaders), and women were mentioned as the brokers and carriers of peace, and backyard influencers.

Al-Shabaab plays a central role in disrupting peace and security in the county. Even though there is a decreased number of terror attacks, there is a high influx of Al-Shabaab due to a serious backlash the group is facing in Somalia and Ethiopia. As one study participant posed, “*Your analysis can identify and exhaust the relationships between normal networks, but how will you define Al-Shabaab network, which I presume is equally strong in the county?*”⁶⁴

The youth in the county are peripheral actors who are externally exploited by clan elders, politicians, and other groups. There is no structured youth network besides some amorphous groups such as Mandera Got Talent, Mandera Vital Voices Network, Safe Mandera Network, youth football clubs, and other youth groups. These groups are not connected and do not share a common goal or values. A youth parliament that was formed in 2014 has never seen the light of the day after a serious conflict erupted, making it disintegrate. The youth football teams engage in friendly football teams across borders. However, this is not a structured engagement and getting from Balet Hawa to Mandera takes time as they undergo vigorous security screening.

Generally, the youth across the cluster are not united and there are many youth groups competing against each other. This has made them become peripheral actors in all spheres. There is also a worrying trend where the youth have formed clan enclaves and form football groups using their clan identity. Thus, subsequent differences among the clans also affects the few structured and focused groups among the youth.

3.9.2 Gedo Region

Gedo administration is at loggerheads with the Jubaland state administration, which has reduced engagement between the two levels of governments. Control over Jubaland, Somalia's economic hub, has been, and will probably continue to be, a contentious issue. Due to its extensive seasonal rainfall, lush farmlands, and potential for enormous offshore oil and gas deposits, Somalia's southernmost region has the potential to be one of its wealthiest. One of the biggest cities in Somalia and a highly desired asset is its port, Kismayo⁶⁵.

The rift is widening, with recent clashes in Duyagaroon in Gerilley leading to the death of one person from the Ogaden clan. Respondents have recommended that the IGAD liaison office in Mandera, which is newly established, could be used to bridge the differences between the two administrations.

Intra-Marehan conflict is also resurfacing in Gerilley and Elwak between the Urmidig and Talha. The two groups previously experienced devastating conflict between them primarily due to a power struggle, which is further exacerbated by the politics in Gedo and Jubaland. It is alleged that the Rer Hassan, who are strong political actors in Marehan, have largely moved to Elwak, Somalia, making the local Urmidig and Talha clans feel outnumbered. There are no clear symptoms of a looming conflict, but the pre-existing structural issues have never been addressed.

⁶⁴ Participant, SNA validation workshop, Mandera, Kenya, October 6, 2022.

⁶⁵ Crisis Group Africa.(2020). *Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia*. Briefing N°158, Pg 3 <https://libguides.murdoch.edu.au/APA/internet> (accessed September 2, 2022).

3.9.3 Liben Zone

For the past three years, the Liben zone has been generally peaceful, with lesser disputes emerging over water resources. Previous conflicts between the Garre and Degodia in Filtu and its environs over precious pastures originated in the Dire, Liben, and Dawa zones, and had severe consequences in Kenya. Dawa and Liben zones are primarily populated by pastoralist populations whose livelihoods are based on animal products.

Whereas the Garre predominate in the Dawa Zone, the Degodia predominate in the Liben Zone. The River Daua separates the two zones and serves as a marginal boundary between the two clans⁶⁶. The two sub clans have long had cordial relations and social-cultural interdependence. However, their relations have been affected by a decade-long conflict that has raged since 2010. Although the exact cause of this conflict has yet to be determined, contestation over grazing lands and farm ownership formed the foundation of their dispute.

Degodia pastoralists have long lived in Dawa's Malka Wiila and Malka Mari villages, which have fertile arable land suitable for camel herding. When the Garre created Mubarak *woreda* in order to have the Dawa zone officially recognized by the government, it sparked a massive outcry from the Degodia. Subsequent efforts to collect taxes by the Garre administrators were met with outright resistance from the Degodia, with the claim that they are governed under the Liben zone. Revenge killings and retaliations across the Kenyan border exacerbated the situation⁶⁷. The Ethiopian government introduced a policy of promoting sedentary agriculture in a quest to quell the disputes over the farms, affecting pastoral mobility and leading to more Degodia pastoralists from Kenya joining the conflict.

Over the last three years, however, the relationship between these two clans has been quite good, even though the power dynamics between them are still shaky. This is a positive sign for effective CBCR Activity resilience programming. Because contestation over farmlands in Dawa and Liben zones was at the core of their previous conflicts, investing in a collective agricultural development project as a peace dividend is deemed necessary.

There were fewer mentions of intra-Degodia conflict in Ethiopia, which can also be resolved through engagements with the *wabar* (Degodia king) in Ethiopia. The region has also experienced terror attacks by Al-Shabaab in recent months, a phenomenon that has been very rare in Ethiopia.

3.10 Cross-Border Dynamics

In general, it was found that, aside from infrequent need-based engagements, cross-border interactions and engagements among cross-border actors have ceased throughout the years due to weak networks. This is attributed to lack of coordination and some institutions becoming dysfunctional, primarily due to financing lapses. This has caused the information flow to not be reciprocal.

After a period of sour diplomatic relations between Somalia and Kenya, inter-governmental relations between the two countries are gradually returning to normal. Whereas Kenyan officials stated that the Kenya-Somalia border is now partially open, and the customs operating normally, the communities claim that things are still the same and informal routes are still widely used. Some essential institutions, such as the immigration and custom departments, have not been activated. The border closure and the harassing of traders across the borders affects their livelihoods, which subsequently affects resilience

⁶⁶ FGD Participant, Banissa, Kenya, September 17, 2022.

⁶⁷ Interview with key informant, Dollo, Ethiopia, September 18, 2022.

within the communities. It was reported that IOM and the Border Committee conducted a session for the business community and custom officers to foster communication.

However, with all that in place, various goods from Mogadishu always find their way to Mandera markets. Recently, high inflation rates have been experienced across the borders after Al-Shabaab deliberately cut supply lines from Mogadishu through high taxation. The only possibility for goods to reach the distribution lines in Mandera and Suftu, therefore, was through Wajale in Somalia. The implication this has for the CBCR Activity’s resilience programming is determining whether the project can play a catalyst role in fast tracking regional development programs such as the Northern Corridor and LAPPSET, among others. What this means is that there is dire need to engage in a multifaceted improvement in the relationships between local livelihood actors, decision makers, and the influencers at the track one level.

The Mandera County Government's sewer project is another issue that can cause strife in the triangle. The project, which the national government is funding with assistance from the African Development Bank (AfDB) to the tune of KES 1 billion (US \$ 8.8 million), may lead to a dispute over transboundary water use between Kenya and Ethiopia. The river, which serves as a physical barrier between the two nations, is not far from where the sewer pans are situated, and it is anticipated that the waste will flow into the river. Populations from both ends are encroaching more upstream, raising concerns that the scarce supply may be exhausted. According to one key informant, *“The Ethiopians will tell you don’t tap a lot of the water because you will end up depleting the resource shared. The rate at which Kenyans are tapping is more than that of Ethiopians.”*⁶⁸


The role of IGAD in advancing transboundary water governance and cooperation, and facilitating joint dialogue was emphasized by the stakeholders interviewed. The CBCR Activity can act as a catalyst to open communication and enhance the capabilities of government players in the governance of transboundary waters.

In its 2050 Water Use Plan, the Mandera County Government is also taking into account the population of the nearby border towns of Suftu and Belet Hawa. Every day, people from the three communities travel to Mandera to look for work, do business, or visit their blood relations, thereby increasing the consumption of water. This is based on a demand analysis of water use as a crucial, shared natural resource across the borders.

3.11 CBCR Indicators

3.11.1 Awareness of USG-funded food security and livelihoods initiatives

According to the survey results, 78 percent, 69.7 percent, and 53.8 percent of participants from Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, respectively, were aware of United States Government (USG)-funded food security programs in their areas. Participants who indicated that they were aware of USG-funded food security programs in their areas were also requested to specify the agency, NGO, or government ministry implementing the program. The most popular organization among the participants was WFP, followed by SCI, and other UN agencies.



⁶⁸ Interview with key informant, Mandera, Kenya, September 9, 2022.

KII and FGD respondents mentioned that there are many donor projects in the cluster but could not verify if these were funded by USG. In Ethiopia, the flagship PSNSP national safety net, implemented by SCI and the government in Liben zone, was commonly identified as a USG-supported initiative. Similarly in Kenya, participants identified a cash transfer program implemented by RACIDA.

3.11.2 Access to socio-economic and political resources and opportunities awareness of program with USG assistance

From the survey results, 15 percent of the participants indicated that they were aware about a project or program with USG assistance meant to support male and female equal access to social, economic, and political resources and opportunities, while 85 percent indicated otherwise. Specifically, 14.6 percent, 15.2 percent, and 15.4 percent of the participants from Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, respectively, were aware about a project or program with USG assistance meant to support male and female equal access to social, economic, and political resources, and opportunities.

3.11.3 Current relationships between women and men

The participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with various statements regarding current relationships between women and men. From the results, 49 percent of the participants agreed that women and men have equal control over production and distribution of resources, while 28 percent disagreed. In addition, 52 percent of the participants indicated that women and men participate equally in decision-making at all levels, including household and community level. In addition, 52 percent of the participants agreed that women's and men's material needs (food, income, healthcare, etc) are equally met, while 28 percent disagreed.

The results also show that 48 percent of the participants agreed that women get access to resources (land, labour, credit, training, public services, and civic and legal rights) on an equal basis with men, while 38 percent disagreed.

3.11.4 Groups And Institutions Strengthening Resilience

The participants were asked to indicate the groups or institutions that are strengthening or building community resilience. From the results, 73 percent of the participants indicated that the institutions strengthening or building community resilience were I/NGOs, 46 percent indicated the county/state government, 44 percent indicated national/federal government agencies, 36 percent indicated drought management authorities, 35 percent indicated local peace committees, 35 percent indicated women's organizations, 34 percent indicated youth organizations, 29 percent indicated the private sector, 27 percent indicated CBOs, 17 percent indicated district steering groups, 17 percent indicated farmers' associations, 9 percent indicated SMEs, and 6 percent indicated local CMDRR committees.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a research method that has never been used in the area, hence this research establishes a distinctive precedent. There is still more to be discovered and studied regarding the dynamics of relationships among the actors and changes in the network. It is necessary to measure long- and short-term changes in the networks through mid-term and end line SNA studies.

Informal networks are dispersed over the area and, despite having little overall influence, they have a considerable impact in their own right. The findings in this report reveal several interconnected and independent networks throughout the target areas, but they also reveal weaker links with government administrations and agencies. Even if structural problems, financing shortages, and unsustainable engagements are major obstacles, non-state actors' actions are coordinated to some extent throughout the three regions.

While elders and religious leaders have significant influence in negotiating for political space, mediating conflicts, and mobilizing humanitarian relief, they are not formally organized and do not have a shared strategic goal.

4.1 Recommendations

Networking and Influence

- Kenya has significant sector networking that Ethiopia and Somalia could adopt, largely due to some organizations not actively participating in their networks. In order to create a more collaborative system where organizations within the sector have a common vision, goals, and strategies for carrying out their programs, networking must go beyond the coordination of projects to learning and developing awareness, local buy-in, and sustainability of social cohesion, NRM, and livelihoods initiatives in the cluster. There is a need to facilitate learning trips between actors in the cluster so that measures that worked in Kenya can be replicated in Somalia and Ethiopia.

Relationships among Actors

- There is a need to develop engagements that provide the youth across the cluster with a more central, decision-making role in community interactions. The most practical youth networks that can communicate across borders are football teams. However, they need to be regionally organized, their activities supported, and connections made with other stakeholders. Overall, relationships among actors follow a similar pattern guided by service provision and minimizing duplication. There is a need to extend to coordination and collaboration to continuous capacity building of local actors, localization of aid, and institutional strengthening.

Information Sharing and Network Sustainability

- It was noted, particularly in Mandera, that all coordination platforms i.e., CSG, MCEF, MCPAF, have WhatsApp groups where they share information and discuss issues. This can be revamped into a live report and response platform to widely engage diverse actors.
- The networks have good overall connectivity and information exchange, but there are no venues for interacting and sharing information with local organizations and peripheral actors. There is a need to identify information sharing and dissemination practices that can ensure information flow is seamless. An effective communication strategy for engaging organizations that have a role in the different sectors but lack the resources to be fully engaged is also needed. WhatsApp forums, which were adopted by existing coordination platforms, can be revamped into a

systematic feedback and response mechanism using GIS (Geographic Information System) and related technology.

- The IGAD CEWARN program should be urged to support the revival and reconstitution of the DPCs.

Conflict and Power Dynamics

- The Activity must consider marginalized communities' involvement and their representation when engaging the communities, particularly in the Liben zone. The community leaders should be involved in this to guarantee that beneficiaries are targeted fairly. The boundary delimitation in Kenya is a ticking bomb that should be programmatically addressed to avoid recurrence of inter-clan conflict in Mandera. Creating a working relationship between the *Wabar* (Degodia king) and Garre Sultan is essential in subsequent CBCR Activity programming to quell inter-clan tensions in Ethiopia.

Cross-border Collaboration

- Cross-border engagements have largely halted due to lapses in funding. Thus, it is prudent to have sustainable cross-border engagements while building increased dependability among actors for regular interaction and engagements. For example, this could be by establishing a more active and transparent border management system, reviving the dead cross-border networks, and establishing sector response units.

4.2 Key areas of programming/ potential activities

- a. Capacity assessments of existing networks and coordination platforms to analyze their programmatic and policy gaps.
- b. Capacity development trainings for all networks for institutional development and collaboration between actors.
- c. Meetings to reinvigorate cross-border networks and to develop strategies for sustainable cross-border engagements.
- d. Activities to initiate inter-administration structured coordination meetings between the office of the County Commissioner, Mandera, the Balet Hawa administration, and the Dollo administration to discuss security challenges.
- e. Meetings to reach out to peripheral actors such as the youth, casual laborers, farmers, cooperatives, and the business community in order to understand their networking needs and strengthen their collective engagements.
- f. Cross-border transboundary water governance and cooperation meetings between Kenya and Ethiopia involving IGAD, government representatives, water stakeholders, with local development organizations (LDOs) taking a lead role.
- g. Youth and local authorities capacity building sessions, and consultation forums in Liben zone.
- h. Policy advocacy on cross-border taxation regimes and trade incentives for livestock traders, women traders, and general merchants.
- i. Create a network to link research partners to networks and academic institutions, engage them in regional development initiatives, and make sure they serve as knowledge centers.
- j. Engagement between Degodia *Wabar* and the Garre Sultan to promote inter-communal harmony and dialogue.